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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the nature and progress
of Russo-American relations. The study addresses two principal questions.
Why, at the end of the nineteenth century, did the long Russo-American
friendship turn into a bitter rivalry? Why was Manchuria prized sufficiently
by each to risk jeopardizing this friendship? In answering these questions
an attempt is made to view the relationship from both the Russian and
American standpoints, since the actions of one, whether economic, political
or military, frequently prompted counter-moves from the other.
To obtain a broad perspective the whole century is included. It
was over this entire time frame that the relationship first flourished and
then quickly withered. Attention is centered on Northeast Asia, for it
was in that region that Russian-American interactions were most numerous and
where the expansionist drives of both nations finally intersected. The
study traces how the geographic gap was gradually bridged across the North
Pacific.
Throughout the century these interactions stemmed primarily from
the initiatives of private individuals and businesses--fur hunters, whalers,
merchants and entrepreneurs. Consideration of these private contacts and
the process through which the two governments were slowly drawn into confrontation provides one of the underlying themes explaining the estrangement.
In order to understand the historic foundations of the amicable
relations, attention is directed at the high degree of cooperation displayed
during the 1850s and 1860s. Highlighted are the circumstances surrounding
the benevolent neutrality exhibited toward Russia during the Crimean War and
Russia's reciprocation during the American Civil War. Although both governments were drawn more deeply into the affairs of Northeast Asia, the results
at mid-century seemed mutually beneficial. Russia acquired the Amur region,
and the United States was permitted to purchase Alaska.
By contrast, examination of the escalating events of the 1890s--the
political turmoil in Korea, the construction of Russia's Siberian railroad,
the defeat of China by Japan, the subsequent diplomatic successes of Russia
and the projec.t.i.on of American seapower into the Far East--reveals heightened
competition between Russia and the United States and deteriorating relations.
The Russian advance into Hanchuria, which appeared about to frustrate
America's own last opportunity to gain a foothold in Northeast Asia, was
viewed with particular concern.
The study concludes with an outline of the pressures placed on the
McKinley administration to safeguard American interests in Manchuria and an
analysis of the procedures adopted. The policy promulgated by the first open
door notes is shown to have been a tactic designed primarily to chec~ Russian
expansion into Manchuria. American insistence on an open door policy and
Russian resistance to it brought to a close the long period of previously
unquestioned friendship.
vii
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INTRODUCTION

At the outset, my intentions for this dissertation were to
examine the general question of why, toward the end of the nineteenth
century, had Russia and the United States,
friendship, become unfriendly rivals?
ment?

aft~r

a long tradition of

What had caused this estrange-

The more recent and dramatic shift from Grand Alliance to Cold

War undoubtedly stimulated my curiosity in this similar, if less
spectacular transformation some fifty years earlier.

I found that many

accomplished historians, whose interest may also have been piqued by
the contemporary Soviet-American power str.uggle, had already examined
various aspects of previous Russian-American relations.

Yet none of

these historical studies addressed either this particular'"question or
answered it completely to my satisfaction.
When the basic question was raised at all, a
to agree with Edward Zabriskie.

~onsensus

seemed

In his American-Russian Rivalry 1895-

1914, Zabriskie includes a valuable and comprehensive review of the
diplomatic exchanges which characterized the latter stages of the rivalry,
but does not overly concern himself with searching for the basic causes.
To him, and to many others, the rivalry occurred rather suddenly as
the "result of the economic competition in Manchuria which began as
early as 1895." 1

This succinct answer, while having much to offer,

spawned in my mind a whole host of nagging secondary questions.

Why

was relatively remote Manchuria suddenly considered of such vital economic
concern to both Russia and the United States asto risk the disruption
2
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3

of a previously cordial relationship?

·Why was the United States more

upset by the Russian expansion into Manchuria than it had been with
the Russian advances into Central Asia, the Amur basin, the Maritime
provinces or Sakhalin Island?

Why had not the United States concentrated

on the far larger commercial markets in South and Central China, particularly along those coastal regions opposite its newly acquired entrepot
in the Philippine Islands?

Why had not the United States taken equal

exception to the growing German, English, French and Japanese spheres
of influence in China?

In its search for markets why was the United

States not equally concerned about the Russian market in general and
the Asiatic Russian market in particular?

For its part, why was Russia

so reluctant to concede an open door policy in Manchuria?

And so on.

My first inclination, much like Zabriskie, had been to examine,
in detail, the Russian-American relationships during the period between
the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War.

But to answer

these questions at all adequately, I felt compelled to reappraise the
earlier basis for friendship and search for the roots of the rivalry.
This necessitated broadening the scope of the investigation in several
directions.

First, the period under investigation was extended backward

to include the entire nineteenth century.

This, in turn, resulted in

expanding the geographical area of interest to all of Northeast Asia
and to include extra-governmental relationships as well.
Charles Stewart Todd, a Kentucky politician and businessman,
expressed a commonly held belief regarding the foundation of the RussianAmerican friendship.

Having returned from serving four years as the

United States minister to St. Petersburg, Todd declared in 1846 that
Russia and the United States "are destined to be. the best of neighbors,
because they are so far off." 2

At mid-century most Americans and
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Russians probably agreed with Todd.

If they thought of Russia at all,

Americans generally viewed the northern empire from a single perspective.
To them, Russia was remotely located eastward, beyond the North Atlantic.
The established European states lay in between, acting as a barrier
to direct contact and any possibility of a clash of interests between
the two nations.

Russia and the United States, each as expanding powers,

could grow in strength on their own continent, isolated from one another
and, therefore, remain in amicable harmony.

Yet across the far distances

of the North Pacific, and at first largely ignored in St. Petersburg
and in Washington, Americans by mid-century had long been in vigorous
and direct contact with Russian subjects and were, on occasion, actually
encroaching on Russian-claimed territory-.

In most respects, as James

Field has argued, the United States may have had an Atlantic orientation, but the main approach to Russia was across the North Pacific to
Siberia. 3

It was in the Pacific that the safe separation of the two

powers was narrowed and put at risk.
As has been emphasized by such historians as Richard Van Alstyne
and Walter LaFeber, the United States did not suddenly or unconsciously
embark on an overseas expansionist path in the 1890's. 4

The climax

of imperialism at the end of the century was not an accident or an
aberration, but can only be understood in the context of American
activity during earlier decades.

The same holds true in attempting

to understand the shift in Russian-American relations.

While Van

Alstyne and LaFeber gave manifold examples of early American interest
in the Caribbean, Hawaii and East Asia, they could as readily have
included similar manifestations of Americans confronting Russians in
Northeast Asia which preceded and set the stage for the enunciation
of the "open door" policy.
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Howard Kushner,

.~n

his Conflict on the Northwest Coast, and

others have described the considerable interaction between the "Boston
men" a:td the employees of the Russian-American Company. 5

But the con-

flict was not confined to the Northwest coast of North America.

It

extended, early in the century, to the very shores of Asiatic Russia.
Americans came there in increasing numbers.

Merchants set up shop

on Kamchatka and at the mouth of the Amur.

Whalers swarmed into the

Okhotsk Sea and made themselves at home on the beaches.

Naval sur-

veyors charted Siberia's coastal waters for safe passages and searched
for coal deposits ashore on Russian territory.

Unfortunately, only

a relatively few scattered and sketchy accounts are available upon
which to judge the extent of this interaction.

For every John Ledyard,

Peter Dobell, John D'Holf or William Collins, there were hundreds of
other Americans who ventured into Northeast Asia, but left no record.
Nevertheless, these trans-Pacific pioneers widened the knowledge of
Northeast Asia in American circles and gradually set the stage for
later events.

Their impact on Russia was even greater, as can be

seen from such Russian sources as Semon B. Okun's The Russian-American
Company and P. A. Tikhmenev's A History of the Russian-American Company. 6
They present additional details concerning the American presence on
Russian soil and the Russian reactions to these incursions.

Such

conflicts that did arise from these early Russian-American confrontations rarely involved the two governments, both of which largely maintained a "hands-off" policy regarding the actions of their citizens in
these remote regions.

And, since Asiatic Russia frequently depended

on American seaborne commerce, a degree of cooperation was usually
maintained that enhanced the traditional friendship.

Yearly, however,

the gulf between the Russian empire and the North American republic
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was being bridged by these extra-governmental contacts and the prime
basis for the friendship was eroding.

By 1895 the American minister

to Russia recognized the transition which had long been taking place
and was warning that while "under old conditions we !."<ever came into
contact

under modern conditions we are" and that "the diffi-

culties increase of honorably maintaining that friendly relationship
which was formerly never put to the test." 7
As the century progressed, two trends materialized.
L;.e focus of Russian-American

First,

interaction shifted across the Pacific

from Alaska to Kamchatka and thence southward to the Okhotsk Sea to
the Amur basin and finally to Manchuria.

The rivalry in Manchuria

was but the latest of a whole series of Russian-American confrontations
in the region which had led to both cooperation and to competition.
By the end of the century both nations still had interests which
extended beyond the confines of Manchuria.

And while the status of

Manchuria had become the chief immediate issue, the stakes were
greater than just the commerce of Manchuria.

The perceptions of both

protagonists were shaped by what had already transpired between them.
Manchuria was seen as the key toward domination of not only Northeast
Asia, but perhaps of the rest of Asia and the North Pacific as well.
Second, the official governments began to play an increasingly
active and continuous role in the region.

In previous decades, both

conflicts and agreements were primarily among
businesses.

priva~e

individuals or

The two governments intervened only sporadically and

even then, because of slow communications, allowed the official on
the scene a relatively free hand.

At the end of the century, first

the Russian government and then the United States, largely at the
urging of the private groups concerned, decided to accept more direct
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involvement.

By the time the rivalry reached the Manchurian phase

it had turned into a government-to-government affair and, therefore,
of more significance than previous encounters.
In attempting to reconstruct some pattern in the earlier
decades of Russian-American contact across the Pacific, I was struck
by the degree of sensitivity which the countrymen of each nation
exhibited toward the activities of the other.
Americans reacted and vice versa.

When Russians acted,

When one group became successful

at exploiting fur hunting or whaling, the other followed suit.

When

one opened up new territory, whether it was the Amur or Japan or
Korea, the other was right behind.

When American influence in Asiatic

Russia appeared threatening, Russia tightened centralized control
and encouraged more Russian settlers.

When Russia constructed the

Siberian railroad, Americans dreamed of an integrated transportation
system connecting the West Coast with all of Asia.

Neither could

star.d by and let the other have a free hand in Manchuria so their
interests intersected.
To view these interactions as completely and as objectively
as possible, it was necessary to look at the relations in Northeast
Asia from the vantage point of both Russia and the United States.
This was not always possible to accomplish evenhandedly, given the
imbalance of reference material readily available, but an attempt
was made.

The work of B. A. Romanov and Andrew Malozemoff, although

chiefly concerned with events le?.ding up to the Russo-Japanese War,
cited many Russian documents and provided very useful background
and motivation for the Russian expansion into Manchuria. 8

These,

together with clippings from Russian newspapers forwarded by the
American embassy, published selections from the Red Archives and a
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scattering of other Russian documents, provided a rewarding, if
limited glimpse of the Russian-held image of America.

Ironically,

the Russian authorities were, in many respects, earlier and more
closely attuned to the consequences of the trans-Pacific activities
of the American

pione~rs

than Washington officialdom.

At an early

stage they had extrapolated from the American advance to the West
Coast and Alaska, gauged the effect of an unchecked American destiny
in Asiatic Russia, and taken measures to prevent too mcch infiltration.
The changes in American attitudes toward Russia were more
easily traced in newspaper and magazine articles.

These attitudes,

particularly toward the end of the century were affected by more than
the rivalry in Northeast Asia.

They also reflected disapproval of

what would be termed today a lack of Russian concern for human rights.
It had long been recognized that the traditional friendship existed
between the two countries, despite diametrically opposed political
and social systems.

At century's end, improved communications,

greater travel to Russia, and the influx of Russian immigrants to the
United States made it far more difficult to ignore these differences.
Thomas A. Bailey and William A. Williams, in their general explications
of Russian-American relations have included much of the material which
caused a worsening opinion of Russia by Americans. 9

To be balanced,

the contemporary Russian criticism of American lynchings, materialism
and corruption would have to be included.

I have avoided the issue

of this propaganda and counter-propaganda, except as it affected the
major power alignments in Asia.

For example, at mid-century Americans

seemed to accept Russian expansion as a beneficial spreading of European
civilization.

Later, they were more concerned that the sweep of

Anglo-American democratic civilization would be stemmed by Slavic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
autocratic militarism.

This change in attitude I considered a signi-

ficant factor impinging on relations in Northeast Asia.
Which raises the point of the Anglo-American rapprochement
toward the end of the century.

Unlike William L. Langer, in his The

Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, I have not attempted to untangle
the whole skein of international relations surrounding Northeast
Asia. 10

Instead, a strenuous effort has been made to filter out only

those threads connecting Russia and America.

But Anglo-American

relations cannot be entirely excluded, for another firm basis for the
Russian-American friendship, aside from the great geographical separation, had always been a shared antipathy toward the international
policies of Great Britain.

Th~

growing American rapprochement with

England toward the end of the century could be considered as a cause
for the weakening bond with Russia.

Or, taking a slightly different

view, the more intense rivalry with Russia may have led the United
States to seek closer ties with Great Britain.

In either case,

Anglo-American relations could not be considered entirely extraneous.
Next, I was not convinced that the rtllalry was determined
solely, or even principally, by economic motives.

That material

interests strongly influenced Russian-American relations in Northeast
Asia is well documented in such studies as those by Charles Campbell,
Thomas McCormick and Marilyn Young, as well as all the various sources
that dealt with the work of Sergei Witte as Russia's finance minister. 11
But most of these studies are weighted heavily in favor of historical
materialism.

It is relatively simple to comprehend and explain the

finite terms of economic measurement, to tabulate the number of cotton
sheetings exported to Manchuria, or to compare the dollar values of
kerosene exports.

Far more formidable is the task of gauging such
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psycholo;ical motives as the search for glory, the sense of mission,
or the drive for power.

Moreover, economic motives were often, at

least by Americans, articulated as rationalizations to mask what
were considered to be less respectable imperialistic motives.

Such

rationalizations cropped up throughout the century in the words of
Aaron Palmer, Matthew Perry, WilliHm Seward, the Adams brothers, and
the publicists of the Ataerican Asiatic Association, to cite a few
examples.

I have attempted, not necessarily successfully, to offer

at least some hints of these other underlying motives which drove
Americans to Russia's back door.
Finally, the enunciation of the "open door" policy by the
United States in 1899 was taken as an appropriate event en which to
conclude.

The relations between the United States and Russia were

to worsen in subsequent years, but that would have little bearing
on the origins of the quarrel.

The diplomatic efforts in formulating

and seeking agreement with its open door policy was the first overt
manifestation of the American government's intense distrust of
Russian aims.

The gauntlet had been thrown and the Russian

government knew it was being forced to respond and openly declare its
intentions.

The sequence of events leading up to the reluctant and

limited acceptance of the "open door" policy has been amply constructed
by such historians as A. Whitney Griswold, Tyler Dennett, Alfred L. P.
Dennis and Paul Varg. 12

My approach differs in only one respect.

The prism I have held up to the "open door" sequence filtered out all
but a concentrated Russian-American pattern.

From this pattern I have

concluded that the American policy was deliberately designed as a
check on further expansion of Russia into Manchuria and that the
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Russian government was fully cognizant of American intentions.

The

"open door" policy was the culmination of a century of confrontation
in Northeast Asia and the final acknowledgment that the traditional
friendship was at an end.
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CHAPTER I
FUR TRADING

The Russian-American confrontation in the Pacific Northwest,
which culminated in the sale of Alaska to the United States, has been
well chronicled. 1

Because it was on a much smaller scale at first,

the history of the American interests across the Pacific, which converged with Russian positions in Siberia, is less well known.

These

early American enterprises in Northeast Asia cannot be studied in
complete isolation from events along the Northwest coast.

Until 1867,

Russian-America provided a backdrop and rationale for the ambitions
and expansionist drives of both the Russians and the Americans in
the Pacific.

Only occasionally during the first quarter century

did their activity overlap in Asiatic Russia, and when it did, received little, if any, official notice in the United States.

The

imperial government and the officials of the Russian-American Company,
however, scrutinized closely the few American incursions on their
Asiatic shores.

These early interactions can largely be summed up

by examining the experiences of four Americans--John Ledyard, John
D'Wolf, Peter Dobell and William Pigot.

Among them, they had the

distinction of travelling overland across Siberia and European Russia
a total of six, and almost seven, times.

Although three of them kept

journals of their travels, only Ledyard, the man who did not complete
his trans-Siberian travels, has achieved any lasting renown in the

14
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United States.
ship

~aptains,

Nevertheless, these four, plus the other American
who left no record of similar voyages to Siberia, were

every bit as much the pathfinding pioneers to Northeast Asia as the
"mountain men" were in finding ways to cross the Rockies.

And these

early pioneers did leave lasting impressions in Russia which shaped
Russian attitudes and policies

in the region.

The first conirontation took place August 18, 1787 in Irkutsk,
the provincial capital of Siberia, between John Ledyard, itinerant
American traveller, and Grigorii Shelikhov, a leading Russian fur
merchant.

Shelikhov had only recently returned to Irkutsk from a

three year voyage in the North Pacific, during which he had founded
the first Russian settlement on Kodiak Island.

This settlement

formed the nucleus around which Russian-America later expanded.
Shelikhov had conceived of broad plans to assimilate the Kuriles, the
Aleutians and regions of North America into the Russian empire and
to develop commerce with China,
America and the Amur region.

Japan, the Philippines, Spanish-

As a first step in carrying out these

projects, Shelikhov and his associates were busily engaged in persuading Siberian Governor-General Yakobi to endorse their petition
to the imperial government for exclusive monopolistic rights to fur
trading in the new territories and for measures "to discourage those
who might have pretensions in those parts, and to stop the encroachment
of other nations." 2
While attending to these ambitious pursuits, Shelikhov must
have been disconcerted to meet, deep in Central Siberia, Ledyard,
a man who definitely harbored such pretensions.

Though nominally

interested in natural history and anthropological researches, Ledyard
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seemad chiefly to seek information about Russian discoveries in eastern
!:iberia and Northwest America.

Ledyard himself had some first-hand

knowledge of the North Pacific and eagerly sought more.

As a corporal

of marines, Ledyard had been a member of Cook's third voyage of
exploration.

During the course of that expedition, Ledyard was set

ashore to scout around Unalaska in order to determine whether any
Europeans had preceded them to the Aleutian Islands.
Aleuts, he made the two-day
camp.

~.ourney

Guided by two

inland, arriving at night at a

Ledyard recordeu this fiLst encounter with Russians.

To my joy and surprise I discovered that the two men who held
me by each arm were two Europeans, fair and comely, and
concluded from their appearance they were Russians, which
I soon after found to be true.3
During,. his time in the Cook expedition, Ledyard also learned
valuable geographic information.

He spent several months in Kamchatka

when his ship twice visited Avacha Bay near Petropavlovsk.

It was

during these stays that Ledyard gained a sense of how the Russians
had established commercial and communication connections

r:~etching

from St. Petersburg via Okhotsk and Kamchatka at least as far as
Unalaska.

Without this insight, it is doubtful whether even the

intrepid Ledyard would have imagined a west-to-east passage through
Russia to America.
Most important, Ledyard learned, along with the others of
Cook's crew, what it was that had brought the Russians across the
Pacific to the Aleutians.

In March 1778 the Resolution, the ship in

which Ledyard sailed, had moored in Nootka Sound for the purpose of
replenishing fresh water and obta:i.ning timber for spars.

In his

journal, Ledyard noted that "this country will appear most to advantage
respects the variety of animals, and the richness of their furs."
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The crew bartered for a quantity of furs thinking to make warm clothing of them. Only later, during their stop at Kamchatka, did they
realize the profit for which the furs could be sold at the Russian
factory.

The crew's regret in not loading aboard four times as

many furs was heightened later when they discovered that the
selling price for furs in Canton was more than double that at Kamchatka.
Ledyard estimated "that skins which did not cost the purchaser six
pence sterling sold in China for 100 dollars." 4
The potential for profit from fur trade made a deep impression
on Ledyard.

Upon his return to America in 1783 he quickly wrote and

published an account of the Cook expedition and then became preoccupied
with plans for a mercantile venture to the Pacific Northwest.

For

several years he canvassed the Northeastern seaports for financial
backing, but no merchant entrepreneur was yet willing to hazard his
money on Ledyard's unsubstantiated story.
were wild and visionary.

They thought that his schemes

Unable to interest supporters at home,

Ledyard took his plans to Paris and London, but the magnitude of
his designs were overmatched by misfortune.

Repeatedly his attempts

to reach the Pacific Northwest by sea were frustrated.
Ledyard began contemplating his overland journey through
Russia to the Pacific in late 1785.

Thomas Jefferson, then minister

to France, may have suggested the enterprise. He certainly encouraged
Ledyard and attempted to obtain for him a passport
passage.

permitting the

Despite the refusal of Empress Catherine to grant the

requested passport (she thought the project "chimerical"), Ledyard
set out in December 1786 and reached St. Petersburg in March 1787.
Ledyard received help from a chance acquaintance, an officer
in the entourage of Paul, the heir to the throne.

Through him, he
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procured an internal passport from a provincial administrative board
and travel orders from the post office as an "American nobleman."
Despite his newly elevated social status, he travelled as a "messenger"
to avoid expense. 5

As in so many other of his projects, the indefati-

gible Ledyard almost carrieo off his ambitious plan.

By the middle

of August 1787, he had reached Irkutsk, two-thirds of the way across
Siberia.

From then on, though, persons and events conspired to

thwart his venture.

To Ledyard the opportunity to question Shelikhov

about Russian trade and settlements in the North Pacific must have
seemed an unexpectedly fortunate circumstance.

Judging solely from

the entry in Ledyard's journal concerning the meeting, relations
between Ledyard and Shelikhov were good.
Went this morning to see a Merchant owner of a Vessel
that had passed from Kamschatka to different parts of the
Coast of America. Shewed some charts rudely descriptive
of his voyages. He says there are on different parts of
the Coast of America 2000 Russians: and that as near as
he can judge the number of skins produced by them in that
Country amount of 12000: has a Vessel of his own at
Okhotsk. Which leaves that Country for America next
Summer, and offers me a passage in her.6
Ledyard's persistent curiosity about Russian possessions and
Russian trade and his dissimulation about his own participation in
the Cook expedition, aroused deep suspicions in the minds of both
Shelikhov and Yakobi as to

L~dyard's

intentions.

questions concerned the Pacific Northwest.

And not all his

Many questions pertained

to the Kurile Islands and the Russian enterprises there.

When he was

unable to obtain information on the Kuriles, Ledyard was reported to
have stated "that those who are stronger will surely have the first
right to occupy those islands."

The eagerness with which Ledyard

sought to join the "Northeastern secret expedition" of Captain Billings
added to the doubts of the Russian authorities.

Billings, an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
Englishman in the employ of Russia, was a previous shipmate of Ledyard's
from the days of the Cook expedition.

Billings' mission was to

explore Northeast Asia and the islands in the North Pacific.

From

these factors, and perhaps through deliberate misrepresentation by
Ledyard, Yakobi deduced that the American traveller had been'sent here
by the English Crown for reconnaissance of the local situation."
Among Ledyard's claims were that "about ten thousand people of various
European nationalities" were dwelling on the shores north of California.
He also boasted that during the Cook expedition "some of the people
living near Chukot were made English subjects."

7

After Ledyard had spent ten days in Irkutsk, Yakobi decided
to send him on his way to Yakutsk "where there are fewer opportunities
for the fulfillment of his intentions."

Yakobi took the precaution,

though, of warning the cammandant at Yakutsk against Ledyard's "shifty
enterprises" a11d instructed the commandant, while giving Ledyard an
hospitable reception, to detain him inconspicuously by stressing the
difficulties of a winter passage to Okhotsk.

Although dejected by

the thought of the winter delay, Ledyard continued his "shifty enterprises," questioning the great number of Russian merchants and traders
in town about the places they had been.

Tiring of his stay in Yakutsk,

Ledyard gladly joined Billings when he proposed to return to Irkutsk
to pick up supplies for his expedition.

But when Ledyard returned

to Irkutsk, he was arrested and deported from Russia at the express
order of the Empress Catherine. 8
Many reasons for Ledyard's arrest and deportation have been
suggested in the past.

One held that the Russians believed that

Ledyard was a French spy.

Another attributed the deportation to

Catherine's concern for Ledyard's safety.

Yet another placed the
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blame on Ledyard for alleged disorderly conduct.
never offered any explanation.

Ledyard himself was

The most plausible account was first

advanced by Ledyard's biographer, Jared Sparks.

Based on circumstantial

evidence, Sparks surmised, correctly as it turns out, that the plot
to halt Ledyard was conceived in Irkutsk by the merchants engaged in
the Pacific fur trade who feared foreign competitiou.

Most recently

Bolkhovitinov has confirmed Spark's theory from Russian documents.
Using Shelikhov's notes on his conversation with Ledyard as a basis,
the Irkutsk governor-general in November 1787 dispatched an extensive
report on the activities of the "American nobleman John Ledyard" to
A. A. Bezborodko, secretary to the Empress.

Based on this report,

Catherine, in December, issued the orders to expel Ledyard "with the
admonition not to dare appear ever again anywhere within the limits
of our empire." 9
Nor did Shelikhov live to see the fruition of his broad and
daring projects.

Four years after his death, his company and others

were merged to form the Russian-American Company in 1799.

The Tsar

gave the new monopoly a twenty-year charter which allowed the government to exercise direct control when it wanted to counteract foreign
expansion, but permitting also the guise of a private company.

Both

the new company and the imperial offices concerned with Siberia adopted
the same attitude as Shelikhov toward foreign encroachment.
The Russians consistently attempted thereafter to follow a
policy of keeping aggressive foreigners out of Russian frontier
territories in Siberia and America--even lone, twenty-six year old,
impecunious travellers such as Ledyard.
keep out the American merchants.

But halting Ledyard did not

Although Ledyard failed to achieve

any of his aspirations, other Americans would profit by following in
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his footsteps.
Robert Morris, the Philadelphia financier, had almost been
persuaded by Ledyard to support his northwest coast venture.

Instead,

he outfitted the Empress of China and sailed it to Canton with a load
of ginseng root and some furs from eastern American trading posts.
The return of the Empress of China from the Orient in 1785 brought
confirmation of the importance of the fur trade in China.

Lacking

specie or a readily saleable commodity, the Chinese trade would
have languished after this first voyage except that a group of
six Boston merchants decided, based on reading the Ledyard and Cook
accounts, to adopt the scheme of acquiring furs along the Northwest
coast and then exchanging them in Canton for teas and silks.
They dispatched Captain Robert Gray in Lady Washington and
John Kendrick in Columbia in 1787 to Nootka Sound.
trade pattern ea.isiaaed by Ledyard,

Following the

fur~~e~n~t~o~--------------------

Canton and exchanged for Chinese goods which were brought home to
Boston in 1790.

From then on the "Boston men" made regular appearances

in the North Pacific.

More than 100 American vessels traded there

during the next 25 years, most of them from Boston.

As they edged

out other rivals, the American ships reaped a bountiful harvest of
furs, obtaining 10-15,000 sea otter pelts annually around the turn
of the century. 10
American ships, ranging further and further north from the
Columbia River and Nootka Sc:-•md, began visiting Russian-American ports
by about 1800.

The first recorded commercial exchange took place

early in 1801 when the American merchant ship Enterprise arrived at
Kodiak.

Alexander Baranov, the General-Manager of Russian-America,

was faced by such an extreme shortage of goods that he ignored an
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injunction against commercial contacts with foreigners.

Thereafter,

except for intermittent stoppages on direct orders from St. Petersburg,
a lively trade transpired until the early 1840s, mostly with the
Americans. 11
The shortage of food and other supplies was a persistent
concern for the Russian-American Company.
were sought and tried.

Many alternative sources

The overland-overseas route through Okhotsk

was the foremost, but it proved expensive and undependable.
cal!~

Periodi-

direct sea shipments from the Baltic were arranged, but these,

too, were costly and erratic in arrival.

Local agricultural products

from the Alaskan or upper California colonies proved inadequate,
as did all efforts at direct trade with Spanish California, Hawaii,
Japan or the Philippines.

Only as a last resort did the company

turn to regular trade with the Americans.

The resulting agreements

were profitable to the Boston merchants, and beneficial in many
ways to the Russians as well.

Having no means of preventing the

Americans from trading guns and rum to the Indians in exchange for
furs, Baranov preferred to deal directly with those American skippers
whom he could trust.

In addition to buying supplies, Bar.v.nov often

agreed to joint hunting expeditions, splitting the furs 50-50.

Baranov

was also frequently dependent on the Americans for ships and shipping.
To relieve his problems, he purchased eight American vessels, hired
American craftsmen to build ships at Kodiak and Sitka, and chartered
American ships to carry furs and goods to Canton, Okhotsk or Kamchatka.
Through these voyages Americans became aware of the market for supplies
in Eastern Siberia.

Occasionally, the American merchants brought the

furs that they had purchased in Russian-American to Siberian merchants
outside of the company's monopoly. 12
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John D'Wolf was the first American merchant-captain to enter
into an agreement with Baranov and visit Siberia.

D'Wolf skippered

the Juno out of Bristol, Rhode Island, on a memorable voyage in 1804.
The twenty-five year old D'Wolf commanded a crew of 26 manning a
250-ton vessel.
at $35,000.

When ready for sea the ship and lading were valued

Though D'Wolf was pTepared to trade with the Indians,

much of the outgoing cargo was intended for sale to the Russians.
When D'Wolf in Juno arrived in New Archangel in the summer of 1805,
he was welcomed by Baranov.
straits.

The colonies were again in serious

The party of Baron Nikolai Rezanov was inspecting the

colonies that year and planned to winter in New Archangel.

With the

added population to feed, Baranov eagerly bought the bulk of D'Wolf's
cargo of rum, sugar, rice, beef, pork, flour, tobacco and molasses.
Rezanov was a son-in-law of Grigorii Shelikhov, influential in court
circles and a high official of the company.

He was energetically

trying to solve the company's supply problems and forge together the
North Pacific commercial empire dreamed about first by Shelikhov. 13
D'Wolf ingratiated himself further with his Russian hosts by
offering to sell them the ship Juno.

Since the company was chronically

short of good craft, Rezanov quickly agreed to the purchase.

In

exchange, D'Wolf received furs, a small 40-ton craft, Yermak, and a
bill of exchange on the Russian-American company in St. Petersburg.
D'Wolf dispatched the Yermak with his crew and the furs to Canton
and at the invitation of Rezanov prepared to proceed to Okhotsk and
thence overland to St. Petersburg. 14
Unlike Ledyard, D'Wolf engendered no suspicions.

The Russians

in their gratitude set up no obstacles to his completing Ledyard's
journey in the opposite direction, from the Pacific Northwest to
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St. Petersburg by way of the Siberia.

The passage took a long while

and was not always easy, but furnished with a passport and letters
from Rezanov and able to draw on credit from the company's offices,
D'Wolf was warmly received at each stage.

The most difficult was

the sea passage to Okhotsk in a small, 25-ton Russian craft which
D'Wolf commanded.

He learned first hand much about currents, winds,

ice conditions, islands and harbors of the North Pacific.

He made

one significant observation for the future:
This tract of ocean, from longitude 130° West, along the
entire coast of Alashka and through the seas of Kamtchatka
and Ochotsk, was at that time the great place of resort of
the right whale. Persecuted in all its other haunts, it
had sought refuge in this northern region, where as yet
a whaleship had never made its appearance.lS
Finally, D'Wolf arrived at St. Petersburg in October 1807.
There he met some of the directors of the company including Benedict
Cramer, an American banker.

He learned then that copies of his bill

of exchange had arrived before him and had already been paid in a
cargo of goods sent to the United States.
venture was $100,000.

The total profit for the

After three years and eight months, he returned

to Bristol having travelled around the world.

His account of the

journey states that he continued to engage in Russian commerce.
Baranov was under the impression that D'Wolf, while in St. Petersburg,
intended to contract with the company directors for the future pro16
. .
.
•
Amer1ca.
•
v1s1on1ng
o f Russ1an-

The situation in Siberia was somewhat different from that in
Russian-America.

The company maintained depots and trading posts

at the major settlements in Siberia, but while it had considerable
influence and was 2n important source of supply for the imperial
administrative and military forces, the Russian-American company did
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not exercise a complete monopoly of trade.
still existed in Siberia.

Rival trading companies

But from whatever source--overland from

Western Siberia, local agriculture or overseas from the Baltic--food
supplies and other goods were rarely adequate for even the sparse
population.

Prices were exorbitant and the quality of products poor.

The Okhotsk company office had the responsibility to oversee the
supply of the Eastern Siberian posts and the Russian colonies in
America.

When the transport system failed, as it frequently did,

the company of necessity turned to the "Boston men" for supplies which
meant sharing the fur profits.
merchants, also.

This arrangement suited the American

As the number of sea otters and fur seals declined,

they frequently preferred to engage in trade or charter their ships
to the Russians rather than incur the risks of trading with the
Indians.

After the peak of the fur trade passed, about 1810, the

American vessels were alert to other trading opportunities in the
Pacific, e.g., sandalwood from Hawaii and copper from Chile,

Ship

owners gave their captains great latitude in pursuing trade wherever
success appeared promising.

One of these corners of the North Pacific,

the Russian outposts of Eastern Siberia, began to be visited more
frequently by American vessels in search of corr.mercial profit.
1813, Captain Bennett, for example, added a new twist.

In

He exchanged

his cargo of supplies at Sitka for fur seals, but then instead of
sailing for Canton, he took the skins to Okhotsk.

When he placed

them on sale there, the company was forced to buy them back at a much
higher rate to prevent the furs from falling into the hands of rival
merchants which would have created competition thought to be dangerous
by the Russian-American company. 17
Facts relative to the American actions on the Siberian coast
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between 1812-1821 are meager and at times contradictory, but the
Russian reactions to the Americans' enterprise was sufficiently sharp
to indicate that the Russian officials perceived grave significance
to the development.

In particular, they were apprehensive about

the plans and projects of two Americans, Peter Dobell and William
Pigot.

In their activities they foresaw the same type of encroachment

in Russian Siberia that was occurring in Russian-America.

Moreover,

behind the presence of these two Americans, the Tsarist government
divined the resources and support of John Jacob Astor's American Fur
Company.
Few pertinent facts are available relative to Peter Dobell.
He grew up in Philadelphia after his parents emigrated from Ireland.
After serving in the army fighting Indians in Western Pennsylvania,
1,·

he went to sea and travelled in many countries. 18

In 1798 he first

came to China and spent seven or eight years there, mostly in the
Canton area, possibly as an agent for Astor.

19

While in Canton he

performed some sort of significant service for the Russian navigator
Captain Kruzenstern which later gave Dobell a degree of entry to
Russian officialdom. 20
October 1805.
three times.

Kruzenstern in Nadezhda was in Canton in

During the previous year Nadezhda had visited Kamchatka
Nikolai Rezanov was a passenger in Nadezhda at that

time and he arranged the off loading of critically needed supplies
for the residents of Petropavlovsk. 21

Either from his Russian con-

tacts or from Astor's captains, Dobell learned of Kamchatka's needs,
for an American brig,

~'

owned by John Jacob Astor and commanded

by Captain "Dubell" was bound in the spring of 1812 from Canton to
Kamchatka. 22

In August 1812 Peter Dobell arrived in Petropavlovsk

with two ships with cargoes of supplies and provisions.

One of the
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vessels returned to Manila.

Dobell

stay~l

behind.

He travelled in

Kamchatka, met the Commandant and then sailed by way of the Aleutians
and Penzhinskii Bay to Okhotsk. 23
to St. Petersburg.

From there he travelled overland

On these journeys he kept a log which he later

published, but the book proved short on personal details, recapping
chiefly his observations of Siberia.

According to Dobell, Siberia

had "remote regions with inviting attractions to human industry and
improvement" which would become one of "the most flourishing countries
of his Imperial Majesty's dominions" and possessed "nature resources,
soil, and climate, very superior to what is generally believed."

He

also concluded that Siberia had an insufficient number of inhabitants
and that transportation was poor and expensive.

He regretted that

the Amur River, which would have provided for a more efficient transport system was still within Chinese territory. 24

While in St.

Petersburg Dobell became a Russian citizen, joined the merchants
guild and obtained on good terms the right to trade with visiting
foreign ships.

The Tsarist government during these early years looked

favorably on such trade.

Besides this, Dobell presented to the govern-

ment a broad plan with various provisions for commerce and industry
in the Pacific.

His economic development proposal for Siberia included:

1. Inauguration of a whaling and fishing industry in the
North Pacific,
2. Improvement of the communications in Siberia,
3. Occupation of the Liu Ch'iu (Ryukyu) Islands,
4. Arrangement to tranship Chinese goods from Manila
to Kronstadt
5. Establishment of regular trade relations between
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Kamchatka and the Philippine Islands in order to
assure necessary provisions for the inhabitants of
Siberia. 25
To carry out this latter provision of the plan, Debell entered
Russian service and was named Consul-general to the Philippines in
1817 or 1818.

In response to this plan, Baranov sent the American

ship Isabella to Manila.

The expedition which returned in 1816 was

completely unsuccessful, bringing back mostly large quantities of rum.
The Spanish authorities refused to recognize Dobell or any other
foreign emissary to their colony.

At the end of 1817 or 1818, Debell

returned to Kamchatka bringing trade goods with him.

He also made

an offer to the Commandant of Kamchatka, Rikard, to import various
provisions from overseas.

The local office of the Russian-American

company informed the directors of this and they lodged a protest
with the minister of internal affairs.

Undeterred by this setback

Debell prepared to commence a whaling industry with an "agent of an
American company."

However, higher Russian authorities disapproved

of the whaling agreement.

Moreover, the government policy changed

and trade with all foreign vessels was prohibited.

Only because

... ,._

Debell was a Russian citizen was he permitted to return to Manila
and bring back one last cargo to Kamchatka in 1821, despite the pr-otests of the Russian-American company.

The~'

still reportediy

owned by John Jacob Astor and commanded by "Dubell," arrived in the
Hawaiian Islands from the Northwest Coast (possibly from the Asiatic
shore) and was scheduled to sail for Manila that same year. 26
Pertinent facts concerning Pigot 1 s Siberiar1 experiences are
also scant.

In November 1813 Pigot took over command of Astor's vessel

Forester while the ship was in the Hawaiian Islands.

Having acquired

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
a load of seal skins along the Northwest coast, Pigot decided to
dispose of his cargo at Okhotsk, but was forced to put into Kamchatka
late in 1815.

After offloading his furs, Pigot purchased a cargo

from an agent of Dobell and sent the Forester back to Hawaii while he
remained to conduct business.

An agent of the Russian-American company

purchased the furs for six times as much as Pigot had paid for them.
The company headquarters, however, refused to honor the sale and,
citing an imperial ukaz forbidding the import of seal skins, nrdered
him to take the skir

.:•tt of the country.

Pi got made the long over-

land journey to St. Petersburg in an attempt to rectify the

sit~ation.

Unable to obtain a satisfactory solutL,n, he returned to Kamchatka.
Pigot made an offer which was "zealously supported by Rikord" to conduct fishing and whaling along the shores of Kamchatka for a period
of ten years.

From Kamchatka he sailed for the Hawaiian Islands with

Astor's seal skins aboard the schooner
1818.

.Q~neral

San Martin in October

For a time, Pigot apparently was doing business for himself.

In December 1819 he bought the _?an Martin.

This schooner was noted

arriving at Manila in March 1820 in company with the

~'

but not

under the command of Pigot who had been engaged as an agent for the
Pedler, another of Astor's ships.

The Pedler traded in Sitka before

proceeding to Kamchatka in September 1820.

Forsaking further trading

ventures, Pigot went in San Martin with a company of Americans to
settle Fannings Island. 27
What role did Astor play in the Dobell-Pigot Siberian development schemes?

His interest in the Pacific fur trade was concentrated

primarily on the Northwest Coast, but his ambitions went far beyond.
Since 1809, Astor and his agents had been negotiating with Andrei
Dashkov, the Russian Consul-general and with Count Pahlen, the Russian
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minister to the United States.

The object of the talks was to set

conditions for cooperation between Astor's Pacific Fur Company and
the Russian-American company to exclude the other Americans from the
Northwest Coast.

As a consequence of these conversations, Astor

sent Captain Ebbets in Enterprise in November 1809 with a cargo of
supplies for Baranov in Sitka.

As part of Astor's instructions Ebbets

was authorized to deliver a portion of the cargo to Okhotsk should
Baranov find that expedient.

So Astor knew as early as 1809 of the

shortness of supplies in Siberia.

Ebbets was able to confirm that the

prospects for trade with Kamchatka were good and might include an
exchange for Siberian sables. 28

In 1811 Astor sent his son-in-law

Bentzon to St. Petersburg to conclude a final agreement.

One of the

terms which Astor proposed was to allow his company to import into
Russia, duty free, up to 2000 skins of animals trapped in the interior
of North America, such as black bear and raccoon.
receive RussLm goods in return.

Astor proposed to

The Russians accepted all the con-

ditions of Astor's proposal of cooperation except the import of furs
by Astor into Russia.

The directors of the Russian-American company

suspected the motives behind this proposition and voiced their objections
to Count Rumyantsev, Russia's foreign minister, arguing that the Tsar
should not permit "further hampering of Russ:i.an industry by private
American traders."

This difference of opinion between Bentzon and

the directors of the Russian-American company received prolonged
examiniation in the upper levels of the imperial government, including
the Minsters of Finance and Internal Affairs.

The import proposal was

finally firmly rejected by Rumyantsev on the grounds that such a
measure would constitute a violation of the Russian tariff.

29

It seems likely, from a review of what is known about the
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Dobell-Pigot movements in the years 1812-1821, that Astor did not give
up his interest in opening up Siberia to American trade.

The circum-

stances suggest that in 1812 he directed Dobell's two ships to Kamchatka
with supplies, trusting that the Ruasian settlers there would become
as dependent on him for provisioning as those in Russian-America.
Pigot in Fores.ter may not have arrived in Kamchatka in 1815 under
any specific orders from Astor, but it must have seemed strange to
the Russians that only three years after the rebuff to Bentzon an
Astor ship was attempting to import a cargo of furs into Siberia.

No

wonder that P5got spent three fruitless years, 1815-1818, trying to
sell his cargo.

During this period Pigot was able to keep Astor

further infor~ed regarding Siberian trade. 30
Whether Astor was specifically aware of the Dobell-Pigot plans
to establish a Philippine-Siberia supply run or to start a whaling
and fishing industry in Kamchatkan waters is more problematical.

Pigot

had purchased his own ship in 1819 and Dobell had become a Russian
citizen a few years earlier.

So these projects may not have been

associated directly with Astor, though he may have assented to support
them.

From the Russian viewpoint though, they were still dealing with

an "agent of an American company," as Pigot certainly was again during
the port visit of Pedler to Kamchatka toward the end of 1820.

By then

the Russian reaction against the American endeavors was in full swing.
Because all of the Dobell-Pigot-Astor activity in Siberia since
1812 took place outside the framework of the Russian-American company,
this caused the company to register strenuous complaints to government
officials.

Concerning foreign ships visiting Eastern Siberian ports,

the company argued that foreigners usually brought in high profit
luxury items such as alcoholic beverages rather than low-profit, bulky
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food staples.

They also argued that the furs obtained in the Kamchatka-

Okhotsk region would inevitably pass into the hands of foreign competitors with a consequent loss of profits to the company and loss of
customs duties for the government.
enterprises, the company

b~ard

As to the fishing and whaling

of directors feared that the foreigners

would use whaling as a pretext for a permanent settlement in one of
the company's possessions and would be drawn into trading fnr furs
with the natives or engaging in fur

tr~pping

themselves.

This, the

company concluded, would be a direct violation of the exclusive imperial privileges granted to the company and hurt the economy of Kamchatka.
In February 1820 Count Speranskii, the Governor General of Siberia,
reported on the subject to Count Nesselrode, the foreign minister.
While acknowledging the benefits which would accrue from a thriving
whaling industry, he supported the arguments of the company and presented the disadvantages he saw in permitting the industry to fall
into foreign hands:
1.
Everyone knows of the Russian-American Company's complaints about the efforts of American cit~zens to trap and
trade on their own account, and even to provide the natives
with fire arms; these complaints are justified, but the
matter cannot be helped. To try to get the American
government to prohibit this would be in vain and against
the spirit of that nation's trading rules. The company
has only one recourse: to attempt to place its own
establishments at key points. At the least, the government
should not favor this foreign-owned trade. But it undoubtedly will be favored by the establishment of whaling
on the eastern shores of Siberia. This would both foster
and support it.
2.
Although for various ~easons animal trapping in
Kamchatka and Okhotsk has diminished in significance, present and future hopes of the trade still depend on Russian
hunters. But if foreign establishments are set up on the
shores, it will undoubtedly pass into foreign hands. In
these sparsely populated regions it would be impossible to
maintain close surveillance or to prohibit the import~tion
of alcoholic beverages, if this trade were permitted.
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3.
For the unity and completeness of its enterprise, the
Russian-American Company should attempt to establish whale
fishing, if not with its own employees, then at least with
its own capital. At present its capital position is not only
strong, but even excessive, and for this reason its enterprises require expansion. But a contract with foreigners
would impose an insurmountable obstacle to this expansion.
4.
Rikord asserts in his letter that if the foreigners
wished to carry on whaling in those regions we would lack
the forces to prevent them. First, the disproportionate
weakness of our forces is questionable. The timely appear. ance of one well-armed ship would subdue and scatter all of
these whalers. Second, if they are able to appropriate this
industry by force, why should we support their force with
contra~tual rights?31
Upon the advice of his ministers, the emperor decided not to
ratify the whaling contract with Dobell and Pigot, but instead to
direct the Russian-American Company to turn their

~ttention

to the

whaling industry and equip one ship with the necessary gear and
experienced men.

As to commerce, the government of Irkutsk was

directed to prohibit all foreign merchants from trading or putting
into the ports of East Siberia.

Foreigners were to be forbidden

to enroll in the merchants' guilds or settle in Kamchatka or Okhotsk.
Dobell himself, though a Russian subject, was ordered to leave East
Siberia and prohibited from making either provisioning voyages to
the Philippines or his projected venture transporting Chinese goods
to the Baltic.

Henceforth, the Russian-American Company must be

responsible for furnishing supplies to Kamchatka and Okhotsk in
their own vessels.

In sum, the Russian-American Company had reacted

strongly against the enterprises of Dobell and foreigners in East
Siberia.

At the instigation of the company, the government had

abruptly changed its policy concerning foreign trade with Siberia.
No 1onger we 1come, sueh tra d e was proh ~.b.~te d • 32

At first glance, the Russian reaction to the incursion of a
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handful of private Americans seems drastic.

During the previous

decade only a comparatively few American vessels had put into Siberian
ports.

But the activities of the Americans in Siberia were not

viewed by company or government officials in isolation.

They were

well aware of the larger drama unfolding along the Pacific Northwest-how the few foreign traders on the coast had multiplied to dozens
~

in later years.

They observed how the Americans disregarded the

territorial claims of Russian-America and Spanish

California--~mug-

gling, poaching, putting into shore and trading contraband items
with the Indians anywhere that no permanent settlement was in place.
How American statesmen proclaimed theil. own continental ambitions for
the United States and how the people were realizing these claims by
the relentless westward press to settlement.

But most of all the

Russians observed how the commercial, seaborne thrust of the "Boston
men" could become the deciding influence in determining the fate of
the region.

Russian naval officers such as Captain Vassilij Golovnin

were particularly irked at the American encroachments.

After his

voyage tc, inspect the colonies, he recommended in 1819 that Russia
protect and defend its colonies against foreign penetration.

The

Russian minister to the United States, Pierre de Poletika, also
reported the intense interest of American citizens and the Congress
in the settlements of the Pacific Northwest.

33

Compared to the main events in the Pacific Northwest, the
plans of Dobell and Pigot would have seemed like the actions of bit
players except for the fact that they were being acted out in the
Russian wings.

Nor did the Russian authorities overlook the many

similarities between the Asian side of the North Pacific and the
American.

Eastern Siberia was still very much a frontier colony,
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sparsely populated with large stretches between the Russian settlements.

In extensive regions the natives were not yet under the

effective administrative cont=ol of Russia.

Because of the transporta-

tion and communication difficulties, imperial authorities well realized
th~t

they would have been hard put to prevent the same kind of

American commercial and territorial encroachment along the Siberian
coastline.
Therefore, when the events along the Pacific Northwest
triggered the imperial ukaz of September 1821, the terms were extended
to include the Asiatic Northeast coast as well.

The Minister of

Finance, D. A. Gurev, a member of the committee that drew up the
ukaz, emphasized in a report to the emperor that "it was necessary
to protect the Eastern shores of Siberia, to shelter our colonies,
and maintain them in close connection." 34

By the first two articles

of the ukaz, the imperial government decreed such protection.
1.
The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishery, and of
all other industry on all islands, posts, and gulfs,
including the whole of the north-west coast of Americ&,
beginning from Behring Straits to the 51° of northern
latitude, also from the Aleutian Islands to the eastern
coast of Siberia, as well as along the Kurile Islands from
Behring Straits to the south cape of the Island of Urup,
viz., to the 45° 50' north latitude, is exclusively granted
to Russian subjects.
2.
It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels not
only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia
as stated above, but also, to approach them within less
than 100 Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is
subject to confiscation along with the whole cargo.35
If the plans of Dobell and Pigot had not already been enjoined
a short time previously, this edict would have effectively curtailed
their activities.

The ukaz was not entirely defensive in nature.

In

Asia, Russia was laying claim to vast territories nominally belonging
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to China and Japan.

The latitude 45° SO' north runs from the southern

tip of Urup island in the Kuriles through the La Perouse Straits to
a point on the Asiatic mainland far south of the mouth of the Amur
River.

The entire island of Sakhalin and a large portion of the

Primorye (Maritime) Region, or
the ukaz

Coa~t

of Tartary, were claimed by

for the first time as Russian possessions.
Why did the Tsarist government raise the issue of the Siberian

coast in the 1821 ukaz?

F~om

a review of the diplomatic

correspondence~

it is evident that Russia had seriously considered declaring the whole
northern portion of the Pacific Ocean as a mare clausum.

To make such

a sweeping declaration of jurisdiction, it was necessary to include
as great an extent of

surroun~ing

hence the Asiatic coastal claim.

land possessions as possible,
Moreover, as Robert Kerner has

pointed out, there was a strong connection between Russian expansion
in America

and in the Amur region.

When checked by the Treaty of

Nerchinsk in 1689 from pressing southward, the Russians advanced
northeastward and eventually to Russian-America.

Now, with the

prospects of being checked on the North American continent, Russia
was reversing directions and laying the groundwork for expansion
southward to the Amur.

Those officials drafting the ukaz also saw

an opportunity for an advance into a region promising a more assured
supply of food for its Pacific outposts. 36
The American Congress and the New England merchants paid
scant attention to the provisions of the ukaz dealing with the Asiatic
Pacific regions.

Their ire was aroused solely by the threatened

expansion of Russia along the Pacific Northwest.

In all the diplomatic

correspondence exchanged between Russia and the United States between
the issuance of the ukaz in 1821 and the signing of the Russian-American
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convention in 1824, the situation in eastern Siberia was rarely
mentioned and then only in general terms.

The United States raised

no objections to the new boundary demarcation in Asia even though it
became extended by dint of repetition by both sides to 45° North on
the Asiatic side. 37

No time limits were expressed in the convention

concerning Northeast Asia.

Nor was any list of contraband trade goods

imposed.
But John Quincy Adan,s, the American Sec.retary of State, did
insist that the vessels of the United States, as an independent nation,
had the right to freely navigate thoRe seas as a part of that independence.

To the United States minister to Russia, Henry Middleton, he

gave firm instructions.
The pretensions of the Imperial Government extend to an
exclusive territorial jurisdiction from the forty-fifth degree
of north latitude, on the Asiatic coast to the latitude of
fifty-one north )n the western coast of the American continent; and they assume the right of interdicting the navigation
and the fishery of all other nations to the extent of one
hundred miles from the whole coast.
The United States can admit no part of these claims.
Adams went on to compare the isolated Russian factories along
the Northwest coast to those established by European nations along
the coast of Africa for the past three centuries.

The factories only

communicated with one another by sea which did not suffice to consider
the entire coast as being a Russian possession.

Although Adams did

not extend the analogy to Northeast Asia, the same argument largely
pertained there also. 38

Thus only in general terms did Adams keep

the waters on both sides of the Pacific in mind.

While he apparently

had no territorial ambitions for the United States in Eastern Asia,
Adams was strongly concerned about maintaining maritime rights of the
United States unimpaired.

During the subsequent negotiations with
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Russia, Adams would only concede that in the Pacific Ocean "citizens
of the United States shall not land in any part of the coast actually
occupied by Russian settlements, unless by permission ••

"

Despite

counter proposals by the Russians also to ban citizens of the United
States from coasts "belonging to Russia," 39 the first article of 1824
convention between the United States and Russia stipulated that:
It is agreed that in any part of the great ocean commonly
called the Pacific Ocean, or South Sea, the respective
citizens or subjects of the high contracting powers shall
be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navig~tion,
or in fishing, or in the power of resorting to the coasts
upon points which may not already be occupied for the
purpose of trading with the natives, saving always the
restrictions and conditions determined by the following
articles.
Since the restrictions and conditions determined in the succeeding
four drticles of the convention were specifically concerned with the
Northwest Coast, the only article relevant to the Northeast Coast of
Asia was the general first article.

In this area of the Pacific the

American proposal had been adopted in its entirety.
did the Russians realize the possible consequences.

Only belatedly
40

Admiral Mordvinov, director and spokesman for the RussianAmerican Company protested that the convention was vague and violated
the company's monopoly rights.

Before ratification the emperor ordered

a special commission to review the company's complaints.

Their report,

approved by the emperor, tried to rectify the oversight by explaining
that the condition permitting United States citizens to fish in
colonial waters and trade with coastal natives should not be taken
as implying the right to approach the shores of Eastern Siberia and
the Aleutian and Kurile Islands.

To avoid an "incorrect" interpreta-

tion of the convention the Russian envoy to the United States was
instructed to make a formal explanatory declaration before the treaty
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was sent to the Senate for ratification.

Accordingly, Baron Tuyll

approached Secretary Adams with the Russian clarification regarding
the convention's application to Siberia and the Aleutians.

Adams

told Baron Tuyll that the convention could only be modified by a
new convention and the departments concerned with its execution had
no authority to consider stipulations.

Adams advised the Baron to

wait to present his note until after ratification in order to see how
the convention worked in practice.
about previous

America~~~omme~ial

'
Because he was probably uninformed
attempts, Adams assured Tuyll

that "Our merchants would not go to trouble the Russians on the
coast of Siberia • • • and it was wisest not to put such fancies into
their heads."

Tuyll reported to his government that he had only

been able to express the Russian sense of the convention to the American cabinet verbally for to do otherwise would have been to arouse
prejudicial conjectures.

Both governments then proceeded to ratify

the convention. 41
In reviewing this first chapter of Russian-American contacts
in Northeast Asia, one must keep in perspective that the two nations
were at the beginning of a flood tide of friendly relations.

The

conflict of interests on the Northwest Coast tempora;ily caused a
slight back wash to the tide, but the events in Siberia hardly a
ripple.

Out of necessity the Russians found cooperative efforts

acceptable.

As long as they exercised a degree of control they agreed

to trade, purchase ships, charter vessels and mount joint hunting
expeditions with the Americans.

B,>:cause Captain D'Wolf fell in with

Russian plans, his experiences were entirely amicable.

Independent

commercial enterprises proposed by Americans were met, on the other
hand, by suspicion and opposition.
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The imperial government, reused by these first threats of
American encroachment, strove to maintain the security and exclusive
jurisdiction of its possessions, no matter how tenuous its claims,
and attempted to forestall all challenges to the company trade
monopoly, especially on the Siberian mainland.

Despite these efforts,

during the first quarter century the initial steps had already been
taken to shift the scene of Russian-American interaction from America's
continent to Russia 1 s.

American ships had navigated the North

Pacific many times over and found their way safely into Asiatic
Russian ports.

The abundance of whales had been noted and reported.

Americans had traversed Siberia several times and viewed the region
for themselves.

The initial plans had been hatched by Americans to

exploit the resources and commercial prospects of the region.

The

United States government had refused to curtail the private enterprises
of its citizens and had shrewdly avoided inhibiting Americans from
following up in any unsettled areas of Northeast Asia.
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CHAPTER II
WHALING IN THE TSAR'S SEAS

Within two decades a second wave of Americans followed in
the wake of the fur traders.

By the late 1840s, hundreds of American

whaleships sailed the Tsar's seas and resorted to the Tsar's shores.
The whaling enterprise at its

peak~

which depended primarily on its

catch in the North Pacific, was far more extensive than that of the
fur trading pioneers.

The numbers engaged in the irdustry, both at

sea and at home, numbered in the tens of thousands, rather than
hundreds.

The value of one year's whale cargoes exceeded the annual

imports from China.

The segment of the country involved also reached

beyond Boston and New England to the middle Atlantic coast and to
San Francisco.

As a consequence of this wider spread interest,

the whalers gained a measure of support and protection from the
United States government.

Two naval expeditions were dispatched to

the North Pacific ostensibly to make whaling safer and more productive,
one to seek assurances from Japan that shipwrecked mariners would
be treated decently and the other to chart the dangers to navigation
in the seas off Northeast Asia.

To the advocates of these two missions,

such as Aaron Palmer and Senator William Seward, the purposes behind
the expeditions were more far reaching--to open the area to American
commerce, to acquire the necessary coaling stations along the sea
lanes, and to establish a trans-Pacific foothold from which to spread
American civilization in Asia.
44
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Russian officials in Asiatic Russia and the managers of the
Russian-American Company were annoyed by the presence of so many
whalers in their waters.
disturbed them 111ore.

News of the American naval expeditions

From their ,viewpoint, the entire island

chain from the Kuriles, to Sakhalin, to the Japanese

Islan~s~

and as

far south as to Ryukus provided not only commercial opportunities
upon which to base their own Pacific trade empire, but also an offshore
barrier guarding against foreign encroachment on to the Siberian mainland.

A permanent American presence and possible predominance any-

where along this chain was considered a threat to be counteracted, a
factor which contributed to the Russian policy toward consolidating
and expanding its own hold on Northeast Asia.
The Russians had long known about the presence of large
numbers of whales in the North Pacific, but had failed to exploit
their early advantage.

Lacking experience in whaling, their single-

minded dedication to fur gathering hampered their fer· abortive attempts
to become proficient.

Included in Baranov's appointment as chief

manager of the Russian colonies in America were instructions to report
the number and size of whales washed ashore, the amount of oil and
bone which might be extracted from them and the best means to catch
whales in abundance.
in Russian-America.

Whaling became a small, but essential industry
The Aleuts had always needed a whale catch for

food and for greasing their small boats.
hunters were engaged in this pursuit.

But only about twenty whale

Mostly the hunting consisted

of searching for whales that had been washed ashore, though the Aleuts
did attempt to expand this processbysticking darts in small whales
close inshore.

Despite company offers to pay for each whale caught,

no one was interested beyond the subsistence hunting.

Occasionally
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the colonies, amidst the plentiful whales, were actually short of
whale blubber and oil for their own needs. 1
In the Siberian waters the Russian-American Company made even
less of an effort to develop whale fisheries.

The government had

recognized in 1820 the practical advantages of the Dobell-Pigot
whaling proposal to secure a food supply for the local inhabitants.
As a consequence, when the foreigners were prevented from proceeding
with their plan, the

compan~

had been directed to initiate whaling

and fishing around the shores of Kamchatka.
preliminary

inq~iries

The directors made some

in England and Holland as to the cost of

equipping a whaling ship, but never followed through.

The Russians

in effect left the entire North Pacific whaling areas, by default,
to outsiders to exploit. 2
And the American whalers eventually came in large numbers.
By the beginning of the 19th century, American vessels had begun to
frequent the South Pacific.

In the 1820s, the American whaling

activity had moved northward.

Usi.ng Honolulu as a base, whalers

cruised off Northern California and the "off Japan Grounds," the
vast area between Hawaii and Japan.

Before long, whaling activity

had penetrated into the North Pacific areas.

The "golden age" of

whaling commenced about 1835 and lasted for several decades.

American

whaling assumed its greatest importance and its greatest commercial
value during this period.

The first right whale was taken off Kodiak

in 1835 by a Nantucket whaler.
to follow suit.

This signalled a rush of Americans

By 1841, fifty whalers were hunting the waters

around the Alaskan peninsula and the eastern Aleutians.

The follow-

ing year the Russian-American Company received reports that 200
whalers were expected that season.

In 1843 two ships from New
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Bedford took, off the coast of Kamchatka, the first bow-head whales
which proved to have great thickness of blubber and weight of bone.
The quest for whales took a Sag Harbor whaler through the Bering
Straits in 1848 where the whales were found to be comparatively tame. 3
At its peak in 1846, the whaling fleet numbered over 700
vessels with a capacity of more than 233,000 tons and valued at $21
million.

Of these whalers, nearly all of the large Nantucket and

New Bedford fleets were

engag~d

in whaling in the Pacific.

Between

1843 and 1860, on an average, nearly 200 American whalers were in
the North Pacific region annually.
pass unnoticed by the Russians.

All of this activity did not

In fact, they probably exaggerated

the already large scale of the operations.

The governor-general of

Eastern Siberia, Count Muravev, wrote to the Naval Chief of Staff
in September 1849:
this year there were at least 250 whaling ships in our Sea
of Okhotsk alone. They were all of large tonnage and had
large crews. I met them constantly during my voyage; often
there were several ships together. Nevel'skoi and Korsakov
met them also. My own figure of their number is more
conservativz than any which I heard from the whalers
themselves.
During the decade of the 1850s, the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk
were especially important to the whaling industry.

According to

Tikhmenev, the Russian-American Company historian, writing in 1861,
the number of foreign whalers in the Sea of Okhotsk averaged at
least one hundred vessels yearly

during that period.

The number of

whalers increased until "not a single spot in the Okhotsk Sea was
left unexplored."

Most of the whalers concentrated in either the

northern bays (Penzhinsk, Gizhiginsk and Tauisk) or the southern
bays (Tugursk and Ul'bansk) near the Shantar Islands.

These bays

had rivers flowing into them which caused an earlier break-up of the
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ice and the whales gathered there in large numbers to breed.

Even

so, the hunting season only lasted from mid-June to mid-September
when the storms commenced. 5
The sight of the Americans profiting from whaling in the
North Pacific did not upset the officials of the Russian-American
Company so much as the temerity of the whalers.

All the ills that

the Russians had predicted might stem from approving the Dobell-Pigot
plan in 1820 did in fact transpire 25 years later and to a far graater
extent.

The Americans penetrated the coastal waters at will, boldly

stood into shore and landed wherever they chose.
sell in Honolulu.

They cut wood to

They hunted game as they pleased and they rendered

oil on the beaches which allegedly frightened the fur-bearing animals
away from their habitat.

Soon the whaling crews were engaging in

trade with the natives, diverting furs from the company monopoly.
Occasionally

,,~olence

broke out between the American shore parties

and company employees.

The Americans ashore were accused of rowdiness,

destruction of property and a complete disregard for Russian authority
and regulations.

The Americans felt so at home in Siberian waters

that they gave their own nomenclature to geographical reference points
and sometimes wintered over on the Sii1erian coast, though this
proved both arduous and dangerous. 6
The Russian-American Company repeatedly complained to the
imperial authorities about the incursions of the American whalers.
In 1850 the company recommended that whaling in the entire Sea of
Okhotsk be prohibited.

Barring that, the company proposed that naval

cruisers be based near the Shantar Islands in order to protect those
places where the whales abound.

To the company's energetic protests
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of the American highhanded activities, the government returned cautious,
restrained replies.

Few protests were forwarded to the United States

during this period because the names of the vessels and the captains
usually remained unknown.

Moreover, the Russian Minister of Foreign

Affairs.·had become accustomed to the idea that the United States was
powerless to restrict its citizens from arbitrary
coasts.

~ctions

off distant

The Russian government refused to declare again any part of

the North Pacific a "closed sea."

Article 1 of the Convention of

1824 being still in force, American citizens were recognized as
having the right to fish everywhere in the Pacific Ocean including
the Sea of Okhotsk.

Only in territorial waters, customarily within

a cannon shot or about three miles from shore, did the Tsarist government apply restrictions.

Commencing in 1853, Russian patrol vessels

were given the task to see that whaling was not conducted in such
a manner as to hurt the natives and to maintain order within the
coastal areas of Russian possessions. 7
Why did the Russian government not pay more attention to
the complaints of the Russian-American Company and defend the Siberian
shores more vigorously against the American whalers?
answer is apparent.

Part of the

The empire was preoccupied with European affairs.

Liberalism and nationalism were sweeping Europe.

The Far East

possessions, despite a resurgence of interest lA the Amur region,
were a secondary theatre to Russia.

The Russian colonies in North

America were approaching economic collapse.

The Russian withdrawal

from its eastward thrust had already commenced with the sale of
Fort Ross.

Neither the company ships nor the Russian naval contingent

in the Pacific were of sufficient strength to police the entire North
Pacific littoral.

The expense of gaining such naval power was too
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formidable to contemplate seriously.

In 1848, for exaw.ple, the

company balked at paying the expenses of outfitting and maintaining
a single navy vessel to cruise the waters off Russian-America. 8
But that still does not completely answer the question of
why Russia did not protest hotly to the United States through diplomatic channels or capture a few American ships to set an example.
The Russian reluctance to take such steps can be attributed, by
inference, to their unwillingness to bring attention again to the
provisions of Article 1 of the 1824 Convention.

Russia was willing

to grant those aspects of Article 1 which dealt with free navigation
and fishing, but wanted to avoid a renewed discussion of the freedom
of "resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already be
occupied for the purpose of trading with the natives."

The issue

had last been raised in 1834 during the negotiations following the
expiration of the ten-year limitation on Articles 2-5 of the 1824
Convention..
articles,

When Russia refused to consider an extension of these

~he

United States continued to argue forcefully, based on

the permanent Article 1, the right of its ships to visit and trade
at unoccupied points along the Northwest Coast.

Henry

Middleton~

the United States Minister to Russia, in 1824 had presented the
American stance that with regard to "trade in unoccupied places
all the shores of the great ocean upon which the parties of this contract have any claim will continue open to them."

During the

protracted diplomatic exchange between Russia and the United States
which lasted from 1834 until 1838, the focus wag entirely on the
Northwest Coast.

Nevertheless, the United States persistently held

to its cla"ims to resort to any coastal point of the Pacific not already
occupied.

This claim was justified not only on the mutual and permanent
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clause of the 1824 Convention, but also on pre-existent rights which
"existed in perpetuity by the laws of nations."
was never satisfactorily settled.
urgent issues.

The disagreement

Both nations turned to more

A decade later it is not 3urprising that Russia

avoided reopening this discussion, no matter how annoying the American
whalers.

Tikhmenev suggested that Russia feared also that England

and France would join in such discussions.

9

Unlike the paltry enterprises of Debell and Pigot, American
whaling in the North Pacific had become an imyortant factor of the
United States' economy.

Business interests connected with whaling

were valued at seventy million dollars, giving employment to 70,000
per~ons.

At its peak thirty-four ports in four Northeastern states

were engaged in the trade.
fornia soon joined in.
wealth.

Ports in New Jersey, Delaware and Cali-

Whale fishing was a source of national

The average annual cargo was estimated as worth nine million

dollars which exceeded the highest annual import from China by two
million dollars.

Moreover, the skills in shipbuilding, navigation

and seamanship which were developed in the whaling fleets enhanced
the naval strength of the United States. 10
The hundreds of vessels plying the waters off Japan and along
the Siberian coast were in constant danger from ice floes, unpredictable
weather and uncharted shoals.

Their situation was made more difficult

by being so far from a port where they could refit, repair damages
and take on supplies.

Inevitably shipwrecks occurred.

The sailors

who managed to reach Japanese shores were thrown into jail.

Eventually,

some of those shipwrecked were repatriated through the mediation of
the Dutch at Nagasaki and news of the severe treatment they endured
was learned.

American resentment of such treatment of American
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whalers provided the proximate cause for dispatching a naval diplomatic
expedition to Japan under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry. 11
A second, underlying motive which influenced Perry's expedition had a more directly commercial basis.

American manufacturers

and merchants perceived brighter prospects for increased trade with
Asian nations now that the United States was firmly established on
the Pacific Coast.

Projects to connect the Atlantic and Pacific

coasts by intercontinental railroads and an Isthmian canal heightened
American interest in ending the isolation of Japan from international
trade.

To this end, Perry was directed to seek permission for vessels

of the United States to enter Japanese ports for the sale and barter
of their cargoes.12
As direct trade from the west coast of the United States to
Asia became a familiar thought, one prerequisite was recognized
as indispensable.

Before trans-Pacific steamship routes could be

implemented efficiently, it would be absolutely necessary to acquire
strateeically located coaling stations en route.

Planning for coal

resources became an important factor in both naval expeditions and
was to remain a consideration of American policy throughout the century.
It is not surprising that among the guidelines furnished Perry was
the reminder as to the desirability of establishing "a depot for coal,
if not on one of the principal islands, at least on some small uninhabited one." 13
In prosecuting the objectives of the mission to Japan,
Secretary of the Navy Kennedy, realizing that the American naval
squadron would be operating at a great distance from day-to-day
direction, invested Perry with "large discretionary powers."

As a

final instruction, Perry was authorized to enlarge the scope of the
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expedition, if the squadron was able without interfering with the main
objectives.

He was told to

explor~

the coasts of Japan and of the

adjacent continent and islands with a view toward extending commercial
relations and of securing ports of refuge for American whaling vessels.
To accomplish this latter purpose, Perry was authorized "to

negotiat~

treaties of amity and navigation with any and all established and
independent sovereignties in those regions." 14

With these extraordinary

powers Perry was ready to test out his broad conceptions of an American commercial empire in the Pacific.

His orders, which he may have

had a large hand in writing himself, suited his purpose exactly.
Perry was being given the opportunity to bring the honor and glory
to his nation that Captain David Porter had sought back in 1815 when
he reminded President Madison that the United States "borden: on
Russia, Japan and China."

Porter had urged that the United States

then send out an exploring expedition to the remote regions of the
Pacific, to introduce civilization and secure valuable trade. 15
The history of the U.

s.

Naval Expedition to Japan has been

recounted, in detail, in several forms.

Two aspects only will be

extracted from the various documents and narratives of the expedition
and emphasized here.

First, the imperialism of Commodore Perry,

which was reflected both in his actions in the North Pacific and in
his later commentary, is of interest as it foreshadowed the late
nineteenth century imperialism of the United States.

Second, the

sense of Russian and American rivalry engendered during the course
of the expedition was also a precursor of later events.
If, as Tyler Dennett has

suggested~

the instructions given to

Commodore Perry mark the "first comprehensive statement of the basis
of American policy for the Pacific," Perry's contribution came during
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his months of study and preparation for the expedition.

Perry had

never before been assigned to a Pacific squadron, but he did gather
together and· read about the experiences of others and he did talk
to New Bedford whalers who had been tc the Far East.

One of the

experts that Perry consulted was Aaron Palmer, a New York commission
merchant, who had been a leading promoter and lobbyist of those
manufacturers favoring the American expedition.

It may well have

been Palmer who recommended enlarging the scope to include the
"adjacent continent."

Among Palmer's early promotional efforts was

a geographical, political and commercial memoir addressed in January
1848 to President Polk on the "present state, productive resources,
and capabilities for commerce of Siberia, Manchuria and the Asiatic
Islands of the Northern Pacific Ocean."

He not only urged that the

United States' government foster the commercial navigation and whale
fishery in the North Pacific, but also recommended that the United
States should insist on the right of navigating the Amur River and
its affluents "upon the same footing as the Russians."

Speaking of

the Gilyaks and other nomads along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, Palmer
made a point that their states were independent i1.1 that "they pay no
tribute either to the Chinese or Russian governments. 1116
Through his studying Perry became convinced of the commercial
importance of the Pacific region and the national necessity for the
United States to ensure a prominent role there for itself.

The concept

of an extra-continental policy was not only new, but fraught with
difficulties when taken beyond the talking stage.

Projecting a secure

and permanent American presence across the Pacific had practical consequences to be considered.

How could Perry manifest the United

Statesi destiny in the Far East without resorting to European style
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imperialism?

Samuel E. Morison has termed Perry an

a difference."

"imperialist with

Perry may have been different, but not in the results

he hoped to achieve, only in the methods he proposed to use. 17
Commodore Perry put his ideas concerning trans-Pacific American
outposts into action at two places in the Western Pacific, in the
Ryukus and the

~onin

Islands.

Both locations seemed suitable for

being placed under American "surveillance."

They would provide

necessary ports of refuge for whalers and coaling bases for Pacific
navigation.

Both could be treated as oemi-independent, since prior

claims of sovereignty were mixed.

Both could become models of American

administrative probity and examples of Yankee industry.

Each could

serve as stations from which American missionaries could be sent to
the "benighted" countries of Asia.

To Perry, it seemed necessary

for the United States to "extend its territorial jurisdiction beyond
the limits of the western continent" in order to sustain "our maritime
rights in the East."

Although Perry tried to avoid the odious term

"colony" for such outposts, he rationalized their acquisition as
justified by the commercial benefits and the advance of civilization
and the industrial arts.

Perry acted promptly to establish a semblance

of American authority over these island groups because "some other
powers, less scrupulous, may step in and seize upon the advantages
which should justly belong to us."

The power he chiefly had in mind

• 18
was Russ~a.

Perry well knew that the United States would meet competition
in achieving its Pacific destiny.

Before embarking on the expedition,

Perry had examined carefully the repeated efforts of other nations
to break down the Japanese barriers.

He knew from his studies that

Russia had made a number of attempts to establish relations with Japan
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commencing 60 years before when Lt. Laxman sailed from Okhotsk to
Hakodate to open talks.

Laxman failed as did the subsequent peaceful

missions of Rezanov (1804) and Golovnin (1811).

Nor had the show of

force employed by Khostov and Davidov (1807) changed the Japanese
resolve for isolation.

Perry may not have been aware of the most

r.ecent uns·uccessful Russian try to open trade.

A Russian-American

Company ship Kniaz Menshikov in August 1852 entered the port of
Shimoda to return seven Japanese castaways and open talks, but like
all previous missions was ordered to depart before accomplishing its
object. 19
After his departure, Perry was informed by the Secretary of
the Navy that the Russian government was sending a naval force to
Japan.

As early as 1843 the Tsarist government had considered sending

such a naval expedition to China and Japan under the command of
Admiral Putyatin, but had held back because of the cost involved.
Once the American expedition was imminent, the long-proposed expedition
was reactivated to prevent the United States from obtaining a preeminent relationship with Japan.

In August 1853, the Russian squadron

arrived off Nagasaki a step behind Perry's ships which had made their
first visit to Tokyo Bay in July.

For a year thereafter, Perry and

Putyatin maneuvered in a Pacific "pas de deux," although Perry much
preferred to act alone.

Thus, when Putyatin proposed that the forces

combine to cooperate in attaining their ends more easily, Perry
positively, but courteously declined, believing that cooperation might
benefit Russia, but would not advance the cause of the United States.
To the Secretary of the Navy he declared himself considerably :nnoyed
by the "mysterious movements" of the Russian ships of war.

He was
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even more annoyed when he learned that, contrary to Perry's orders,
the Russian Admiral had been permitted to purchase 20 tons of American
controlled coal in Shanghai in order to facilitate his fleet reaching
Nagasaki.

It was to circumvent just this sort of thing, that Perry

had collected all the coal he could lay his hands on and placed it
in the U.

s.

Naval stores in Shanghai.

Putyatin requested a second

order of coal in vain. 20
Leaving his proposals with the Japanese officials, Perry
departed Tokyo Bay after ten days, intending to return for his answer
in the spring.

Putyatin continued his discussions and received some

encouraging words, but no treaty.
...............,"!

The Japanese, not above playing one

foreigner against another, told Putyatin that Russia was considered
"as a defense against other countries" and that should Japan finally
permit trade, "it will be first to your country." 21
and American

diplow~cy

interfered with tbis promise.

But circumstances
Due to the lack

of suitable ships and the onset of the Crimean War: Putyatin was
unable to reopen negotiations until November 1854.

Meanwhile, Perry

stole a march on the Russians by hastening his squadron back to Japan
in February 1854 and signed the first treaty with Japan

i~

March which

earned him the distinction of "opening up Japan."
A few

month~:'

after the announcement of the treaty, a Dr. Von

Siebold published a pamphlet claiming that Russia should receive the
credit for opening Japan to trade.

Von Siebold, a knowledgeable Dutch

authority on Japan, had been banished from Japan because he was
thought to be a Russian spy.

For this reason Perry had refused his

offer to join the American expedition.

His claims on behalf of

Russia undoubtedly increased Perry's suspicions of that nation's
motives. 22

In every direction that Perry steamed in the North Pacific
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he felt that Russian presence.

He intended to turn Naha in the Ryukus

into an American port of refuge, but found that the Russian squadron
had also

vi~ited

and exercised an armed force ashore.

In examining

the various claims to the Bonin Islands, he again discovered that
Russia was a prior contender there, also.

When the American squadron

visited Hakodate, one of the newly opened treaty ports in Northern
Japan, Perry became aware that Russia had recently "annexed" the
Amur region. 23
At the outset of his voyage, Perry, as might be expected,
was strongly opposed to "annexationist England."
course of the expedition, his attitude changed.

However, in the
The British had

extended him several courtesies and freely acknowledged his lead in
opening Japan.

In Russia, on the other hand, Perry perceived a

potential rival, one which "might aim to be a great maritime. power,
and to rule mistress of the Pacific."
is replete with similar warnings.

His narrative of the expedition

Noting that Russia had already

seized some of the Kurile Islands which belonged to Japan,

~e

thought

it not in "the i.tterest of any part of the commercial world that
Russia should ever own Japan," although "Russia has, doubtless, long
seen the importance to her of its acquisition."

Russia was suspected

of secret purposes, of rendering aid to Japan as an ally, with the
intention at the proper time of absorbing all of Japan.

By fortifying

the "annexed" territory at the mouth of the Amur, Russia had excited
"suspicions of ulterior designs. 1124
Although the Perry expedition never proceeded on to the Asiatic
mainland, the possibility that it might had hastened Russia 1 s occupation
along the Amur and on Sakhalin.

The uncertainty as to where Perry

intended to establish American outposts had heightened the sense of
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Russian-American competition.

To Perry, who already bemoaned the

large areas of Asia already under European sway, the Russian acquisition of the Amur must have seemed like another opportunity lost for
gaining a foothold in Northeast Asia.

Based on these experiences,

Perry made his own prophecy concerning the future rivalry with Russia:
It requires no sage to predict events so strongly foreshadowed to us all; still "Westward" will "the course of
empire take its way." But the last act of the drama is yet
to be unfolded; and notwithstanding the reasoning of
political empirics, Westward, Northward and Southward,
to me it seems that the people of America will, in some
form or other, extend their dominion and their power,
until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace
the Islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon
race upon the eastern shores of Asia. And I think, too,
that eastward and southward will her great rival in
future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power
to the coasts of China and Siam: and thus the Saxon and
the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in
friendship, on another field. Will it be in friendship?
I fear not! The antagonistic exponents of freedom and
absolutism must meet at last, and then will be fought
that mighty battle on which the world will look with
breathless interest; for on its issue will depend the
freedom or the slavery of the world,--despotism or
rational liberty must be the f.ate of civilized man.
I think I see in the distance the giants that are growing
up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress
of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be
fought. 25
The United States Surveying Expedition to the North Pacific
had different objectivesfrom Perry's expedition to Japan.

As its name

implies, the aims of the North Pacific expedition were scientific
exploration and reconnaissance, not diplomacy.

The expedition was

instructed to survey the areas navigated by whalers in the vicinity
of the Japanese archipelago and the waters north to the Bering Straits
in order to lessen the hazards of whale fishing by constructing more
accurate charts of shoals, headlands, and protected anchorages.

The

expedition was also charged with charting trans-Pacific routes over
which merchant ships could navigate safely and quickly between San
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Francisco and Asia.

Nor was the possibility of locating a strategic

coaling station along the track overlooked. 26
Senator William Seward was the chief proponent of the North
Pacific Survey Expedition.

In a major speech to the Senate in July

1852, it was he who cited the growth and importance of the American
whaling industry, while deploring the large number of disasters at
sea.
alone.

He pointed out that eleven ships had been lost in the year 1851
Elaborating on this original theme, Seward went on to give

expression to his vision of the United States expanding into the Pacific.
He foresaw "the reunion of the two civilizations, which, having parted
on the plains of Asia four thousand years ago, and having travelled
ever afterwards in opposite directions around the world, now meet
again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific Ocean."

The ordinary

whalers and survey ships were seen by Seward, then, as an opening
wedge into the region which he forecast would become the "chief theatre
of events in the world's great hereafter." 27
Five naval ships were commissioned for the expedition, but
only the movements of the two which surveyed in Russian Far Eastern
waters during the summer of 1855 are of concern here.

The 700-ton

sloop Vincennes served as flagship for Lt. John Rodgers.

The John

Hancock, a small steamer, was under the command of Lt. Henry Stevens.
The last port-of-call before commencing the final stage of the survey
in June 1855 was Hakodate, one of the two Japanese treaty ports opened
by Perry.

Word of this provision in the treaty had already circulated

among American whalers by the time the expedition arrived.

The

whaling ships were making arrangements to resort to Hakodate in large
numbers as a convenient place to re-fit and re-provision. 28
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From Hakodate, Lt. Stevens in Hancock was ordered to proceed
westward through the Tsugaru straits and thence northward along the
west coast of Hokkaido.

After passing through the La Perouse straits

into the Sea of Okhotsk,

L,~

coast of the sea first.

Then, he was to penetrate southward to the

was directed to survP.y the northern

vicinity of the Amur estuary and beyond to Castries in the Gulf of
Tartary, if possible.

Some doubt still lingered whether Sakhalin

was an island or attached to the mainlanu, making the passage from
the Sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Tartary impossible.

The locations

of several places ashore on Kamchatka and Sakhalin were provided to
Stevens in his orders as potential sources of coal deposits, and he
was advised that other localities could "doubtless be ascertained
from the Russians." 29
Like the Perry expedition, the Russians were aware of the
upcoming survey.

Governor General Muravev had offered to detail

two officers to assist the exploration of northern waters, but Rodgers
was not able to avail himself of their services.

In appreciation of

the gesture, Rodgers forwarded a set of charts made by the coastal
survey and requested in return a chart of the entrance to the Amur
River.

In politely refusing, Muravev claimed that the Amur chart

was "yet so incorrect that I do not think it deserves to get a place
in your valuable work."

The policy of Russian Siberian officials

was to welcome the American expedition cordially, but to withhold
detailed information on the Amur estuary on the grounds that

navig~

tion in the vicinity was difficult and dangerous and that the whole
coastline down to the Korean frontier belonged to Russia.

Muravev

was concerned that, if his plans to occupy the Amur region were not
successful soon, then either the English or the Americans

~JDnld
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promptly seize the Amur.

Although he believed, as early as the

spring of 1852, that Russian possession of the "land of the Gilyaks"
was being consolidated, he worried about armed foreign vessels in
the Gulf of Tartary and the American expedition to Japan.

Muravev

still considered the Americans to be friends and not yet in the same
category as the English "enemies."

However, his evaluation of the

"Palmer project" led him to take a cautious approach to the American
expedition. 30
Rodgers, who had Palmer's writings with him on the expedition,
expressed similar admiration of the Amur in his instructions to
Stevens:
The Amur is· one of the great rivers of the world. It is
the largest stream which empties into the vast Pacific. It
is a great highway of natures making from the shores of the
Pacific to the centre of Asia and at some future day a vast
commerce will doubtless be borne upon its waters. A town
at its mouth seems the Russian sister of San Francisco

31

Having received his objectives--to survey the coast of the Sea of
Okhotsk, search for coal fields, and explore the mouth of the Amur-Lt. Stevens departed

Hak~nate

in late June 1855.

Toward the end of

July the Hancock we.s steaming along the western coast of Kamchatka,
a mile or so off land whenever visibility permitted.

The ship fre-

quently anchored to allow shore parties to gather botanical specimens
and to hunt or fish.

According to Ensign Habersham, the first landing

on the soil of "despotic Russia" took place on July 26.

A few days

later coal was found and a week was spent loading 45 tons of coal on
board.

Particular examinations were made in those bays frequented

by whalers.
visited.

While at anchor a number of native settlements were

Stevens allowed one-half the crew ashore at any one time

to take on water and to engage in trade with the natives for food and
furs.

It was noted that the natives had already acquired a few American
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slang expressions from the whalers.

Arriving at Ayan, the Hancock

sailed through a fleet of seven American whalers.

The reception in

Ayan was amicable, although the town was largely deserted because of
a recent raid by the English and French.

This was the only evidence

of the Crime:an war that the expe-·ition encountered.

Habersham did

report that he met two "old acquaintances--membe-r·s of that humorous
tribe of restless Americans who live in all parts of the world,
turning over their nimble six pences or attempting to establish new
forms of government over dilapidated states."
h~d

These acquaintances

already engaged in trade with the Russians and had set up a

warehouse.

During the stay in Ayan, the Hancock crew watched the

whalers chasing their prey right into the harbor.

More whaleships

were observed near the next anchorage in the Shantar Islands.

Haber-

sham was told that once some two hundred. whalers had gathered there.
One of the attractions, aside from the whales, was the rich vegetation
ashore, particularly timber for masts and spars.

St~vens

took the

opportunity of cutting 10 cords of wood to supplement his dwindling
coal supply.32
As the end of the safe navigation season approached, Stevens
tried to enter the Amur River.

Near the entrance of the river the

Hancock approached the American merchant ship Palmetto out of San
Francisco with stores.

The Palmetto had been attempting to enter the

mouth of the Amur for ten days with the aid of a pilot and Russian
naval boats.

On board the

Palm~tto

Stevens caught a glimpse of a

chart of the straits, much to the annoyance of the Russians.

When

Stevens asked for a copy, a Russian officer told him that the chart
was secret and

c~uld

not be handed over to him.

More delay was

encountered in attempting to receive permission to enter the Amur
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from Admiral Zavoika, the Chief of Russian Naval Forces in the Amur.
When the weather began to worsen, Stevens deceided to leave the
gulf without accomplishing all of his mission.

He did ascertain in

conversation with Russian naval officers that there was a passage
through the Gulf of Tartary and that Sakhalin was indeed an island.
In his final report to KcJdgers, Stevens recommended that the Amur
River be revis'i.ted and given a good examination with "regard to the
resources of the country and the wants of the people."

He considered

that the region w0uld become a useful link in American trade with
Japan and China.

Through want of laborers, Stevens postulated that

the Russians would depend on goods from America, no matter how fertile
the soil in the Amur region.

San Francisco, he thought, would be

particularly interested in the commercial possibilities.

Stevens

also suggested stationing a United States' Consular Agent in the
Russian port of Ayan to assist the large number of whalers that called
there. 33
Rodgers reserved for the Vincennes the most hazardous phase
of the survey, the exploration through the Bering Straits into the
Arctic Ocean.

From Hakodate the Vincennes sailed along the Kurile

Islands and after a port call at Petropavlovsk headed for the Bering
Straits in early August.

Before proceeding through the straits,

Rodgers had the ship pull into shore on the Asiatic side.

The ship

was met by a large party of natives from a local Chukchi village.
The natives proved to be friendly, so Rodgers "with a good deal of
anxiety" decided to leave a twelve-man party ashore to make scientific
measurements.

In reporting to the Secretary of Navy, Rodgers carefully

added that the Chukchi were "a race still unconquered and untributary." 34
The shore party safely remained at their Siberian observation post
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nearly a month until the Vincennes returned for them.
Much survey work remained to be done after the ships of Rodgers'
expedition returned to San Francisco.

The whalers still were more

familiar with the North Pacific than the data on the charts would
show, and the trans-Pacific routes needed to be plotted in greater
detail, but the appropriations were exhausted.

The achievements of

the Perry expedition, except for the commercial opportunities opened
in Japan, were also left to wither.

The Pierce administration never

followed up with a permanent American "point of refuge" on Okinawa
or a coaling station in the Bonins.

Japan annexeu both island chains

formally in 1872 and 1875, respectively.

Perry and Rodgers and those

who advocated their expeditions were ahead of their times.

The

westward reach halted temporarily while the United States faced
its internal cirsis.
coast dwindled.
North Pacific.

Even the number of whalers along the Siberian

By 1868 there were only 68 whaling vessels in the
After 20 years of high activity, the lure of the

whale was fading.

The second wave of Americans to Northeast Asia

receded gradually and naturally, leaving behind both a reminder that
any Russian-American contest had only been deferred and a promise
of a new region, the Amur basin, to be developed. 35
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CHAPTER III
THE AMUR:

MISSISSIPPI OF NORTHERN ASIA

Aaron Palmer, the first to call attention of Americans to
the promise of the Amur region, termed the Amur the "most valuable
river in Northern Asia; the highway of nature that directly connects
the central steppes of A:;ia with the rest of the world."

He was

convinced that "a settlement at or near its embrochure would open a
new and most profitable trade with Manchuria, Central Asia, Siberia,
the Japanese Islands, Corea, etc."

He envisioned "no insurmountable

obstacles to direct communication being opened between the Pacific
and the Baltic, and with the Caspian and Black Seas, by route of
this river and the navigable waters of Siberia."

Unlike the common

conceptions of Siberia, Palmer describP.d the river basin in terms of
fertile land, supporting immense herds of animals, producing a wide
variety of minerals and teeming with wild life. 1

By 1855 a ship

of Rogers expedition had confirmed the location of the mouth of the
river and American merchantmen from San Francisco were already offloading cargo for Nikolaevsk.

Commodore Perry may well have had the

Amur region in mind when he predicted i.n 1856 "that America will
place the Saxon race on the eastern shores of Asia." 2

The region

seemed singularly suited to draw American interest--fertile, but as
yet undeveloped; temperate climate; sparsely populated with people
who should welcome the benefits of civilization; and most important,

69
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not yet under any well-defined sovereignty.

By the time that Americans

seriously began to grasp the potential of the Amur region, however,
Russia was already making strenuous efforts to place the territory
under its firm control.
As befitted a frontier zone, the geographical limits of the
Amur region were inexactly defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk of
1689, and remained so until the mid-nineteenth century.

By common

usage, the region roughly embraced the territory north of the Amur
up to and including the southern watershed of the Yablonnoj and
Stannovoj mountain ranges and then eastward to the Sea of Okhotsk
at about the Uda River.

According to the treaty provisions, the

region was an integral part of the Chinese Empire, forming the
outer reaches of Manchuria (north of Heilungkiang Province).
reality, the Amur served as a largely
the empires of Russia and China.

unoc~upied

In

buffer separating

The various groups of natives

were mostly left undisturbed and ungoverned.

Chinese frontier

posts were widely spaced along the right bank of the Amur.

Only

a few Manchurian merchants penetrated into the region to trade for
sable and ginseng.

Overland trade between the empires was trans-

acted at Kiakhta to the west in Mongolia.

A second largely

unoccupied and ungoverned region lay to the east of Manchuria proper,
between Kirin Province and the Pacific.

This territory, later named

the Maritime Region, included the land from the right bank of the
Ussuri River to the ocean.
The Russians were long aware of the potential importance of
these regions, both as a base for growing the food supplies needed
for Eastern Siberia and as an access route to the Pacific.

They
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were only deterred from advancing their boundaries southward to the
Amur by two factors.

First, throughout the eighteenth century the

Chinese Empire was militarily stronger in Manchuria than the opposite
Russian forces in Eastern Siberia.

Second, the Russian government

did not wish any border dispute with China to interrupt the valuable
flow of trade overland through Kiakhta.

The Tsarist government might

well have besn satisfied to coatiDue the ill-defined status of the
Amur border regions had not events, suddenly in 1842, upset the
balance of influence and trade in the Chinese Empire.

In that year

the British defeated the Chinese in the Opium War, widening the rift
in China's policy of exclusion from the maritime powers.

Hong Kong

was ceded to Great Britain, five treaty ports were opened to trade
and low, regular tariffs were established for imports.

The Sino-

American Treaty of Wanghia was concluded in 1844, followed by similar
treaties with other maritime nations.

To Russia, this appeared as

an encroachment on their heretofore priviledged trading position,
as in fact it soon proved to be.

The Russian merchants, still

saddled with archaic trading restrictions, were consistently undersold by their maritime rivals.

With only a dwindling supply of furs

to exchange for an increasing Russian demand for Chinese tea, the
Russian merchants were forced to offer manufactured goods in direct
competition with European and American products.

The Russian govern-

ment realized that in order to compete they needed to increase their
land ports-of-entry, come into more direct contact with the millions
of potential customers iu North China through the navigational
possibilities of the Amur and its Manchurian tributaries, and obtain
the same "treaty port" commercial concessions previously granted to
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other nations.
The appointment of Count Nikolai Muravev as Governor-general
of Eastern Siberia in 1847 signalled a shift to a more aggressive
"eastern" policy.

The advocates of a forward Asiatic policy were

opposed by a faction led by Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister,
but the expansionists gradually gained the support of the emperor.
In the subsequent 13 years, Russia acquired substantial additional
territory for the empire without provoking war with China.

Through

the daring execution, deft timing and the skillful diplomacy of a
handful of leaders, Russia gained the strategic Amur and Maritime
regions which would become the bastion of Asiatic Russia and the
jumping off place during the next attempt to further their Pacific
empire forty years later.
Muravev, himself, provided the rationale for this change in
policy.

In 1853 he made a proposal to the tsar which slowly gained

acceptance within the imperial government and became the basis for
its Pacific policy for the remainder of the century.

Muravev urged,

now that the Americans had advanced across the continent to the Pacific,
that Russia recognize the inevitability of the "North American States"
spreading over all the North American continent.

As a consequence

of this advance, Russia should yield its own North American possessions gracefully and peacefully.

In exchange for this free hand

in North America, Muravev thought that the United States could be
expected to help fend off Great Britain, while Russia redirected
its efforts to extend its rule over the whole Asian littoral of the
Pacific Ocean.

The friendly partnership of the United States and

Russia was expected to result in a sharing of predominance over the
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North Pacific, each from its own continent.
sound and workable in all respects save one.

Muravev's plan proved
Muravev did not foresee

that the Americans would not be content to remain in North America.
They wanted to extend the area of partnership to the development of
all Northeast Asia.
Americans as well.

Soon it would be necessary to fend off the

3

Moving cautiously to expand southward, Russia first engaged
in a series of explorations to gather inforroation about the Amur
buffer zone and the people who inhabited these regions.

The Russian-

American Company was directed to mount these expeditions, although
the government paid most of the expenses and furnished personnel
from the active services.

In this manner, as Okun states, the govern-

ment found it useful "to cloak that expansion behind private initiative."4

Lieutenant Orlov was sent overland from Ayan in 1849 to

establish trade relations with the Gilyaks near the Amur.

The Russian

authorities conveniently considered that the "Gilyaks and their
kinsmen apparently do not recognize the sovereignty of China."

The

following year Orlov returned to found a small settlement on the
Sea of Okhotsk just to the north of the mouth of the Amur River.
The Gilyaks were now becoming fast friends with the Russians.
were recruited into the Russian service.

Some

And when they became upset

about the appearance of foreign ships (probably American whalers)
in the Gulf of Tartary, Orlov was able to assure them that Russia
would defend them.

Concurrently with Orlov's overland expeditions,

Captain Nevelskoj had been energetically exploring from the sea
approaches.

In 1849 he was able to report categorically that the

Amur estuary was navigable with some precautions and that Sakhalin
was an island not a peninsula.

Nevelskoj raised the Russian flag in
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1850 for the first time on the lower reaches of the Amur at the site
of Nikolaevsk.

Nevelskoj announced to the native tribesmen and

commanded that all foreigners be shown the following proclamation:
In the name of the Russian Government all foreign vessels
sailing in the Gulf of Tartary are hereby notified that
inasmuch as the shore of this gulf and t~e whole Amur
region down to the Korean frontier as well as Sakhalin
Island constitute Russian possessions, neither unauthorized dispositions nor injuries to the inhabitants can be
tolerated here.
Nicholas I supported Nevelskoj's actions and over-rode Nesselrode's
objections by declaring "where the Russian flag has flown it must not
be lowered again."
begun.

The permanent occupation o£ the Amur region had

Russian ships in those waters were instructed to inform any

foreign ship encountered that any attempt to occupy any point in
the region would not be tolerated.

Despite the many American whalers

which visited the nearby Shantar Island area, Muravev was mainly
fearful that England would gain a foothold in Northeast Asia before
the Russians could consolidate their position.

When, in 1848 an

Englishman named Austin, for example, attempted to raft down the
Amur, Muravev had him arrested and returned to St. Petersburg.

By

contrast, later American expeditions to the area met a cautious,
but cordial reception.5
The United States had a hint about the Russian move into the
Amur region at least by the end of 1851.

Neill Brown, the American

minister to St. Petersburg, reported that a reliable source had informed him that Russia had acquired the Amur delta by treaty from
China.

In Brown's opinion this was just "another step towards the

acquisition of territory which has been the ruling passion of Russia
for more than a century."

American whalers who sailed the Okhotsk

Sea undoubtedly also brought back the news of the Russian occupation
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of the Amur estuary.

By 1853 Alexander Bodisko, the Russian Minister

in Washington, was able to report to

his government that at least

some Americans seemed anxious for Russia to seize both banks of the
Amur and to open commerce from there with the United States. 6
The Russian occupation was extehded to the Maritime region
in 1853.

Settlements were established at Castries Bay and Imperator-

skij Bay handreds of miles south of the Amur estuary on the Gulf
of Tartary as well as at Mariinsk on the right bank of the lower
Amur.

Reconnaissance expeditions had also been exploring Sakhalin

Island because of its strategic location guarding the Amur estuary
and because of reported coal deposits there.

News of the Perry

expedition to Japan gave added impetus to the Russian scramble to
establish a prior presence in the whole region and on Sakhalin in
particular.

In February 1853 the Rut3sian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

expressed its concern to Bodisko that Perry's expedition to Japan
had designs on Sakhalin Island.

Bodisko was advised that Russia

could not permit that and the United States should be told that
Russia would regard such a move "as contrary to the friendly relations
which excel between the two countries."

To forestall the Americans,

Nevelskoj received the imperial instructions for the Russian-American
Company to occupy points on Sakhalin in July 1853.

By October the

first Russian fort was being constructed at Aniwa Bay on the southern
end of the island despite the presence of both Ainus and Japanese.
Nevelskoj was directed not to harass the Japanese, but not to allow
any foreign settlements on Sakhalin either. 7
This four-year (1849-1853) flurry of occupation, which gave
Russia nominal possession of huge tracts of the previous buffer zone
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with China, was carried out by a relatively few hardy frontiersmen.
Most of the posts were manned by less than 10 men, though 100 had been
allotted to all of Sekhalin.

While company officers such as Nevel-

skoj and Orlov led the expeditions, they were financed and directed
by the government.

Perhaps because of the small size of the detach-

ments, for a few years the Chinese government was kept largely in
the dark about these border developments.

Perry had earlier intelli-

gence on the annexation of the Amur than the Chinese.

But the scale

of activity required to tie the Transbajkal region in with the Amur
estuary would alert the Chinese authorities at their strongholds
along the river.

Approval for this step was granted when it became

apparent that Britain and France were preparing for war against
Russia.

The Russian government was seriously concerned about its

exposed Pacific possessions.

Early in 1854, therefore, the Tsarist

government permitted Muravev to undertake this last step, a ship
and raft expedition down the whole length of the river to reinforce
and reprovision the ports on the Pacific coast. 8
The Crimean War, once declared, furthered Russia's ambitions
in the Far East in many ways.

Heretofore, the Russians had acted

in utmost secrecy or, if confronted,

h~d

made a pretense that their

posts at the mouth of the Amur were simply to defend the waterway
from foreign encroachment.

In actuality, the only pre-war encroach-

ment came from American whalers, not from the feared British.

Then

with the onset of hostilities, Muravev had a ready-made excuse, not
only for overtly reinforcing the garrisons on the coast, but for
establishing cossack settlements along the whole left bank of the
Amur to secure the line of transport and supply.

Henceforth the
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operations became more openly a government affair directed from
Irkutsk.

In April 1854, Muravev sent a note to the Chinese govern-

ment boldly informing it of the intention to take Russian troops
down the Amur to the Pacific.

Although this first contingent was

probably only a thousand men, the Chinese were helpless to oppose
the move.

Since the time that the Manchus had succeeded to the throne,

Manchuria proper had been drained of military manpower and governmental structure to meet the demands of ruling China.
period, because the

~mnchu

During this

dynasty was faced with the serious Taiping

rebellion, it was unable to release reinforcements to protect the
northern border regions.

In the late spring of 1855, Muravev led

an even larger expedition down the· Amur consisting of some 7000
Rus3ia 1 s hold on the lower Amur was now

,military men and settlers.

too strong for China alone to dislodge.

9

Moreover, the imperial policy was firming toward supporting
Muravev's design for permanent possession.

The Crimean War dramati-

cally demonstrated the vulnerability of Russia's Pacific possessions.
The strategic value of the Amur transportation route
was proved in actual operations.

~sing

the Amur

Though only a minor engagement 5

compared to the battles on the Crimea, Russia did enjoy a signal
victory at Petropavlovsk.

Thanks to reinforcements sent to them by

Muravev down the Amur, the Russians were able to drive off an attacking allied fleet in 1854. 10
The onset of the Crimean War brought with it conflicting
claims for American support and sympathy.

Each side sought to enlist

the benevolent neutrality, if not the outright participation of the
United States, in its cause.

During the war, the United States'

government, while proclaiming its strict neutrality, actually
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befriended Russia in many small ways.

And American public opinion

was, by and large, pro-Russian, or at least gave voice to Anglophobia.
Nevertheless, a large segment of the American press and journals,
often reflecting Western European publications, thought that the
United States should side with England and France against "Asiatic
despotism."

Americans were being asked to examine the merits of the

combatants and to make a choice.

The ensuing journalistic debate

first raised issues which were to grow in proportion during the rest
of the century and form the initial arguments questioning the underlying value of the traditional friendship with Russia.ll
Despite the press reaction, the Crimean War usherzd in a
period of unprecedented official cooperation between the United States
and Russia, particularly in the Pacific region.

While the war was

only in the threatening stage, the Russian foreign office enquired
of Bodisko, concerning the extent of American neutrality.
reply he

s~ggested

In his

a policy which Russia repeatedly applied--appeal

to the self-interest of the United States by offering commercial
favors.

The prospect of supplanting British merchants in the lucra-

tive Russian market was dangled before the American traders.

Import

duties were lowered on American goods entering Russia such as cotton
and sugar, which had previously been carried in Engtish ships.
Yankees were to be encouraged by these inducements to risk trading
with Russia and, if an incident occurred with the English blockading
fleet, the United States might be drawn into the conflict on the
side of Russia.

This move was countered by England's agreement to

recognize, for the first time, that the neutral flag protected all
cargo except contraband, a position that the United States had long
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maintained.

However, only in the Pacific, where it was impossible

for the English and·French to blockade the whole Russian coastline
effectively, were Americans able to take full advantage of the trading opportunities. 12
The American-Russian Commercial Company was one of the first
to take advantage of the wartime opportunities.

The company had

been formed by a group of San Francisco businessmen and political
figures in 1852 to buy Alaskan ice for resale in the United States.
Encouraged by the initial success of the enterprise, the president
of the company, Beverley C. Sanders, decided to journey to St.
Petersburg to seek a long-term contract covering a wider range of
products.

Before sailing, he consulted with Bodisko in Washington

and had an interview with President Pierce.

He was also afforded

an official courier's passport by Secretary of State William Marcy.
Cloaked in a semi-official status, Sanders arrived at the Russian
capitol in March 1854 in company with Thomas Seymour, the new American
minister.

Sanders was fully aware that this was an opportune time

to conduct business.

Since the Russians were anxious to express

..

their friendship for the United States, Sanders easily gained access
to government officials and the directors of the Russian-American
Company.

In these conversations Sanders insisted on a twenty-year

exclusive contract to market all of Alaska's exports except furs,
i.e., not only ice, but coal, lumber and fish.

Granting such generous

privileges to an American company was not only a reversal of previous
policies, but the contract terms also extended far beyond the life
of the Russian-American Company's charter itself.

For this reason,

the commercial agreement was granted only through the special
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dispensation of the Tsar.

As late as 1850, the Russian government,

while again permitting some American trade in Siberia, had specifically
refused to permit American vessels to trade in Ala3ka.

The Russian

acquiescence can only be explained by their desperate need to supply
Russian-America and Asiatic Russia by neutral ships during the war. 13
Foreseeing that England and France might join in the hostilities against them, Russia had long worried about the vulnerability
of its possessions in America.

To forestall any future attack,

the Russian vice consul and agent of the Russian-American Company
in San Francisco, Peter Kostromitov, devised a ruse to sell the
colony to the American-Russian Company.

When terms of the fictitious

sale were sent to the new Russian charg~ d'affaires, Edward de
Stoeckl, he asked for advice from Marcy and Senator Gwin of California.
All agreed that the deception could not be maintained and might
embroil the United States.
sary.

As it turned out, the "sale" was unneces-

The Russian-American Company was able to reach an agreement

with the Hudson's Bay Company not to attack each others colonial
possessions.

The only logical reason for England granting such a

one-sided concession was probably a concern that Russia might well
cede the territory to the United States.

Despite the agreement, the

ships of the Russian-American Company were still in danger should
they attempt to supply the colonies. 14
Upon his departure from St. Petersburg, Sanders wrote a
letter to Grand Duke Constantine which reflected his view of RussianAmerican relations:
These two nations ought to be good friends and allies. There
neither exists nor can arise any questions of policy • • •
to disturb the friendly relations which have hitherto marked
their intercourse with each other. Russia wants nothing
America owns or desires to possess; and America does not
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covet anything which Russia has or desires to acquire;
hence the two nations can go on to the fulfillment of
their respective destinies without entertaining the
slightest jealousy of each others prosperity and
greatnecls.
After his return, Sanders turned energetically to helping the Russians.
He ordered constructed a 450-ton steamer, the Astoria, and purchased
a 287-ton bark, the Cyane.

Both were turned over to the Russian-

American Company, but retained their neutral status by having a
United States' registration and by being manned by an American crew.
These two ships kept the

Al~skan

outposts supplied during the war.

Although the record is far from complete, the quantity and variety
of trade with Asiatic Russian ports also increased under Sanders'
direction.

In December 1854 he shipped a cargo of provisions from

New York to Petropavlovsk in the Levantor.

The William Penn left

San Francisco in March 1855 with flour and gunpowder for Siberia.
In September 1855 the Palmetto of the American-Russian Company was
sightedbyCaptain Rodgers trying to enter the Amur River with needed
supplies for the Russians. 15
The American-Russian Commercial Company was not the only
American company trading at Siberian ports.

Since 1835, when William

Boardman of Boston had petitioned the Russian government and been
granted permission to trade in Kamchatka, American merchants had
resumed visiting in Asiatic Russian ports.

By 1843 they dominated

the trade of Kamchatka and by the end of the Crimean War the RussianAmerican Company brought their commercial operations on the Amur to
a close because they were unable to stand up to the competition of
American goods at Nikolaevsk. 16
Nor did

America~

whalers and merchantmen keep completely clear
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of the war zones.

In the spring of 1855, Muravev had ordered the

evacuation of the entire Petropavlovsk garrison before another
Anglo-F~cnch

assault could be mounted.

The evacuees crowded onto

two Russian warships and two chartered American transports.

They

sailed from Avacha Bay to the Amur River and were nearly captured
by an English squadron.

Rear-Admiral Zavoiko who commanded the

Russian convoy had warning from American whalers that the Allied
forces were converging around Sakhalin. 17
Both sides in the Crimean War realized that privateering
would be an effective weapon for Russia to use, if they received
help from the Americans.

When sounded out, Marcy expressed the

opinion that if he were in Russia's place, he would fit out every
available ship against the enemy's commerce.

And as far as his

countrymen were concerned, Marcy believed that they had the right
to do whatever they like--as long as it took place in foreign ports.
Stoeckl took the hint and abandoned all thoughts of arming privateers
in American ports as too risky.
American good will.
their vessels to

Whatever else, he wanted to cultivate

He also discarded a plan for Americans to take

Russian-America to arm and take out Russian citizen-

ships, even though he was convinced that "many a freebooter along
the Pacific coast" would be willing.

The privateering plans were

revived in early 1855 by Senator Gwin and Sanders, both of whom urged
that privateers based in San Francisco could sweep the allied ships
from the Pacific.

All that was needed, according to them, was money

and a few Russian officers to command the ships.
foreign ministry turned down the proposals.

Again the Russian

Not wishing to compromise

their good relations, the only place Nesselrode would consider that
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armed corsairs would be legal was Eastern Siberia and anyone who
wanted to could go there.l8
Among the breaches of strict neutrality was the United States'
attitude toward the Russian government building the warship Amerika
in New York.

Secretary Marcy was aware of the true owners, but did

not interfere as long as the letter of the law was followed.

The

steamer-corvette sailed under American flag to the Pacific by way
of Cape Horn.

At Rio de Janeiro it was intercepted by an English

warship and only the action of an American naval officer prevented
capture.

The Amerika arrived safely at the Amur in 1856 and was to

see extended diplomatic service as the flagship of Admiral Putyatin
and General Muravev.

The Amerika was to be the first of a small

fleet of steamships built in the United States for use by Russia
on the Amur after the war.l9
In dealing with Japan, the representatives of the United
States also entered into a period of cooperation with the Russians,
rather than the competitiveness displayed by Commodore Perry.

Dis-

aster had struck Admiral Putyatin's expedition in December 1854 as
he was negotiating the Russian treaty with Japan.

An earthquake at

Shimoda caused a tidal wave which severely damaged his flagship
Diana, the only ship remaining of his squadron.

When the Diana

eventually sank, Putyatin was stranded in the midst of the Crimean
War.

The Americans rendered assistance.

Captain McCluney and Com-

mander Adams arrived in Japan in January 1855 with the ratified
Japanese-American treaty.

Their offer to transport the Russian

party to Shanghai was not accepted, but they were able to provide
a service.

Through Adams, Putyatin was able to send a copy of the

treaty he had negotiated with Japan to St. Petersburg via Washington.
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Again, when the United States surveying expedition arrived in May
1855, Captain Rodgers offered friendly assistance to the shipwrecked
Russians.

Finally the American schooner Caroline E. Foote carried

a large contingent of the Russian crew safely to Kamchatka in April.
The contingent eventually found passage in William Penn from Kamchatka
to Castries Bay. 20
The Russians reciprocated these kind acts in the following
year.

Captain Poset returned with the ratified Japanese-Russian

treaty in November 1856.

At Shimada he found Townsend Harris, the

first American consul general and minister to Japan who was attempting to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan and was badly in
need of western company.

In addition to the exchanges of gifts

and friendly assistance, the representatives commenced fruitful
diplomatic cooperation in dealing with Japan.

They kept each other

informed of negotiations in progress and collaborated on policy.
When the Russian consul settled in Hakodate rather than Shimada,
Harris struggled to success on his own, concluding a commercial
treaty in July 1858.

Putyatin signed a similar treaty with Japan

a month later. 21
During the Crimean War, the United States was the only major
nation in the world which freely acknowledged a friendship for
Russia.

After the conclusion of peace, the Russian government made

a series of related diplomatic moves, ostensibly to return the friGuJship demonstrated by the Americans in the Pacific area, but which
actually served to ensure American unwitting collaboration with
Russian designs in the Amur and Maritime regions.

The Russian partial

occupation of these regions had been explained to the Chinese authorities
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as a v1artime, defensive measure.

After the war, it was necessary

to negotiate the permanent cession of these lands, but Russia wanted
the Amur issue to be kept separate from negotiations the Western
powers were then carrying on with China to liberalize trade.
avo1d embro1ling the Russo-Ch1nese bilateral

negot1a~1ons

To

1n the

larger diplomatic maneuvers, Russia sought to treat the Amur occupation as a fait accompli.

The Russian government also held out to

the United States the enticement of jointly devsloping the commercial
prospects of the Amur basin.

At the end of the war, American mer-

chants made enquiries as to the chances of trade on the Amur and
Sakhalin Island.

One of these merchants, Perry McDonough Collins,

in conversation with Stoeckl was led to believe that "the friendly
power of Russia now holGs ready and willing to further American
enterprise and energy."

The Russian foreign ntinister Gorchakov

confirmed, that although no American consul could for the time being
be admitted, the Americans would find a warm welcome.

22

Collins, a San Francisco businessman, had been thinking along
lines similar to Palmer.

By 1855 he had determined in his own mind

that the Amur River was "the destined channel by which American
commercial enterprise was to penetrate the obscure depths of Northern
Asia, and open a new world to trade and civilization."

When Collins

learned that the Russians had taken possession of the Amur country
and formed a settlement at the mouth of the river, he decided to
investigate the river personally.
Siberia from West to East.

Like Ledyard, he chose to cross

Unlike Ledyard, he decided not to go

without credentials, so he proceeded first to Washington and conferred
with President Pierce, Secretary of State Marcy and Russian Minister
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Stoeckl.

The latter offered him encouragement concerning his reception

in Russia.

In March 1856 he was appointed Commercial Agent of the

United States for the Amur River and arrived at Kronstadt in May.
Collins' presence in Russia placed the authorities in a somewhat
awkward position.

The Amur territory was not yet officially ceded

to Russia, so the matter of accepting a foreign consul in the region
created an anomalous situation.

And if a United States' consul

were recognized, representatives of other powers, such as Great
Britain, would have to be allowed in.

At the time, the third Russian

expedition was still proceeding down the river.

By the end of the

year, though, the Russian occupation was an accomplished fact.
The Manchu authorities no longer posed any threat to the left bank
of the river.

The Amur was no longer an internal river of China.

Muravev sol,red the dilemma posed by Collins' presence by treating
him with every courtesy and show of cooperation, but he did delay
his departure from Moscow until December 1856.

Thereafter, Collins

travelled with Muravev himself or one of his officers.

He was held

up in Irkutsk and Chita until May 1857, when he was at last permitted
to travel down the Amur to its mouth, arriving in July 1857.

He

then proceeded back to San Francisco by way of Hakodate, Petropavlovsk,
and the Sandwich Islands. 23
Collins' reports to Washington both during and after his
journey could not have been better designed to reveal that the interest
of the United States lay with supporting Russia in its occupation of
the Amur region.

Whether deliberately misled by the Russian authorities

or betrayed by too active an imagination, Collins painted a picture
of a future American commercial empire spreading deep into the
interior of Northern Asia.

A few excerpts from his reports illustrate
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this point.

On the eve of his departure from Moscow, Collins was

confident:
that the entering wedge, which is now for the first time
about to be driven into the heart of Manchooria, will in
good time produce all the good results to our country which
I have anticipated, and may eventually prove of vast
importance to our commerce. At all events our cnuntry will
be first in the knowledge of this hitherto "terra incognita."
That the waters of Lake Baikal can be connected with the
Amoor I think there is no doubt, and thus open the very
heart of Siberia to our Pacific commerce.
From Irkutsk Collins reported that he told Muravev:
that the opening of a direct commerce between Siberia and
the United States, by way of the Amoor, would develop
an immense amount of commerce now latent, would stimulate
all branches of industry, and finally make that vast
country known to the world.
Collins also supported further Russian expansion at Chinese expense:
The probability is that Russia will find it necessary
in order to give peace and security to the trade on
this important river, from her Siberian possessions
into the ocean, to follow our example in the acquisition
of Louisiana; for the whole of Manchooria is as necessary
to the undisturbed commerce of the Amoor as Louisiana
was to our use of the Mississippi; consequently, in my
opinion, nothing short of the Chinese wall will be a
sufficient boundary on the south • • • it would be very
advantageous to us, if this should take place; these
immense countries would then be open to our commerce
and enterprise, and a great city would spring up at the
south of the Amoor, unlocking to us a country of vast
extent and untold wealth.
Concerning Muravev, Collins reported:
He is very anxious to open up the commerce of the
country through this river, and, as stated in another
part of this report, has prevailed upon his government
to grant free trade for a term of years on the Pacific
coasts.
Finally, Collins recommended that the United States create a "commercial
system for Asiatic Russia" so that the "navigable waters of the Amur
can be penetrated from our own Pacific seaports." 24
In the course of his travels, Collins was encouraged by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
evidence that the commercial development that he dreamed of was
already taking place.

At Nikolaevsk, where Collins estimated the

whole trade of the Siberian sea coast would concentrate, he found
five American commercial houses already in operation.

During 1856

and 1857 3 a number of cargoes had already been unloaded.

On his

return voyage Collins noted the establishment of two American commercial houses each at Hakodate and Petropavlovsk.
With glowing reports from Collins, their commercial agent,
and enthusiastic support from congressional members, the United
States' administration was more than willing to continue to accept
the Russian offer to march together in the negotiations with China.
Senator Gwin and Representative Scott of California were among those
who were beguil8d by the new field of commercial enterprise.

Based

on Collins' reports, they believed that the Amur gave Californians
"a ready and facile access to the very center of northern Asia."
They foresaw the Amur becoming "the Mississippi of northern Asia."
No matter how remote the Amur basin, a comparison to the prosperous
development of the Mississippi could evoke support.

The New York

Herald reported that the Amur was second only in importance to the
Mississippi and that "the whole Amoor basin is as necessary to Russia
as was the Mississippi Valley to us."

Leaders on the West

Coast pictured the Amur as directly across the Pacific, opposite
their ports.

These commercial prospects gave added incentive to

connecting the Pacific coast by railroad with the rest of the United
States.

25
The United States, in general, sympathized with Russian

expansion and looked with disfavor on English attempts to stem these
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advances.

This had been one of the deciding reasons

whi~h

had kept

the United States friendly to Russia during the Crimean War.

The

United States saw a parallel with its own efforts to expand in the
western hemisphere being checked by Britain.

In the Pacific, for

example, the Pierce administration had been optimistic, in 1854,
that the Hawaiian Islands would request to be annexed by the United
States.

Both England and France were bitterly opposed.

When Secre-

tary Marcy

so~nded

response.

Russia was only too happy to encourage any move that

out the Russians, however, he received a positive

might create active antagonism between the United States and Great
Britain. 26

Thus when English statesmen and English publications

inveighed against the dominion Russia was attempting in Northern
Asia, the United States foresaw no adverse impact on its national
interest in Russia occupying the Amur.

English carping was passed

off as the usual jealousy which they exprecsed at any nation expanding other than the British empire.
America an inside track

t~

Besides, Russian expansion promised

commercial development in the region.

The United States much preferred to compete in the North Pacific
with what was considered to be a relatively weak sea power, than
with the English merchant fleet.

A better balance of power in

Asia was thought to help the United States.

Most Americans found

nothing reprehensible about the continental expansion of Russia.
Opening the Amur to inland navigation, gaining access to the sea,
settling and cultivating the

land--thes~

were aims that the United

States found compatible with its own continental experience.
Americans at the time felt few foreboding3
the China market.

abc~t

Russia dominating

Rather, they felt confident that Russia would

provide them with the edge to do just that.
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Several years afterwards, a New York Times editorial summed
up the prevailing American opinion:
She (Russia) availed herself of a war with France and
England to quietly and unobservably acquire on the Amoor
a territory worth as much as six times as much as was
lost by the expenses of the war • • • • The great dream
of modern Russia • • • has been a St. Petersburg on the
Pacific • • • which would not be ice-bound six months in
the year • • • • It would of course be inde.licate and
discourteous to interfere with Russia's own little
Chinese maneuvers • • • • It is by no means to the disadvantage of American commerce or manufacturers that the
advance has been made long even before the Pacific
shall have become the Mediterranean of the future. 27
William Reed was appointed to be the American minister plenipotentiary to China in April 1857.

Before departing on his mission,

he studied ail the material he could find on China and submitted
his views to the

Secre~ary

of State.

Among the many diplomatic

issues which he expected to confront in China, the subject of the
"Russo-Chinese connexion in the North" was more important than
generally imagined.

Reed wanted "candid revelations of the real

state of things between them (Russia) and China."

An earlier warning

had been voiced by Humphrey Marshall, a previous United States
Commissioner to China.

During the Taiping rebellion, Marshall was

alarmed at reports that Russia was preparing to render military
assistance to China.

Marshall was concerned that such assistance

might lead to a Russian protectorate over China which would uullify
United States interests in the future, including American fishing
in the North Pacific.

His recommendation was unequivocal:

I think, then, that almost any sacrifice should be made
by the United States to keep Russia from spreading her
Pacific boundary, and to avoid her coming directly to
an interference in Chinese domestic affairs.
Like Marshall before him, Reed did not want Russia to gain undue
advantage:
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if a distinction be taken in favour of Russia in
consequence of her conterminous relations to China,
it occurs to me that the relation of our Pacific coast
and commerce is quite as close as that of the deserts and
caravan intercourse of Asiatic Russia. No one can look
at the map of the world without being impressed by the
peculiar geographical relations of the United States and
Russia to the Chinese Empire.
Moreover, Reed had gleaned the intelligence that the picture of
Russia as the friend and protector of China might not be entirely
accurate, instead, "that difficulties, if not actual hostilities,
have occurred between the Russians and Chinese so that in the existing war a new and unexpectP.d belligerent party may be added."

Reed

considered the "whole subject of the Russian navigation of the Amour
by steam and her naval stations very interesting" and that in the
threatened acquisition of Chinese territory "Russia may have her
designs as well. " 28
Fortuitously for Russia, the Foreign Ministry had advised
Stoeckl in February 1857 how to counter just such issues if they
were raised in Washington.

The Russian position was:

The consolidation of our position at the estuary of the
Amur River is in no way a conquest. According to our pLevious treaties with the Chinese government we have long
established rights to the estuary of the river and, if
until now, we have not found it necessary to proclaim this
publicly, it has not made our rights less obvious. Count
Putyatin, whose mission is of an entirely peaceful character,
is commissioned only to come to an agreement with the Chinese
government on several secondary points connected with this
question, which demands the best possible solution. Opening free navigation over the Amur River is for us an utter
necessity which cannot be contested.29
When Secretary of State Lewis Cass issued detailed guidance to
Reed for the conduct of his mission, the subject of the Amur occupation or possible Russo-Chinese hostilities was not specifically
mentioned.

Rather, Reed's instructions contained a clear call to

cooperate with the Russian envoy:
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You are authorized, therefore, to communicate with him as
far as rracticable upon all subjects of mutual concern,
and should his disposition prove favorable, as it is
believed it will, his cooperation may be highly advantageous in promoting the objects of your mission. This
cooperation is to be expected, moreover, with the
greater confidence, because there is nothing in the
policy of the United States with respect to China which
is not quite consistent with the pacific relations whic~
are understood to exist between that empire and Russia. 0
The Russian-American cooperation in dealing with the Chinese
Empire was sealed when Thomas Seymour, the American minister in St.
Petersburg was instructed to show a copy of Reed's instructions to
Foreign Minister Gorchakov.

Seymour was able to report back that

Gorchakov was very pleased and that the Tsar had told the Russian
envoy, Admiral Putyatin, "to give his warmest support to the United
States' envoy and to cooperate with him in the fullest manner."
also asked about the state of Russo-Chinese relations.

Cass

Again, Sey~

mour was able to reply reassuringly, advising that in his view the
relations were amicable.

About the alleged Russian occupation,

Seymour was unable to give additional details, but gave as his
opinion:
That Russia is strengthening her power in that direction
is no doubt true--1 am quite certain, however, from what
has often been said to me on the subject of the Russian
possessions on the Amur, that Russia desires the Amur may
be open to trade with the United States, and that every
reasonable encouragement will be given to our citizens to
come there, and unite with the Russians in laying the
foundation of a future profitable commerce between the
two countries by exchange of commodities across the
Pacific.
This opinion was bolstered by a subsequent conversation held with
Count Muravev, who told Seymour that Russia had opened up the Amur
region to foreign trade and that three duty-free ports had been
designated--Castries Bay, Mariinsk, and Nikolaevsk.

Muravev also
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lightly inserted the Russian claim to the Maritime Region, which had
only been partially occupied, and was then being reinforced.
n~ws

When this

reached Washington in the spring of 1858, together with reports

from Perry Collins about the American prospects for commercial gain
along the Amur, the United States' policy of leaving the Amur to
the Russians was firmly set.31
But while the Russian occupation was an accomplished fact,
China had not yet officially relinquished its claims.

This was the

primary goal which Admiral Putyatin was directed to accomplish.

The

Admiral had a very delicate assignment when he joi.ned the representatives of the other powers making demands on China.

He hoped to cooper-

ate and benefit by their joint negotiations for commercial advantage,
but secretly he needed to treat with China on the Amur question
bilaterally.

Putyatin particularly fostered friendly relations with

Reed, with whom the stage for mutual cooperation had
arranged.

alre~dy

been

The two got along famously, exchanging views, conferring

about notes to be sent to the Chinese, and using each otherD ships
and courier services when convenient.

Putyatin spoke excellent

English, but flattered the Americans by letting them phrase his notes
into proper English.
American."

Reed considered Putyatin "at least half an

The Amur question was never raised between them.

To all

outside observers, the two seemed to represent a common front of
neutrality and peaceful intentions toward China.

Putyatin's flagship

was even constructed in the United States and named Amerika. 32
Undercover, Putyatin played another game.

In February, the

four powers agreed to send similar notes to China as a last conciliatory gesture.

The contents of these notes were freely exchanged
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among the representatives before transmission to Peking.

However,

unknown to the other envoys, Putyatin added a supplementary document,
revealing for the first time the extent of Russia's territorial
claims against China--the left bank of the Amur and the right bank
of the Ussuri where Russian towns and military posts were already
established.

Unbeknown, Putyatin also invoked

other powers for these claims.

the backing of the

This was given added weight, in the

case of the Americans, because Reed agreed to send the Russian note
to Shanghai in the U. S. frigate Mississippi. Being a gentleman and
unsuspicious, Reed did not tamper with Putyatin's mail. 33
The Chinese authorities correctly assessed that the American
barbarians and the Russian had a common purpose.

The Chinese perceived

that the two would take advantage of the strife, hoping to reap
benefits and that their objective would be to mediate and placate.
Putyatin's tactics of identifying with the Americans worked.

In

March, an imperial edict directed the Manchurian authorities to
commence boundary negotiations in the North:
As to the Russian barbarians, they have had friendly relations with China for years, but never traded on the seacoast. guddenly now there are these (Russian) documents
in Manchu, Chinese, and barbarian characters presented
appended to the American barbarian papers • • • • We have
notified Urga and Heilungkiang to send word to that
country's Senate Yamen to come to an agreement with them
on the matter of their request for a boundary survey • •
The American barbarians, even though in self-vindication
they make it clear that they were not involved in the fall
of Canton, support the demands in their papers.34
The Russian foreign ministry meanwhile, in early 1858, had
decided that Putyatin's mission was too complex.

Gorchakov decided

that, henceforth, Muravev would be entrusted with negotiations on the
Amur trontier, while Putyatin would concentrate solely on obtaining
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the same privileges from China as the other nations obtained.

From

then on, Putyatin could concentrate on obtaining the goodwill of
China so that they would cede the Amur as a reward.

He not only

joined Reed in mediating for the Chinese in trying to meet the British
and French demands, but also offered Russian military equipment and
instructions to bolster the Chinese defenses.
diplomatic

mane~~ering

In all this complicated

Putyatin was successful in keeping the Amur

issue out of the general Chinese negotiations.

Only once did the

Chinese ask American representatives to intercede with Russia about
the Amur frontier.

According to S. Wells Williams, one of the

interpreters with Reed, the Chinese in May 1858 alluded to the
difficulties of the inhabitants of the ceded district, but:
everything said by a Chinese must be taken with allowance.
The weak always resort to cunning and deceit, and I don't
believe this assertion. If Russia wishes to take all the
territory in Manchuria lying North of the Saghalien (Amur)
the matter of dispute concerning an old territory can be as
easily brought up as it was in the American war with
Mexico in 1846 or the Russian with Turkey. However, this
river is by far the most proper outlet for the trade as it
is for the drainage of Eastern Siberia, and it is of no use
to the Chinese in comparison to the facilities it affords
the Russians.
Williams may not have even informed Reed about the conversation, for
Reed made no report of any Chinese appeal.

The personal views of

Williams probably closely reflected the official opinion of the United
States. 35
Meanwhile, Muravev with his new diplomatic authority was
negotiating at Aigun with the Chinese military commander at Heilungkiang.
Muravev was successful in overawing the Chinese negotiator and forcing
a treaty to be signed in late May 1858 which ceded to Russia most of
its demands.

Asiqe from the territorial question, one provision had
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an important bearing on American dreams of commerically developing
the Amur River basin.

The treaties provided for free navigation of

all frontier rivers, but for Russian and Chinese vessels only.

For

all the bright prospects reported by Collins, Muravev had no intention of America monopolizing the trade along the Amur.

Not until

August 1858 did Reed learn of the Aigun treaty and then only from
an unofficial source.

An American schooner which had arrived at

Shanghai from the Russian settlements on the Amur brought him the
news.

There is no evidence that Reed ever received a candid account-

ing of the Aigun negotiations from any Russian envoy,

or that he

demanded one, before he himself departed China in December.

Perhaps

he was too preoccupied with negotiating the Treaty of Tientsin and
the subsequent tariff issues with the Chinese to question the Russians
bluntly.

Nor does it seem that he passed his information on to his

fellow British or French diplomats.

Nevertheless, the Boston Daily

Advertiser credited Reed for giving the United States a favorable
position on the Amur since "the accession of Russia in that quarter
must eventually open to our commerce the whole of northeastern Asia."36
When the Chinese imperial court rejected the terms of the
Aigun treaty, the Russian government persisted, directing in June
1859 that Count Ignatev, their new envoy, reopen boundary negotiations
in Peking.
Pe~ing

The new American minister, John Ward, also arrived in

that same summer to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of

Tientsin.

The Chinese immediately suspected the two countries to

be in collusion and that the "Russian barbarians are taking advantage
of the American barbarians coming to Peking to follow their lead."
The Chinese thwarted every effort of the Russian and American delegations
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from meeting and freely communicating with each other in Peking.
Later, when the Anglo-French forces were preparing to attack China,
Ward was instructed to cooperate with the Russian minister in any
proper efforts to bring the approaching conflict to an amicable
conclusion.

In Shanghai, in June 1860, Ignatev and Ward were finally

able to communicate openly and assure one another that the intentions
of the Russian government were identical with the policies of the
United States.

They addressed joint notes to the Chinese Supreme

Council expressing friendship and their willingness to render the
Chinese any service consistent with a position of entire neutrality.
After the Anglo-French forces occupied Peking, Ignatev did serve the
Chinese as a successful mediator.

In return, Ignatev was able to

negotiate the Russian Treaty of Peking in November, by which the
Chinese again granted all the territorial demands of Russia.

Al-

though the Anglo-French military operations provided the chief
incentive in forcing the Chinese to make such concessions, Russia's
diplomatic triumph was, in some measure, the result of American
tacit cooperation and lack of interference in Russian expansion.

At

no time did the United States seek or receive, in return for its
cooperation and goodwill, any binding agreement from Russia guaranteeing commercial access to the Amur region. 37
In the short run, neither the dreams of Collins or Muravev
were completely fulfilled.
Pacific power.

Russia did not inwediately become a major

In 1872 Vladivostok, near Korea in the Southern Mari-

time region, became the principal port and fortress of Asiatic Russia,
but the Russian Pacific fleet declined in strength.

Russian ships

still depended on Japanese ports when Vladivostok became frozen for
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four months of the year.

Economically, the development of the Amur-

Maritime provinces proved to be a slow process.
not compete with seaborne commerce.

Trade with China did

Nor did the Amur really serve

as an adequate food base for many decades.

Climate and disease

prevented sufficient crops to be harvested to feed even the few
settlers in the region and grain was imported in large quantities
from America.

The possession of the newly acquired territories long

proved a financial burden to the state. 38
When Collins returned to St. Petersburg at the end of 1858,
he was still enthusiastic enough to persuade the American minister,
Francis Pickens, that an Amur "Op""n Door" was at hand, which would
unlock the commerce of Asia.

But a more realistic picture was being

reported by Harrison Chase, who had been appointed as Vice-Consul
at Nikolaevsk when Collins left.

Chase was an agent of the William

Boardman Company, the first American trading company to set up
business on the Amur.
of the river.

They were established before Collins' descent

Chase himself was a competent observer who knew the

Russian language and was well acquainted.

He served previously at

Petropavlovsk and Casties Bay during the Crimean War.

From his

vantage point, Chase concluded that the trade "has not been so
particularly satisfactory and encouraging to Americans as from some
cause generally expected in the United States."
reasons.
weathero

He cited numerous

Trade was limited to six or seven months of the year by
Growth of trade was slow.

only afford the necessities.

The sparse population could

The lack of laborers slowed agriculture

and held up the development of natural resources, hence no export
trade.

Stringent port regulations, local ordinances and the monopoly

exercised by the Amur Company up river hindered commerce.

The
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expected commerce with Northern China did not open up and the lack
of steam transport prevented goods from being transshipped along the
Amur.

To emphasize the bleakness of the prospects, Chase quoted

a statement made by Muravev in May 1859:
No foreigners have a right to trade on the river above
Sophisk and can only pass through the country as travellers.
Foreigners are not allowed to have Russian agents up the
river or in the interior.
Having achieved its diplomatic ends, Russia closed the door to American interests except at coastal seaports.

The Amur, as a result,

was not destined to become the "Mississippi of Northern Asia." 39
The disillusionment over the earlier grandiose schemes did
not completely dampen American interest in Northeast Asia.
continued on with other plans.

Collins

By 1859, the number of American

commercial houses at Nikolaevsk had increased to seven.

Collins'

book about his travels down the Amur, which was published in 1860,
added to the interest in the region among his fellow countrymen.
Writing about opening trade with the region drained by the Amur,
Hunt's Magazine predicted that "development of this great commerce
must produce as great a revolution in the commercial world as did
the discovery of the passage to India."

Several years later, Hunt's

Magazine was more cautious and wrote about more practical aspects
of the trade, concluding that advantages would depend upon the "sagacity
attd nerve" of the American merchants.

Harper's noted that the Amur

region would become the home of a "settled and industrious population
whose geographical position will necessarily bring them into intimate
relations with our own Pacific shores."

A New York Times editorial

described the Amur prospects as one of "the grandest schemes of
American enterprise in the paths of commerce and civilization" which
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"must rapidly assume proportions of immense importance, not only to
Russia, but to the United States. ,AO
The decade of the 1850s had been a period of almost uniformly
good relations between Russia and the United States, but it had also
been marked by rapid changes which required adjustments on America's
part to a larger role in the Pacific.

During the Crimean War, the

United States had actively assisted Russia in the Pacific.

A

f~w

years later, American emissaries were deeply involved with European,
particularly Russian, diplomats trying to persuade China to open her
commerce.

As the United States turned more and more to a Pacific

front, the distance acroes the North Pacific loomed less great.
The geography of Northeast Asia, too, had become more familiar and
less forbidding.

The virtues of the Amur had been extolled

~>uffi

ciently so that prospects of sharing the riches of the region seemed
both natural and attractive.

Californians, especially, saw the West

Coast linked closely to the regions directly across the Pacific from
them.

As early as 1856, Americans could read predictions of a

"continuous line of railway and ocean-steam navigation, reaching
round the globe and turning the commerce of the East through the
heart of America o.nd Russia. 1141
Confronted with the new situation of the 1850s and the
possibilities offered, Americans were of several minds as to what
the future portended for them in Northeast Asia.

The New York Times

was already focussing attention southward on Manchuria as "peculiarly
a market for the heavy manufacturers of the American mills" and
predicting that "Americans will doubtless possess themselves of the
better share of the internal comme't"ce" secured there.

In speaking of
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"Our Empire on the Pacific," Hunt's Magazine predicted that the political influence of California would not be confined to "this side of
the Pacific," but is "destined to reanimate the slumbering nations
of Eastern Asia."

According to the New York Herald, the "young

eagle" was not satisfied just to "gird the Western World," but is
"already taking wing still westward over the Pacific Ocean."

When

"West meets East" the treasures of Asia will be poured into the lap
of the American Republic in return for the "principles of liberty
and civilization."

Across the Pacific "the United States will one

day take the (Russian) bear behind, the thus dispatch him."
Southern Literary Messenger thought otherwise.

The

It agreed that the

United States was changing front from the Atlantic to the Pacific
and would "soon be closely connected with China," but did not believe
that the United States could check the progress of Russia for control
of China any more than the Anglo-Saxon race could be curbed in the
Western Hemisphere.

"At no distant period • • • the world will divide

into two immense empires.

What then?"4Z

As the success of the Russian advance into the Amur and
Maritime regions became more apparent later in the decade, some
American observers became less sanguine that the "star of empire"
always moved westward.

They became more willing, as Muravev had hoped,

to concede almost unlimited sway to Russia on its own continent.
From Sto Petersburg, Minister Pickens warned that Russia was sending
large contingents of settlers to the Amur from whence Russia could
exert "great power over all the North China."
in a series of editorials, went further.

The New York Times,

Asia was "as certainly the

theatre of Russian manifest destiny, as is America for the people of
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the United States."

It was only a matter of time before the Anglo-

Saxon race established sovereignty of the Western Hemisphere and
the Sclavonic races "material supremacy in the Eastern."

What would

happen when the two great expansive powers advanced "at the same
pace toward the same field, the Pacific world?"

The New York Times

speculated that an encounter and a conflict would occur with
"sovereignty of the globe as the ultimate prize of the competition.rr43
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CHAPTER IV
CONNECTING THE CONTINENTS

The events of the American Civil War had little direct bearing
on the relations of the United States and Russia in Northeast Asia.
Indirectlythough, the cordial relations that were engendered in the
course of the war made a significant impact on each nation's posture
and strategy in the North Pacific.

The immediate post-war years

marked the height of Russian-American friendship.

The wartime spirit

of cooperation led to a joint attempt to link Asia and North America
by telegraph line.

And that same sense of friendship and obligation

to one another greatly facilitated the sale of Russian-America to
the United States.

From this period emerged also a whole litany con-

cerning the "lasting and traditional" friendship between the two
peoples which was frequently invoked in later years, but which
reflected only an ephemeral community of interests, not a permanent
foundation capable of offsetting any real challenges to national
self-interest.
The attitude of Russia toward the United States during the
war h::1s been described by revisionists as a "mythical" friendship.
That is not an entirely correct characterization.
friendly acts toward
grateful.

Russia did perform

America and the United States was properly

Not surprisingly, these acts also accorded with Russia's

self-interest.

The only myth created was by those who exaggeratedly

attributed Russia's actions to altruistic motives.

Nor was it

107
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surprising that Russian officials never disclaimed any credit for
these actions, unselfish or otherwise.
One of Russia's policies,which was taken as a friendly act,
was its adamant refusal to join with other European powers in any
plan of enforced mediation in the Civil War.
service to the federal government.

This was a distinct

Simply by wishing the federal

government well during the conflict and studiously avoiding any
intervention, Russia proved a "steadfast friend."

The fact that the

interests of Russia and the North coincided does not diminish the
importance of the Russian position.
motives of Russia altogether hidden.

Nor were the sentiments and
Russia was seriously concerned

about continuing the strength and unity of the United States as an
offset against other European powers and did not hesitate to say
so.

The Union was considered by Russia to be an "element essential

to the universal political equilibrium."

The emperor himself declared

that he was very anxious that the "United States, as a nation, should
suffer no diminution of power or influence."

Prince Gorchakov, the

foreign minister, likewise acknowledged that "we desire, above all
things, the maintenance of the American Union as an indivisible nation."

The Russian refusal to intervene in the internal affairs of

the United States was in its own best interests, but proved a boon
to the Lincoln administration.

Left unspoken was Russia's equal

reluctance to set any precedent for intervention while other European
powers were threatening to interfere in the Polish insurrection. 1
The second, more dramatic and more public act, was Russia's
decisio~

in 1863.

to dispatch two squadrons of ships to United States' ports
This was perceived by the American public as an open
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manifestation of friendship and a virtual alliance against any outside powers intervening in the course of the Civil War. Based on
his research of the Russian archives, Frank Golder has effectively
explained the real purpose behind the unexpected visits of the
Russian ships.

The Russian authorities were apprehensive about

their fleet being bottled up in Baltic and Black Sea ports in the
event of European involvement arising out of the Polish insurrection.
Not wanting to repeat the experiences of the Crimean War, Russia
forestalled the possibility by ordering their fleet to America.
From there the Russian ships could pose a threat to French and English
shipping, should war ensue.2
As early as January 1862, Admiral Popov,

commanding Russia's

Pacific squadron, had been directed by Grand Duke Constantine to be
prepared to destroy enemy commerce in the Pacific in case of war
between Russia and a stronger sea power.
ships was left up to him.

The disposition of Popov's

He faced much less chance of being bottled

up in the North Pacific, but he chose San Francisco as more desirable
than any of Russia's own stations.

Popov was familiar with San

Francisco from previous visits and he was assured of a warm welcome
from his friends thereo

Many leading San Francisco civic and business

leaders already had commercial interests in Russia through the
American-Russian Trading Company and a nascent Pacific-based whaling
industry.

Popov rightly anticipated better provisioning, repair

and communications facilities in San Francisco than elsewhere in
the North Pacific and, most importantly, permission to enter and
leave port as he chose. 3
Rear Admiral Popov arrived in San Francisco with his squadron
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of six ships October 12, 1863 where he was warmly and enthusiastically
received.

In the absence of detailed contrary instructions, Popov

came near to breaking strict neutrality and becoming the active ally
of the federal government.

During the winter of 1863-1864, San

Francisco was left without the protection of any U. S. man-of-war.
When rumors were reported that Confederate cruisers were planning
to attack, Popov readied his ships for action to assist the unguarded
city "in all measures which may be deemed necessary by the local
authorities to repel any attempt against the security of the place."
When Popov's plans were reviewed by Gorchakov and Stoeckl they were
disapproved and he was urged to maintain the strictest neutrality. 4
Russian spokesmen at the time never claimed that the Russian
ships had been sent as an overt gesture in support of the federal
government, only that the fleet was there "for no unfriendly purpose."
Nor did they disclaim such motives when public opinion in the North
assumed that Russia had acted solely out of friendship.

Russia did

not reject American gratitude and was prepared to accept credit for
performing a distinct service to the North.
accepted this "myth," even at the outset.

But not all observers
The Harpers New Monthly

Magazine noted quite accurately that:
In the present position of European politics the presence
of these vessels in our ports has a special significance.
During the late Crimean war the Russian fleet was closely
shut up at Cronstadt and in the Black Sea, and was unable
to render any effective service. The Russians have now
quite an effective naval force in the open seas.5
And when Senator Charles Sumner asked "Why is that fleet gathered
there?" he answered himself:
My theory is that when it left the Baltic, war with
France was regarded as quite possible, and it was determined not to be sealed up at Kronstadt.6
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In general, though, the American public and the government,
according to the reminiscences of Frederick W. Seward, Assistant
Secretary of State to his father, felt intuitively that help would
come from Russia, if needed.7

Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful

that the members of Lincoln's administration were completely deceived
as to Russia's actual motives and policies during the war.

However,

fostering an illusion of disinterested amity on Russia's part proved
beneficial to the United States in the short term.

In the long run,

one young observer of the Washington scene may have been influenced
by the differences between the perceptions and realities of this
Civil War tradition of Russian friendship,
secretary to Lincoln.

John Hay was a personal

Thirty years later as Secretary of State,

he was habitually distrustful of Russian motives, frequently harping
on Russian "mendacity."
The temporary concert of national interests between Russia
and the United States overrode, for the time being, any antipathy
either may have held toward a nation with diametrically opposite
political institutions.
sought diligently to
government.

Both sides, in their diplomatic exchanges,

rationalize the differences in their forms of

Usually this took the form of emphasizing the many

parallels in their current state of development and recognizing that
diversity in approaches were only human.

Both were described as

young, vigorous and improving empires which were expanding continentally.
Each was carrying the light of civilization to heathen lands.
found itself occasionally resisted by other jealous states.
had recently emancipated those in bondage.
put down an internal insurrection.

Each
Each

Each had successfully

And more importantly, Russia

and the United States were still considered geographically remote
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from each other,

"placed at the extremities of the two worlds,"

and therefore would "never come into rivalry or conflict."

Despite

such assurances, Secretary of State Seward, reflecting some of the
thoughts of the previous decade, recognized full well that the tracks
of empire would eventually meet.
U.

s.

As he instructed Cassius Clay, the

Minister to Russia, early in Lincoln's administration, the two

nations "may remain good friends until, each having made a circuit
of half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and greet
each other in the region where civilization first began. " 8

As a

consummate expansionist, Seward envisioned that the meeting would
take

place when the American empire touched Asia.

To this end,

even in the midst uf the Civil War, he actively encouraged a project
linking the continents by telegraph.
During his second trip to Russia in 1859, the fertile mind
of Perry Collins, the San Francisco businessman who had previously
rafted down the Amur River, conceived a project for connecting North
America with Asia and Europe by telegraphic line.

His plan visualized

a telegraphic link between San Francisco and Nikolaevsk by way of
the Bering Strait.

The recent failure of the trans-Atlantic tele-

graphic cable gave impetus to his plan.

Samuel F. B. Morse: when

consulted, foresaw no insurmountable difficulties in the proposed
project.

Hiram Sibley, President of the Western Union Company, which

had just extended its telegraphic system to the West Coast in October
1861, reported that his "men are pressing me hard to let them go on
to Behring's strait next summer."

To support Collins' proposal,

Senator Latham of California submitted a bill calling for the United
States to aid and assist in a survey, under the authority of the
Russian government of the waters, coasts and islands of the North
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Pacific in order to determinethe best route for the telegraph.9
The first American approach to the Imperial Government was
rebuffed.

In 1861 when Cassius Clay asked Prince Gorchakov for the

cooperation of the Russian government in constructing such a telegraph
line, he was advised that Russia intended to build such a line itself.
The following year Seward again instructed the United States minister
to Russia, Simon Cameron, to exert his efforts in favor of the telegraphic enterprise which would "doubtless be effective in enlarging
the commerce between the two countries and the two continents."
In this instance Gorchakov went so far as to reply that the Collins'
project was under consideration, and that a "telegraphic connection
between the two nations was decidedly favored."

10

By mid-1863 the climate had improved further and rapid
progress was made toward an agreement.

Clay, again back at his post

in St. Petersburg, on May 13 submitted, upon request, his views on
the telegraphic project to the Russian Asiatic Committee.

A week

later he was able to report to Washington that General Ignatiev, the
Chief of the Asiatic Department, was favorably inclined to grant
most of what Collins had requested.

On May 27, 1863 the Tsar con-

firmed the decision of the Asiatic Committee to approve a charter
conditional only upon proof that the Russian-American Telegraph
Company actually had been formed, that shares for at least one-half
the cost of construction had been sold and the final plans for the
lines direction produced. 1 1
The original Collins' proposal requested that the telegraph
company be awarded full possession of all territories along the telegraph's

right-of-way and exclusive control of the native tribes not
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under the direct authority of the Russian government.

If granted,

this would have meant virtual sovereignty by an American company
over long stretches of Asiatic Russia.

The grant, when finally

approved, greatly modified these stipulations.

The company was

not allowed to exercise any right or pm·;ers in the Russian dominions
or to subordinate the natives to their control.

The negotiations,

however, left little doubt that the American entrepreneurs had
preferred to carve out their own independent domain in Siberia.

The

Russian grant did warn that the stations near Bering Strait ought
to be constructed in such a manner as to be able to defend themselves
against natives in case of attack and recommended that the company
hire armed Russian guards for protection.
natives

were still relatively untamed.

Apparently, the Chukchi
The grant further stipulated

that all workmen on duty along the projected line be Russian subjects,
but rejected the idea of establishing villages along the line peopled
with "exiled culprits. 1112
Even so modified, it is somewhat difficult to understand why
the Russian government, after mulling over the ColJ.ins' proposal for
two years, suddenly consented.

Why, when Russia was still so sensi-

tive to the incursion of American merchants and whalers along the
coasts of Asiatic Russia and Russian America, should the government
permit American influence inland?

Russia acknowledged that the

principal benefits would accrue to the commercial cities of Europe
and the United States and not to Russia itself.
Perhaps it was not coincidental that renewed interest

in the

American telegraphic proposal began during the period when Russia
was contemplating the dire prospects of European intervention into
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the Polish insurrection.

Acquiescing to a commercial project in

which the federal government believed strongly enough to push forward,
despite the ongoing Civil War, must have seemed another means of
cementing cordial relations with the United States at a crucial
moment.

Perhaps the Russian officials were convinced that such a

gigantic undertaking would never be executed.

Once the Polish

question subsided, their enthusiasm for the telegraph project did
wane.

When Collins and Sibley returned to St. Petersburg in October

1864 with the required proofs as to the establishment and financial
status of the Russian-American Telegraph Company, they again ran
into delays and a new set of conditions.

Some of these new proposi-

tions limited the franchises of the earlier grant, but most
importantly reduced the profit margin allowed to the company.

Since

the enterprise was already well underway and much capital had been
invested, Sibley and Collins reluctantly agreed to the revised
agreement and did not cancel the project, as perhaps the Russian
government was hoping. 1 3
If the Russian aim was to secure better relations with the
United States, they succeeded.
of Russian friendship.

This act served as yet another reminder

President Lincoln was able to report in his

third annual message to congress that "satisfactory arrangements
have been made with the Emperor of Russia, which, it is believed,
will result in a continuous line of telegraph through that empire
from our Pacific Coasto 11

Seward, noting the "liberality and friend-

ship" which Russia and Great Britain had manifested toward the United
States, thought that no other enterprise "within the scope of our
foreign relations more directly important than the preservation of
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peace and friendship with those two great and enlightened powers."
The New York Chamber of Commerce commended the Russian "spirit of
wise liberality."l4
To Perry McDonough Collins belongs all the credit for first
envisioning the

u~ion

of the continents by telegraph and for tenaciously

negotiating with Russian officialdom.

In the words of Seward, the

"country could not have a more enlightened, assiduous and faithful
representative" than Collins.

But equal credit redounds to Seward

who immediately recognized that the telegraphic project would
further his dreams of an American Pacific empire.

As a consequence,

Seward provided diplomatic support to the project at every stage,
and was instrumental in securing congressional support for the contracts and surveys necessary to begin construction.

In May 1864

Seward propounded to the Senate Committee on Commerce in detail the
feasibility of the proposed

t~legraphic

its claim to government patronage.

line, its usefulness and

He pointed out that, domestically,

telegraphic communications had stimulated an active and profitable
system of commerce.

From this he conjured up a vision of an

America-centered, worldwide commercial empire in which:
the merchant or the manufacturer, the miller, the farmer,
the miner, or the fisherman, of Halifax, Quebec, Portland,
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, Memphis,
St. Paul, Little Rock, Denver, Salt Lake City, Carson City,
Los Angelos, San Francisco, Sacramento, Portland, with the
aid of a transoceanic telegraph, would be in daily, and, in
case of need, in hourly correspondence with producers and
consumers on the Amoor, where the fur trade of Asia is
gathered up; with Sofinsk, the depot for the overland
traffic between Russia and Japan, and the mineral treasures of Nerchinsk; with Kiakhta, the centre of the
international commerce of Russia and China; with Irkoutsk,
Moscow, St. Petersburg; with all the cities of western
Europe, including ConstantinoSle; with the cities of
Alexandria, Cai~o, and Suez.l
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Seward also had expectations beyond the immediate telegraphic
project which he believed would follow as a matter of course.

He

foresaw the telegraphic enterprise as another wedge for the entry of
the United States into the development of Northeast Asia, particularly
the Amur basin, and from there, to all of Asia.

As he predicted

to the Senate, by their cooperation in Collins' design,
Russia actually invites us to put forth our national energy
from every point within our borders where industry of any
kind dwells, and especially from our northwestern and
western States, and to apply that energy in the great
work of renewing and restoring the long languishing
civilization of the regions where our race first impressed
its dominion upon the globe appointed for its residence.l6
With the enthusiastic support of Seward the Congress passed
a bill in July 1864 granting the proposed telegraphic line a right of
way within territory of the United States, the assistance of the Navy
and the protection of troops.
engineer-in-chief.

Colonel Charles S. Bulkley was appointed

By the summer of 1865 he had organized three

exploring parties to survey the routes of the line.

The Asiatic

Russian segment stretched approximately 1800 miles through bleakest
Siberia from Nikolaevsk on the Amur River to the Bering Strait.

The

responsibility for finding a suitable route through this trackless
wilderness was assigned to ten men, a Russian and nine Americans, one
of whom was George Kennan.

By spring, when travel bogged down in many

regions of Siberia, the entire route had been traversed.

The party

commenced the work of constructing station houses along the way and
warehouses to store the large quantities of material due to arrive
during the summer.

Additional foremen also arrived to superintend

the actual construction.

The next year was spent distributing the

company supplies of insulators, wire and brackets, as well as cutting
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thousands of trees for telegraph posts.
laborers were hired.

For this work, 600 Yakutsk

By the spring of 1867 the work had progressed

so well that those in charge confidently expected to have the line
completed before 1870.

Then in May, from an American whaler, they

heard the news that Cyrus Field had not only successfully laid a
trans-Atlantic telegraph cable, but had actually lifted and repaired
his earlier attempt.

Soon word was received to cease work, sell

what material they could and return home.

17

George Kennan's chronicle of his two and one-half years in
Siberia was first published in 1870 and was never out of print for
the next forty years.

Numbers of Americans seemed interested in

reading about the wilds of Northeast Asia and, through the eyes of
George Kennan, getting a glimpse of a new frontier.

For the first

time Americans had a first-hand view of the interior of Asiatic
Russia, the spectacular geography, the forbidding weather, and the
colorful natives.

Heretofore, the knowledge of Siberia had been

limited to the coastlines visited by whalers and Navy surveyors
l' or to the more established roads and waterways.

In Kennan's portrayal

one reads about a hardy band of American pioneers overcoming all
the hardships and dangers of a vast wilderness area.

They trekked

beyond the few settlements and ventured into the lands inhabited only
by the wandering Chukchi and Koryaks, whom Kennan compared to the
North American Indians.

Already in the isolated settlements Kennan

noted signs that American "culture" had penetrated--natives who
swore in American and sang

"Oh~

Susannah," and had pictures from

Harper's Weekly adorning the walls of native yurts.

From Kennan

Americans gained impressions of American ships frequenting the coastal
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waters of Siberia and American merchants monopolizing the trade. 18
The Yankees, one was led to believe, cannot only deal with
the natives in their own element, but also can develop this remote
territory through American ingenuity and organization.

The telegraphic

project was prosecuted with all the vigor which capital and intelligent labor could secure.

It was cancelled only after an expenditure

of three million dollars, not through any failure in the enterprise,
b~t

because another telegraph route proved to be more economical.

The continents of Asia and North America were, nevertheless, drawn
closer together in men's minds.
remote.

Asiatic Russia was not nearly so

Western Union offered to continue the project solely on

the North American side if Russia would undertake the entire Asian
segment up to Bering Strait, but the Russian government did not
avail itself of this offer.

Russia was even then, at the moment

of cancelling the project, disengaging completely from the North
American continent.

19

Underlying the sale of Russian-America to the United States
was the widely held belief among Russian leaders that the United
States would eventually seize the territory anyway, so why not sell
it peacefully and gain something from the transaction.
relations between the two nations during and

immedi~tely

The friendly
after the

Civil War certainly facilitated the negotiations and overcame the
reluctance toward the transaction in each nation, but it was the
growing realization by Russia that Russian-America could no longer
be held intact as a colony against American pressure without the
unacceptable expenditures of funds and military effort which decided
the issue.

At the time of the 1824 Convention, a few Russian naval
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officers and officials of the Russian-American Company had advocated
just such an expansionist course.

They had urged that Russia extend

its holdings in California to block

t~e

predicted onrush of the

Americans before their move was well underway.

Their proposals were

overruled and by the terms of the convention Russia began its retreat
from North America.

Now, some forty years later, a growing number

of Russian officials assessed that the American continental expansion
to the Pacific coast and the rapid settlement thereon would lead
to acquisition of the entire North American continent by the United
States, including Russian-America.
"manifest destiny."
American.

They were convinced of America's

Perhaps they were more convinced than the average

To those Russians who followed Muravev's blueprint, the

solution seemed obvious--eliminate this source of future friction
with the United States, while ridding Russia of an indefensible
liability.

They did not urge a retreat from the Pacific.

On the

contrary, they recommended that Russia concentrate its efforts on
the newly acquired Amur and Maritime Regions.

To them, this was

the best strategy for strengthening Russia's power in Asia.
The most influential of those convinced of the Muravev con-

cept was Grand Duke Constantine, younger brother of the Tsar and
General-Admiral of the Russian Navy.

He became the real promoter

of the sale of the Russian-American colonies as early as 1857.

He

argued that "we must not deceive ourselves and must foresee that
the United States,aiming constantly to round out their possessions
and desiring to dominate undi'Tidedly the whole of North America will
take the aforementioned colonies from us and we shall not be able
to regain them."

Therefore, Constantine proposed that the colonies
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be sold to the United States, "solving in a friendly fashion and in
a way that would be profitable to us a problem which will otherwise
be solved in a way disadvantageous to us and in addition by conquest."
Otherwise, not only will the Russian-American Company trade be harmed,
but "all Russian trade in America."

Russia he urged "must endeavor

• to hold those extremities which bring her real benefit. 1120
Baron Wrangell, who had served as governor of Russian-America
and was a stockholder in the company.7 well knew the value of the
territory, if its natural resources could be developed without "fears
of the future."

Nevertheless, he too urged that Russia turn over

the colony to the Americans since such a cession was "anticipatory
prudence."

21

Admiral Popov, who commanded the Russian fleet in the Pacific,
was not only a confidant of the Grand Duke, but was well acquainted
with the situation in the North Pacific.

From his visits he had

a personal glimpse of the American appetite for expansion.

He was

convinced that Americans truly believed in the Monroe Doctrine
and that their "manifest destiny" would lead to eventual seizure of
Russian-A~erica.

As a consequence, he also recommended that Russia

focus its energies in developing the nearer and more promising Korea
and Amur regions of Asia, while ceding the colonies on the North
American mainland and the Aleutians, because "geographically all
thes:= are American."

Popov did not include the colonies on the Kurile

islands, which had earlier been tentatively considered for sale,
and he specifically urged retention by Russia of the Commander Islands
"so as not to have the Yankees too near us." 22
From his vantage point in Washington, Stoeckl was urging a
similar course of action.

During the Crimean War he had been involved
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in the abortive attempt to make a fictitious sale of Russian-America
to the United States.

Since that time, Senator William McKendree

Gwin of California had made several unofficial overtures to him
concerning a bona fide sale, which Stoeckl relayed o~.

Senator

Gwin's interest in acquiring Alaska was but one facet of his plans
for an American commercial empire stretching out from his California
and embracing the millions of people who inhabited China and Japan,
and the "hosts Russia will soon have planted in her possessions on
the Amoor River."

The encouragement of friendly relations with

Russia became the basis for Gwin's Pacific policy.

Stoeckl was

equally anxious to promote friendly relations, because the monopoly
exercised by the Russian-American Company was an embarrassment.
While he was busy trying to promote good relations, the company
was creating needless friction with the United States.

American

commercial and fishing interests were excluded from Russian-America,
while Russian ships and commercial agents were welcomed to San
Francisco.

Stoeckl was particularly alarmed when he heard rumors

that a large body of Mormons intended to settle in Russian-America.
He recognized that the colonizing power of America would be difficult
to forestall.

The Mormons did not test the situation, but reports

of gold being found in Russian-America threatened an actual st&mpede
of American prospectors to the region.

In his reports Stoeckl

spoke of the "aggressions" of the Americans.

Only the current small

value of Russian-America, according to him, made it "safe from
American filibusters."

After the sale, in an effort to answer critics

in Russia, Stoeckl was even more explicit.

He described how Americans

considered the continent "their patrimony" and how the "rapacious"
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American filibusters "swarm in the Pacific" causing "depredations on
our coasts."

Stoeckl likewise thought the best solution for Russia

was to solidify its hold on Asia:
It is upon our Asiatic coast that our interests lie and
it is upon this point that we should concentrate our energy.
There we are upon our own soil and we have the products of
a vast and rich province to exploit. We shall take our part
in the extraordinary activity which is developing in the
Pacific; our establishments will rival in prosperity those
of other nations and, with the solicitude which our August
Master has devoted to the countries bordering on the Amour,
we are destined to gain, in this great Ocean, the high
consideration which belongs to Russia. 23
Prince Gorchakov, who received all of these recommendations
for Russia to divest itself of its North American colonies, gradually
became convinced.

He was cautious not to antagonize England care-

lessly and he wanted the initiative to come from the United States,
so at first he avoided a decision by setting a commission to study
the problem.
for awhile.

1

Then the Civil War permitted him to sidestep the issue
Meanwhile, the government withheld approval for a new

charter for the Russian-American Company when it expired at the end
of 1861.

Finally, in December 1866, when Stoeckl was back in St.

Petersburg, Constantine brought the issue to a head at a council
meeting attended by the Tsar.

Stoeckl was ordered to return to

Washington to open negotiations and to accept no less than 5 million
dollars for Russian-America.
The reluctance of Gorchakov may have been partially overcome
by the euphoria created by the Fox mission only a few months before.
During the summer of 1866,

Gus~·avus

Fox, the Assistant Secretary

of the Navy, was sent with a squadron of three naval warships to
Russia to deliver a resolution passed by Congress congratulating Tsar
Alexander II upon his providential escape from assassination.

For
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six weeks the mission travelled to various cities in Russia receiving
deputations, memorials, banquets, toasts, orations,
and honorary citizenships.

medals, gifts

Fox met with the imperial family, court

officials, naval officers, civic leaders and merchant groups.
Expressions of unstinting friendship were mutually exchanged.

The

friendship of Russia and America was variously described as:
fraternal, disinterested, not founded on selfishness, permanent,
sincere, unchanged for ages, not artificial or chimerical, lofty
and pure, indissoluble, a union of two worlds.

In one of the last

speeches, Gorchakov spoke about the "manifestations of sympathy
between the two countries."

At the time Gorchakov considered:

It is a fact the most interesting of our epoch, a fact
which creates between two nations--I will say rather
between two continents--germs of reciprocal good-will
and friendship which will bear fruit, which create
traditions, and which tend to consolidate between them
relations founded upon the true spirit of Christian
civilizations. This understanding does not rest on
geographical proximity--the gulf of oceans separates
us.24
Three months later he was setting in motion the continental aspirations
of both nations, but drastically narrowing the gulf between.
Not all Russian officials favored the sale.

Baron Osten-Saken,

of the Asiatic Department, when he learned of the proposed sale of
Russian-America, raised some pertinent objections.

He pointed out

that the sale \vould destroy the three-power equilibrium on the northwest coast of North America and that Russia would be subject to
renewed fears 5 misunderstandings, disadvantages and further seizures
from a "new next-door neighbor in the person of the United States
of North America."

In Osten-Saken's view, it was preferable to have

the Americans blocked off by the intervening English colonies rather
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than separated from Asiatic Russia by narrow bodies of water.

Antici-

pating that the Americans would not stop at the water's edge, he
questioned whether Russia was "in a position to oppose them (the
Americans) with any counter-action in the Eastern Siberian Territories."
The immediate temptation for an American advance into Eastern Siberia
was at

h~nd,

the Russian-American Telegraph project.

Osten-Saken

believed that the United States, once Russian-America was theirs,
would have a strong motive for gaining exclusive possession of the
important line which would interconnect America with Japan and
China "along the chain of volcanic islands connecting America with
Kamchatka, Kamchatka with Sakhalin, etc. 1125
In later years Osten-Saken gained high position in Russia's
foreign office, but in 1866 his influence did not match his vision.
If the high council which decided to sell held any such

~ualms,

they were calmed by the simultaneous determination to strengthen
Russia's hold on Asiatic Russia.

Minister Clay, in judging Russian

opinion concerning the sale of Russian-America, acknowledged that
some were jealous of foreigners and traditionally opposed to ceding
any territory, but that the prevailing group "look upon it with favor
because we are to be near their eastern possessions, and they regard
us perpetual friends, in hopes that it may ultimately lead to the
expulsion from the great Pacific of nations whose power in the east
is justly feared."26
Once Stoeckl returned to Washington, he and Seward quickly
agreed on March 30, 1867 to terms of the sale of the Russian colonies
to the United States.

The Senate ratified the treaty ten days later

by an overwhelming vote of 37-2, following the lead of Senator
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Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The

United States was notified of the Russian ratification of the treaty
in mid-May and in October the territory of Alaska was officially
transferred.

The only hitch in the smooth proceedings occurred

during the summer of 1868 when the House of Representatives debated
for a long time whether to appropriate the money for the purchase.
Public opinion, as reflected in newspaper editorials and
congressional debates, was generally favorable to the purchase in
all sections of the United States, once the public became more
knowledgeable of Alaska and its potential economic worth.

Backers

of the treaty were also aided by a strong pro-Russian sentiment.
Many, who were at best lukewarm advocates of the purchase, nevertheless supported it, in order not to offend Russia.

Most of the argu-

ments favoring the sale stressed the economic and commercial advantages-mineral resources, furs, fish, timber and ice.

Considered equally

important was the opportunity to cement good relations with Russia
and show American gratitude. 27
Two other American motives behind the sale were more muted,
p~rhaps

to avoid arousing the vocal group which objected that the

acquisition was just another misguided attempt to follow the doctrine
of "manifest destiny."

Seward, the architect of the treaty, ardently

believed in the eventual expansion of the United States across all
of North America.

As early as 1860 in St. Paul, he had prophesied:

Standing here and looking far off into the northwest, I
see the Russian as he busily occupies himself in establishing seaports and towns and fortifications, on the verge of
this continent, as the outposts of St. Petersburg, and I
can say, "Go on, and build up your outposts all along the
coast up even to the Arctic ocean--they will yet become
the outposts of my own country--monuments of the civilization of the United States in the northwest. 28
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An indication of the importance he attached to the purchase
occurred in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War.

Seward arranged to

invite Grand Duke Constantine to visit the United States on a
mission "beneficial to us, and by no means unprofitable to Russia."
Although the chief Russian proponent of selling Russian-America could
not come at that time, Seward's eagerness was apparent.

Yet, when

the treaty was forwarded to the Senate, he avoided any hint of
jingoism, citing mainly examples of the bonds of friendship between
Russia and America and how the treaty would prevent the growth of
difficulties arising out of the fisheries in the Russian possessions.29
In one of his arguments in his lengthy and decisive address
to the Senate advocating that the treaty be ratified, Sumner returned
to the theme of extending the dominion of the United States.

Sumner

urged that accession of territory obtained peacefully and honestly
would stimulate pride in the country and an increased consciousness
of strength.

He particularly favored the extension of republican

institutions and the dismissal of "one other monarch from the
continent."

A number of newspapers expressed pleasure that the

United States expansion had thwarted the plans of Great Britain and
thrown British Columbia in jeopardy.

But in an uncharacteristically

sharp comment, the Philadelphia North American and Gazette rejoiced
that the universal "lust of dominion displayed by Russia" was stayed
by the treaty which "freed this continent from her designs" and
that "Russian ambition has disappeared from the American continent." 30
Speaking thirty years after the purchase of Alaska, Theodore
Roosevelt enlarged on this sentiment without too careful a

regard

for the facts surrounding the transfer of territory:
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The English-speaking people have never gone back before
the Slav, and the Slav has nev·er gone back before them
save once. Three-quarters of a century ago the
Russians meant that Northwestern American should be
Russian, and our Monroe Doctrine was formulated as
much against them as against the other reactionaries
of continental Europe. Now the American has dispossessed the Russian • • • the American--the man of the
effete English-speaking races-~has driven the Slav
from the eastern coast of the North Pacific.31
Having "driven" the Russians from Alaska, did the United
States have as an additional motive for the purchase, the possibility
of using Alaska, and particularly the Aleutians, as a strategic
stepping stone for further expansion into Northern Asia?
answer is a qualified yes.

The

Seward himself had long predicted that

the Pacific would become the chief theater of events in the world
and that there lay America's destiny.

"Certainly no one expects,"

he said as early as 1853, "the nations of Asia to be awakened by any
other influences than our own."

Openly and officially at least,

Seward was discreetly silent on this point, seeking to allay any
Russian fears on this score during the period of treaty negotiations
and ratification.

He may well have expressed himself privately

concerning the strategic value of Alaska for future American
enterprise in the North Pacific during his vigorous efforts to
garner support for the purchase.

A number of newspapers and politicians

either echoed similar views or became convinced that Alaska, in
addition to its other values, was likely to become the northern
gateway to Asia.32
Sumner pointed out the advantages of uniting the "East of
Asia with the West of America" noting that the great circle navigation
route from San Francisco to Hong Kong by way of the Aleutians was far
shorter than by way of Hono'.lulu.

Advocates of a Northern Pacific

Railroad were quick to observe that the route to Asia through Puget
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Sound was shorter still.

Once the concept of the west coast rail-

road terminals had been equated with trans-Pacific commerce, all
sections of the United States could visualize a commercial interest
of their own.

Newspapers advocating one or the other of the routes

across North America argued which would be the better "Asiatic route
across the continent." 33
Editorial comment from every section remarked on the importance of Alaska to expanding the trade with East Asia.

The ports

and harbors of Alaska, it was explained, would make excellent coaling
stations and provide a "commanding naval base."

The Philadelphia

Inguirer thought that "possession of this territory will give us the
command of the Pacific."

The New York Times opined that the main

importance of the acquisition of Alaska was "upon our future trade
with Japan, China and the other countries of Eastern Asia • • • •
It seems inevitable that all such commerce should be American." 34
The heated debates in the House of Representatives in
mid-1868, presented another forum in which those favoring the payment
of the 7.2 million dollars looked to American "commercial and naval
supremacy in the Pacific."

Congressman Maynard of Tennessee did not

think that any obstacle should be placed in the "westward course of
empire."

To Congressman Johnson of California the "Aleutian range

• • • stretches far away to Japan, as if America were extending a
friendly hand in trade to Asia."

But the most vociferous exponent

of the trans-Pacific advantages to accrue to the United States by
possession of Alaska was Congressman Banks of Massachusetts.

He,

too, thought that the Pacific would be the "theater of the triumph
of civilization in the future" and that Alaska was the key.

Noting
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that the new territory brought America to within seventy or eighty
miles of the Asiatic coast, he claimed that this new possession
"gives us control of the Arctic" and makes the "Behring Sea substantially an American Sea."

Furthermore, he foresaw a time "when

Americans are in absolute possession of the commerce, trade and
fisheries

• of the north Pacific • • • and the Russians excluded

therefrom altogether."35
A close reading of these American newspaper editorials and
congressional debates might have led Russian authorities to question
the wisdom of selling Russian-America.

Some Americans, at least,

did not view the acquisition of Alaska as being only a step in
completing the North American dominion.

Rather, they perceived the

new possession as a strategic entry point to Asia.

The commercial

rivalry which had led to conflict on the northwestern coast of North
America was resolved, but the threat of renewing the rivalry in
Northeast Asia became more of a reality.

The Republic of the West

and the Empire of the East, expanding in opposite directions were
indeed destined to meet, but henceforth it would be on Asian soil.
Observing the situation from St. Petersburg, Minister Clay
was aware of Russia's resolve to strengthen its position in Asia
and was having some second thoughts about the Russian activities
there.

Previously he had been completely convinced that it was

Russia's proper destiny to "civilize" Asia:
The world should not regard her progress into Asia with
distrust, but gratification. The new life must come
from the West and Russia is the only nation which can
give it.
Now, he saw that such moves might have an adverse effect on American
interests.

He reported that "our friends the Russians are gradually
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taking possession of all the islands inclosing the Sea of Okhotsk,
which is now the best whaling ground in the Pacific."

He called

attention to Russia colonizing in "Northern China and the isles of
Japan" iu preparation for future political and commercial moves
against "those great centers of population and wealth." 36
Clay still visualized Northeast Asia as the gateway to the
riches of Japan and China, but he was becoming convinced that Russia
was not going to invite the United States to participate
in the venture.

join~ly

Despite the dreams of Americans like Perry Collins,

Russia intended to develop the Amur Basin without a partner.

His

suspicions were confirmed in May 1868 when Chase, the commercial
agent at Nikolaevsk, advised him that four years earlier he had seen
secret instructions from Grand Duke Constantine to naval and civil
officials in Eastern Siberia to "drive the Americans from their
coasts." 37
To offset the strategic advantage that Clay thought Russia
was gaining, he recommended that the United States act vigilantly
to acquire bases for "future power and security."

He thought it

important for future "commercial and political" relations with East
Asia

that the United States have "some formidable stand-point in

the seas bordering on Japan and China, where our armies and navies
may rest secure."

Specifically, Clay suggested that the United

States investigate the island of Nanki (Port Hamilton) belonging
to Korea or Kunashiri belonging to Japan.

It is doubtful whether

anyone in the State Department gave any serious heed to Clay's
recommendations, but his reports should have dampened any speculation
that American commerce of influence was likely to gain access to
China through Asiatic Russia. 38
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One island over which Russia sought to gain sole control was
Sakhalin, because of its strategic position off the Amur estuary.
Aside from its location, Sakhalin had little to attract attention
except coal deposits.

In 1860 the American consul at Yokohama,

E. E. Rice, obtained permission from the Russian government to mine
coal on Sakhalin and under the direction of an American merchant at
CastrieBay, Otto Esche, small-scale mining of coal was attempted.
By 1867 the demand for coal was growing.

The Pacific Mail-Steamer

Company proposed to finance a larger development on Sakhalin.

The

Americans formed a joint stock company including Clay, who petitioned
the Russian government for a 20-year exclusive right to mine coal
on the whole island or, barring that, on that portion of the island
lying between 49° and 50° North latitude.

After some preliminary

indications from lesser officials that the American request would
be granted, Gorctiakov reJected the pet1t1on 1n 1369 on the basis that
he was opposed to monopolies on Sakhalin.

In reality, another

possibility which was being discussed within the Russian government
worked against the American request.

Officials in St. Petersburg

planned on turning Sakhalin into a huge penal colony where convict
labor would mine the coal.

Such a scheme would rid the rest of

Siberia of convicts and the guards would simultaneously afford
military protection to the island. 39
Besides, Russia was having difficulty enough settling the
Sakhalin boundary question with Japan without the presence of an
extensive American enterprise on the island.

Shortly after the

Crimean War, Russia had commenced a reoccupation of the center of the
island, gradually moving military detachments and settlements southward
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toward the Japanese fishing villages.

For years the Russians pressured

Japan to cede them the entire island.

The Japanese government

turned for support to the United States.

When Seward was on a

private visit to Japan in 1869, his views were sought.

He advised

Japan to offer to buy Sakhalin, but unlike the case of Alaska,
Russia considered Sakhalin a defensive necessity, not a liability.
Again in 1370, Japan asked the United States to mediate the boundary
dispute, but Russia refused the American offer.

Finally, in 1875,

Russia and Japan signed a treaty resolving the territorial issue for
thirty years.

Japan relinquished all claims to Sakhalin to Russia.

In return, Russia ceded all of the Kurile Islands to Japan.

Strategi-

cally, Russia had chosen to strengthen its defense of the Asiatic
mainland rather than retain its possessions seaward.

No longer could

Russia maintain even a vestige of a claim to the Sea of Okhotsk
being a mare clausum.

This turning away from the inhospitable North

presaged the eventual southward swing for Russian expansion.

The

shift of its Far Eastern naval base from Nikolaevsk to Vladivostok
in 1872 was yet another step, but Russia still did not enjoy a
year long ice-free port on the Pacific and did not immediately gain
uncontested control of its North Siberian coastline. 40
As Baron Osten-Sacken had predicted, the acquisition of
Alaska had not prevented the Americans from continuing to enter
Siberian waters.

Although decreased from its peak years, substantial

numbers of American whalers still hunted in the Tsar's seas.

Attempts

by Russia to equip its own whaleships were not successful economically
and the single Russian cruiser could do little to interdict the
American whaling fleet, now operating principally out of San Francisco.
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Nor could the Russian government establish colonies of Russian settlers
in all the remote bays frequented by the Americans.

It was alleged

that the Americans also poached fur-bearing animals, consorted with
natives, sold them contraband vodka in exchange for furs and spread
epidemics of smallpox and syphilis.

Worst, fromtheRussian viewpoint,

the Americans felt themselves so much the masters along the coast
that their charts and atlases showed the Chukotsk land as independent
0f

. 41
RUSS1a.
The most profitable American venture turned out to be a

renewal of seal hunting.

After a prolonged prohibition on hunting,

seals were again plentiful on the Commander Islands, just off the
Kamchatkan mainland.

In 1871 an American company, Hutchison, Cole

and Philips, gained a 20-year hunting lease on the islands in return
for generous payments to the Russian treasury.

The company started

out taking 10-15,000 pelts annually, but by 1880 nearly 50,000 were
acquired yearly.

Although the venture proved profitable for both

the Russian treasury and the natives, as well as the company, the
government began to have second thoughts as the scope of the American
exploitation grew and the islands came more under American subordination.

As Admiral Popov had feared, the Americans in the Commander

Islands were far too near.

Captain Hooper, commanding a large Ameri-

can ship patrolling the islands in 1879, reportedly claimed that
"It is not necessary for the Russian government to take active
measures, but it is sufficient only to permit the customs cruiser
of the United States to oversee the industry and the
the Northeast coast of Siberia."

cow~erce

along

Notwithstanding this generous offer,

the imperial government in 1882 promulgated stricter rules regulating
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access to Russian shores.

Henceforth, permission would have to be

received at Vladivostok from the governor-general of Eastern Siberia
before any hunting or commercial enterprise could be conducted along
the Siberian coasts.
fiscated.

Otherwise, ships and cargoes would be con-

This ruling led to an upswing in Russian-American incidents

which reached diplomatic levels for resolution. 42
As Russia exerted its claim to sole possession of the Siberian
mainland and extended its sway to nearby Sakhalin, it must have become
apparent to American entrepreneurs that the left bank of Amur River
was temporarily closed to the United States.

Despite the earlier

optimism of Collins, Clay and Seward, Russia was not going to allow
American participation in the development of the Amur basin.

Russia

held exclusive control of this northern gateway to China and Japan
and showed no disposition to share its strategic position, despite
vague promises in the past.

The very proximity of Russian-held

and fortified territory to the commercially important nations to the
South began to cause disquiet.

The United States minister to China

thought that Russia's policy in her intercourse and dealings with
China was "mysterious and past finding out."

He reported that Russia

"is suspected by most people of a desire for further territorial
encroachments."

The United States found itself with no forward area

strongholds in the region, a weak and aging navy, and no means to
counter any further thrust of Russia.

The German minister to Washing-

ton sensed this mood of unease as he observed in 1874 that:
the Secretary of State never speaks of P..ussia, when one
talks concerning Japan. Because the United States regards
Japan as an appendage of America. And although the Yankee
feels strongly enough to be able to hope that sooner or later
he will be in a position to paralyze the influence of all
European powers in Japan, the Asiatic proximity of Russia
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yet fills him with a secret fear, and the colonization of
the Amur region as well as the Russian settlements on
Sakhalin island are well suited to darken for every
American politician of the future the heaven of his
Japanese hopes.43
Henceforth, the buffer territories of Korea and Manchuria would take
on added significance.

In early 1876 reports appeared in English-

language newspapers in China concerning encroachments by Russia
south of the Amur boundary.

George Seward, the United States minister

to China, forwarded these rumors of a Russian military settlement
in Manchuria to Washington.
region at some length.

He used the occasion to speak of the

He thought Manchuria "might become the seat

of an Empire" if its great resources could be developed.

The

Chinese, according to Seward, were becoming interested in controlling
Manchuria more thoroughly, but may have been too slow to recognize
the danger of control passing to that "great northern E·.1ropean
Asiatic state."

"How eagerly would the statesmen and capitalists of

America seize upon this opportunity to develop such a region"
anticipated Seward.4 4
However, after nearly 20 years of strenuous activity in Northeast Asia, both private and governmental, neither Russia nor the
United States seemed to have the necessary immediate energy or will
to sustain any further drive for empire in Asia and the North Pacific.
The ambitions of both had suffered temporary frustration and, after
the 1860s, a period of relative stagnation followed, as each nation
turned attention more to other sectors.

The visions of Pacific

empire, though held in abeyance, remained alive.

Russia's advance

southward along the Asian littoral came to a halt, but would be
renewed.

Russia's plans to contain the Americans solely within North
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America were only partially successful, but would be continued.

The

efforts of the United States to connect the continents across the
Pacific had been disappointed, but the concept would be revived.
Americans had been discouraged in their expectations of a partnership
with Russia to develop the Amur region and an opportunity to gain
access to the rest of Asia, but American hopes for Northeest Asia
would flower again.
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CHAPTER V
KOREAN PROLOGUE

The United States showed scant interest in the Hermit Kingdom
until after the Civil

War.~

Yet the opening of diplomatic relations

with the Kingdom of Korea was to have far reaching consequences.

As

a secluded nation, closed to all but the token suzerainity of China,
Korea promised little of economic value and posed no military threat
whatsoever to its neighbors.

Once opened to foreign diplomatic,

commercial, missionary and military influences, the Korean scene
changed drastically.

Korea was to be the fulcrum in Asiatic affairs.

The king of Korea became a puppet with too many outsiders striving
to manipulate the strings.

Neither China, Russia, or Japan--the

three most concerned protagonists--could stand idly by and watch
either of the others gain control.

A weak, neutral Korea could be

left in peace, but a Korea under the protectorship of a great power
represented a strategic threat to the others.

Moreover, Japan soon

had a considerable commercial stake in Korea, which from its 1876
treaty with Japan onward provided an increasing amount of food and
fiber to Japan.

The British empire with its worldwide responsibilities

played a supportive role in China's interests.

England, concerned

about the Russian empire's expansion southward all across Asia, from
the Middle East to Central Asia to China's northeastern provinces,
was alert to counter any move, real or imagined, by Russia against

141
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Manchuria or Korea.
Morning

Cal~

The uneasy balance which surrounded the Land of

was irrevocably altered when the United States in 1882

became the first occidental nation to negotiate a treaty successfully.
During the next several decades Korea became the site of fierce
diplomatic intrigues to control the government and the battleground
for two major wars.

Political fortunes changed rapidly in Korea

as first China, then Japan, and then Russia gained the position of
primary influence.

Inevitably, the United States, despite early,

vigorous efforts to stay absolutely neutral in the power struggles,
was drawn in.

Attention will be directed at only those aspects of

Korean affairs which tended to affect the attitudes of Russia and
the United States towards one another.l
The American experience in Korea during the years before the
Sino-Japanese War represented a marked change from the United States'
involvement in the previous China treaty-making process of the 1850s.
The first change was the degree of participation in Korean internal
affairs and the influence wielded temporarily by the handful of
Americans in the field.

American missionaries became well-established

in the countryside, American entrepreneurs clamored for concessions.
American diplomats had the ear of the king and other Americans acted
as his advisers in the customs and foreign service.

Military

instructors were requested from the United States to strengthen the
Korean army.

The Navy saw an opportunity to lease a strategically

located Korean island to serve as a naval base from which to protect
growing American interests in Northeast Asia.

Had not Washington curbed

their enthusiasm with cautious directives, their attempt to foster
an independent Korea with its territorial integrity internationally
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guaranteed, might have succeeded.
The relationship of the United States toward Russia over the
events in Korea was also marked by a distinct change from the close
cooperation experienced during the 1850s.

Then, American negotiators

in China had worked in close harmony with their Russian counterparts,
both sides acting under government-to-government understandings.
The United States had lent its moral support to the Russian seizure
of the Amur and Maritime regions from China.

In Korea, the Americans

acted independently and often at cross purposes to Russia.

They

were just as suspicious and alarmed about Russian attempts to control
Korea as they were of attempts by China, England or Japan--probably
more so.

Neither in Seoul nor in Washington was there ever any

suggestion of cooperating with Russia in the joint development or
occupation of Korea.
By the terms of the Treaty of Peking, Russia had already
gained in 1860 a common boundary with the northeast corner of Korea
at the Tumen River.

One of the Russian objectives in acquiring the

Amur territory had been to increase trade with China and its outlying
districts.

In the subsequent years Russia made repeated attempts to

stimulate such trade, but was, in the main, thwarted by the Chinese
authorities who feared further Russian advances.

Only along the

Korean border were the Russians somewhat successful.

Without the

benefit of a formal commercial agreement, Koreans supplied the Russian
settlers around Vladivostok with badly needed foodstuffs.

Also,many

Koreans crossed the border to work for the Russians, thus easing
the shortage of laborers during the construction of the naval base.
This gave Russianofficialsinformation about Korea and a means of
contacting their opposite numbers.

Attempts by Russia to open
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official ties to Korea spurred a rash of allegations concerning
Russian pressure on Korean territory.

Most of these and later similar

allegations claimed that Russia was about to seize, barter for or
purchase the northeast province of Korea, the principal prize being
the ice-free Port Lazarev.

The first attempt supposedly occurred

in 1866 when a Russian man-of-war appeared in Broughton Bay demanding
the right of trade and residence for Russian merchants.

If the

demands were not satisfied, Russian troops, reportedly, would
enforce them.

This and later reports were given credence at the

time and widely circulated in Japan and China. 2 To a great extent
the possibility of Russia forcibly opening the Kingdom of Korea
created an atmosphere which eased the eventual peaceful overtures of
the United States.

The opening of Korea was not the competitive

race such as Commodore Perry had engaged in with Admiral Putyatin.
Nevertheless, the mere presence of Russia to the north aided American
negotiations.
The first attempts by the United States turned out to be
not so peaceful, however once commenced, they were persistent and
determined.

The efforts began in late 1866 when Rear Admiral Bell,

commanding the Asiatic squadron, received word that an American
schooner, the General Sherman, had been wrecked on the Korean coast
and that the vessel had been burned by Koreans with the loss of
the entire crew.

Bell recommended to the Navy Department that an

American force be sent to capture Seoul and to demand satisfaction
from Korea.

At the same time in Washington Seward learned of a

French expedition which had been sent to punish Korea for the massacre
of nine French missionaries.

Seward proposed to the French minister
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that the United States and France join in retaliatory action against
Korea, but France declined.

Meanwhile, Commander Shufeldt in Wachusetts

had been sent to investigate the incident in 1867.

This was followed

up the next year by Commander Febiger in Shenandoah.

From information

gathered during these ship visits, it became apparent that the crew
of the General Sherman had probably been the aggressors and been
killed in a melee ashore. 3
This incident did lead the United States into taking a more
active lead to ensure the safety of mariners along the Korean coast.
George Seward, the United States consul-general at Shanghai, in
writing to his Uncle William, proposed that a diplomatic mission
be sent to Korea to open negotiations.

He did not anticipate that

a commercial treaty was of "sufficient object • • • to render it
advisable to use force or even the show of force."

But he did point

out that American vessels already frequented the waters surrounding
the Korean peninsula which juts between China, Japan and Siberia
where American commerce was bound to increase.

According to G.

Seward, Admiral Rowan was eager to have the Asiatic squadron cooperate
with any diplomatic mission to Korea. 4
Although Secretary Seward approved of sending the mission,
it was unaccountably postponed for two years.

The proposal was

initiated again by Rear Admiral John Rodgers in 1870.

The new

Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, decided that the negotiations
should be carried out by the American minister at Peking, Frederick
Low.

It was hoped that Low could enlist the good will of China in

the American cause.

Low and Rodgers settled on the use of the same

tactics which had worked so well for Perry.

They agreed to leave
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Korean waters after announcing the purpose of the visit and return
a month later for a reply.

In accordance with the request of the

State Department, the expedition was "sufficiently formidable to
make an impression on the native authorities."

Five navy vessels,

including the flagship Colorado, carrying eighty-five guns and more
than twelve hundred men provided the "display of force adequate to
support the dignity" of the United States.s
Despite the show of strength, the mission failed.

Arriving

at anchorage off the west coast of Korea, Low informed the minor

Korean officials who first came aboard about the nature of his mission.
He also thought that he had received assurances that the Americans
could safely survey up the river.

However, while so engaged, the

survey party was fired upon from the Korean forts guarding the river
entrance.

Low and Rodgers decided to preserve the prestige of the

United States by demanding an apology within ten days.

When no

apology was tendered by the Korean government, Rodgers sent a
retaliatory expedition ashore.

The sailor and marine shore party

assaulted and captured five Korean forts, took 481 pieces of artillery,
killed approximately 240 Korean soldiers and then withdrew.

Find-

ing it impossible to conclude a peaceful treaty, and judging that
the forces available were insufficient to reach the Korean capital
without great risk, the fleet returned to Chefoo.

The navy report

on the expedition took some comfort in that the "punishment which
was inflicted upon our treacherous assailants • • • has not failed
to make an impression upon the people of the Chinese coast."

the mission failed completely in its major objective.

But

"Our little

war," as the New York Times editorialized, left "little to be proud
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of."

Low concluded that neither conciliatory negotiations nor

demonstrations of force would accomplish any practical results in
Korea.

Only a sizeable invasion force, capable of insuring success

without undue risk, could open up Korea.
yet ready for such drastic action.

The United States was not

Instead, Rodgers was cautioned

against any attempt at the conquest of Korea.

There the matter

rested for several years. 6
Washington learned in 1874 that the young king of Korea
had assumed power in the country and had deposed the regent who had
been acting for the past fifteen years.

It was hoped that the new

regime would be more favorably disposed to foreigners.

Two years

later, Japan succeeded in concluding a treaty of amity and commerce
with Korea.

This encouraged the United States to renew its overtures.

Senator Sargent of California introduced a joint resolution in 1878
which would authorize the president to appoint a commissioner to
arrange a treaty similar to Japan's.

Aside from the usual arguments

concerning commerce, civilization and secure navigation, Sargent
raised an important new point, representing a departure in American
thinking.

The United States, he said, "should seek to extend them

(Korea) the protection which arises from our recognition as a safeguard against the aggression of Russia."

Curiously, he also claimed

that "America is the nearest to Corea of all the nations having
European civilization except Japan."

Reflecting the growing concern

in Washington about Russia's designs south of the Amur, Sargent
hoped that a friendly Korea would prove an American lodgement on
mainland Asia and a bulwark protecting Japan:
The addition of Corea to the number of the strong, armed
powers in friendship with the United States will increase
our influence on that continent, besides strengthening
Japan. Such strength is necessary, unless the advance of
Russia southward on the eastern shore is to be unchecked.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148
The Russian question is a formidable Asiatic question.
That there is a danger of the Russians taking Corea
is obvious by a glance at the map showing the relation
which the Yellow Sea bears to the frozen country of
the Amoor; and Russia in possession of Corea is a standing menace to Japan.7
The joint resolution was never adopted, but the Navy Department had been listening.

Sargent was the chairman of the Senate

Committee on Naval Affairs.

Late in 1878 Commodore Shufeldt, a

close friend of the senator's: sailed in Ticonderoga on a commercial
and diplomatic mission to various eastern countries.

Among his

"\.nstructions wa::; the requirement to open "peaceful" negotiations
with Korea.

It was hoped that Japan's good offices could be used

to facilitate the negotiations, but attempts to initiate talks by
this means failed.

While Shufeldt awaited in Nagasaki during the

summer of 1880 for replies from Korea, another possible avenue
of communication opened up.

Li Hung-chang, the viceroy of Chihli

province, invited Shufeldt to visit him at Tientsin.

Shufeldt,

believing that the Japanese were not exerting themselves in behalf
of his mission, readily accepted Li's invitation.
apparent motives in approaching Shufeldt.

Li had two

First, he wanted to

prevent the United States and Japan from joining together in recognizing Korea's independence from China's sovereignty.

Li offered

to use his influence with the government of Korea so that it would
accede to the friendly request of the United States to open negotiations for a treaty.

He was foiled in his aim though.

China became

the intermediary through which America gained access to Korea, but
the United States never relinquished its claim to be dealing with an
independent Korea.

The second thing which motivated Li was a fear

that war between Russia and China was imminent.

He sought Shufeldt's
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opinion concerning the relative strengths of the Russian Pacific
fleet and the Chinese navy.

Li also expressed the hope

~hat

Shufeldt

would be permitted to assist in the reorganization of the Chinese
navy. 8
The cause of Li's concern lay in the occupation by Russia
of the Kuldja region in Chinese Turkestan.

When

Chin~

moved to

reoccupy the territory, Russia dispatched a fleet to the Far East.
China considered this a "hostile and menacing naval demonstration
in its own waters in time of peace."

Another concern to China was

a report in April 1880 of Russian mission composed chiefly of
cavalrymen which had entered Korea's northeast province to propose
a treaty.

F~·om

conversations held in November 1880 with the Chinese

minister in St. Petersburg, John Foster, the United States minister,
gathered that a conflict between Russia and China "was almost inevitable and not far distant."

Foster was also told that if China

was driven by the unjust demands of Russia into the maintenance of
its honor and independence, that China could with justice appeal
to friendly nations for sympathy.

Li's offer to intercede for the

United States in Korea was an attempt to elicit the friendly help of
America in case war with Russia could not be averted.

Although the

cavalry advance of Russia into Korea never materialized, the threat
had a more lasting effect on Chinese policy than the actual punitive
American raid on Korea ten years earlier. 9
Shufeldt returned to Washington in late 1880, but not for
long.

Secretary of State Blaine endorsed Shufeldt 1 3 new approach

to Korea through China.

To further the plan, he ordered Shufeldt back

to Peking to aid in organizing the Chinese navy, if requested, and
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to await Korea's response to Li.
had changed.

By this time though, the atmosphere

There no longer was any sense of urgency.

and China had resolved their differences.
territory had been restored to China.

Russia

Much of the disputed

Shufeldt considered that the

agreement with Russia lessened Li's enthusiasm to act as intermediary

° Finally, however, word was received that Korea was

with Korea. 1

willing to discuss terms of a treaty.

Most of the negotiations took

place in Tientsin under the sponsorship

of Li.

Nearly a year after

Shuff:ldt's return to Asia, the documents were formally signed in
Korea in May 1882.

To Shufeldt his long and arduous task was worth

the effort, for he believed strongly that the "Pacific Ocean is to
become at no distant day the commercial domain of America."

He

was also convinced that Korea needed a treaty with the United States
as an "absolute necessity as a matter of protection against the
aggression of surrounding powers. 111 1

It now remained for American

diplomats to provide such protection.
Although Shufeldt garnered little immediate personal recognition for his accomplishment, no one could fault his comprehensive
treaty.

Within a short period it became the model for the other

nations interested in a treaty with Korea, including Russia.

By

its terms the United States gained diplomatic and consular representation, American citizens were permitted to trade at the open ports
at fixed rates of tariff, shipwrecked mariners were assured of good
treatment, and the United States was granted most-favored-nation
privileges.
From the very beginning of American representation in Seoul,
Lucius Foote, the first minister of any western power, became deeply
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involved in Korean affairs.

Secretary Frelinghuysen had instructed

Foote to emphasize that the United States had no ulterior designs on
Korea and that the kingdom was to be treated as an independent and
sovereign power.

This supportive policy, as actively pursued by

Foote and his successors, made a profoundly favorable impression
on Korea's king.

Five months after his arrival, Foote was granted

a private, informal audience with the king who asked Foote's advice
on a number of issues.

They discussed the forthcoming Korean treaties

with England and Germany and the United States was urged to request
that Russia and France open similar treaty talks.

Of more significance,

the United States was invited, through Foote, to appoint an
gentleman"

'~merican

to act as advisor to the Korean Office of Foreign

Affairs and to provide military instructors to train a modern Korean
army. 12

This invitation was repeated over the next several yea~s.

The caution, inefficiency and delays at the State Department negated
the effortR of the Americans in Korea to prop up a weak government.
Frelinghuysen had expected that the problems facing Foote
would stem primarily from the relations of Korea with China and
Japan.

And, indeed, these relationships were complex and critical.

By 1885 the situation grew more complicated when the rivalry of
England and Russia spilled over into Korea and threatened its
territorial integrity.

Foote had by then resigned his post because

its rank had been downgraded.

During the England-Russia contest of

wills, Ensign George Foulk assumed the responsibilities as American
chargl.

This remarkable young officer started as the naval attach~

in Seoul and he, too, gained the confidence of the king.

Unlike in

earlier periods, American representatives in China and Korea were
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concerned about Russian expansion in Asia.

No longer were they

singlemindedly in support of Russia as a civilizing force anc as
a gateway to commercial enterprise.
with China or Japan.

Their sympathies often sided

Having gained the credit for opening Korea,

Americans felt some responsibility for its survival as an independent
nation.

Foulk and his successors grew increasingly critical of

Russian expansion, viewing it with suspicions which became more
deeply ingrained with each repetition.

To some extent this distrust

of Russian motives was influenced by what Americans read in the
English-language periodicals published in the Orient.

These over-

whelmingly attacked Russia for its purported aggression.

Some of

these stories were also picked up and reprinted in the American
press.
Most of the speculation concerning Russia's next annexation
continued to be centered on the northeast coast of Korea.

Observers

were convinced that Russia would never be satisfied until it had
secured an ice-free port for itself.

At the time of the Kuldja

incident the American minister to China warned, for example, that
Russia woald not disperse its la=ge Pacific fleet "without making
some demonstration in Korea, either to open the country or to gain
possession of Port Lazare££."

Nor, once Korea was open, was Russia

content simply to follow the lead of the United States.

Russia saw

no ultimate advantage in a commercial treaty permitting trade through
a few selected seaports.

She wanted to regulate trade along the

Korea-Siberian land frontier.
western powers.

This desire was

n~t

understood by the

Instead, it was interpreted as another instance in

which Russia "preferred to make her owri way without the knowledge or
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the interference of the other powers."

Behind the cloak of secrecy

it was imagined that Russia was attempting to rectify the boundary
line with Korea to make it more satisfactory to Russia. 13
Another commonly held belief was that in the advance of
Russian power in Asia, she never failed "to find her advantage in
the perplexities and misfortunes of the Asiatic powers."

Thus,

when China became embroiled in a controversy with France in early
1885, the American minister to Peking reported the rumor that Russia
intended to occupy the island of Quelpart (Cheju) off the southern
tip of the Korean peninsula.
New York Times.

This rumor was later repeated in the

Russian forces never set foot on Quelpart. 14

By mid-1885 Russia had been drawn into a real intrigue over
Korea by a German national, von Mollendorf, who served as Advisor
to the Korean Foreign Office.
Li Hung Chang.

Von Mollendorf owed his position to

He was acting as China's man in the Korean government.

In anticipation of getting American advisers the king, trying to
assert his independence, had dismissed both von Mollendorf and the
Chinese military advisers from Korean service.

When neither Shufeldt

nor any other American advisers arrived, the king was forced to
restore von Mollendorf to his position.

Perhaps feeling his situation

tenuous, von Mollendorf turned to other sponsorship.

The king himself

may have played a role in the subsequent schemes, though he denied
it later.
June 1884.

Russia had concluded a standard treaty with Korea in
However,

unknown

to most in the Korean government, von

Mollendorf began conducting secret negotiations by which Russia was
to furnish one hundred military instructors for the Korean army.
In return for protecting Korea "against all attacks,"

Russia was
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allegedly to receive the "loan" of Port Lazarev.

15

Concurrently, Russia and England were engaged in a struggle
over conLrol of Afghanistan.

This struggle spread to Korea when,

in April 1885, Great Britain seized Port Hamilton, another small
island off the southern tip of Korea.

Whether the occupation of

Port Hamilton was a response to the von Mollendorf secret negotiations
or a general precaution in anticipation of a war with Russia has
not been confirmed.

Ensign Foulk first learned of the scheme in

May when von Mollendorf told him that negotiations with Russia had
commenced several months previously, but that certainly "Russia
would not make any occupation of Korean territory." 16

The Korean

government received its first official word of the von Mollendorf
negotiations upon the arrival of Alexis de Speyer, Secretary of the
Russian legation at Tokyo.

This officer informed Foulk that if

England retained Port Hamilton, then Russia would acquire "ten
times as much territory" from Korea.

Foulk was plunged into the

center of this crisis, not only in his diplomatic role, but also
as the king's confidential adviser.

In the latter capacity Foulk

became privy to the conversations de Speyer held with Korean officials.
From them he learned of de Speyer's threats:
If you do not accept the American Army instructors, there
would be no loss; but if you do not take the Russian
officers, you must lose a great deal • • • • If you
break with America in this, there is no loss, but if you
do with Russia, trouble lies directly before your eyes.l7
With both England and Russia threatening the autonomy of his
country, the king again relayed through Foulk another request for
American military instructors.

Foulk, fearing that Anglo-Russian

hostilities might break out on Korean soil, suggested to the Chinese
and Japanese representatives that they postpone the withdrawal of
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their troops from Korea.

When Secretary of State Bayard learned of

Foulk's activities on behalf of Korea, he cautioned Foulk to take
a more passive role:
Seoul is the centre of conflicting and almost hostile
intrigues involving the interests of China, Japan,
Russia, and England • • • • It is clearly the interest
of the United States to hold aloof from all this and do
nothing nor be drawn into anything which would look
like taking sides with any of the contestants.l8
Ofall the outside powers, Foulk was most concerned about Russia.

He

was convinced that the von Mollendorf-de Speyer scheme was aimed at
nothing less than "establishing Korea as a protectorate of Russia."
Whatever the scope of their plans, they failed for the time being.
Von Mollendorf was again dismissed from his post and de Speyer returned to Tokyo.

Although St. Petersburg disclaimed any intention

of acquiring a part of Korea, the New York Times detected in the
incident a "suggestion of Russia's irresponsible mania for aggrandizement" and an example of the "Muscovite stealthiness of approach." 19
The next Russian charg~, S. Waeber, took a more pleasant and
conciliatory attitude than de Speyer.

Nevertheless, he persisted

for several years in trying to arrange a new treaty which would
have effectively extended Russian influence deep into the northeast
province of Korea.

In late 1886 the terms of the proposed treaty

were shown to Foulk by the king who once again sought his advice.
The Russian draft called for a free trading post to be established
deep inside Korea, about 75 miles from the Tumen River border.
The proposition immediately raised suspicions concerning the Russian
aims.

The Korean counter-proposal, as suggested by Foulk, was to

grant Russia a trading post, but on the seacoast in the vicinity of
the Tumen River.

The king, however, despairing of material aid from
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America, may once again have turned to the Russians for protection
against Chinese overlordship.20
The Chinese representative at Seoul, Yuan Shih-kai, had
gradually been gathering in the reins of power.
ing Waeber's negotiations closely.

He had been follow-

Before they came to fruition

Yuan claimed to have knowledge of an agreement, bearing the king's
approval, which in effect would "turn Korea bodily over to Russian
protection."

This document may well have been a forgery designed

as a pretext for overt Chinese intervention in Korea.

England had

long urged China to incorporate Korea within its empire.

Authentic

or not, the document nearly triggered a war between China and Russia,
until Li Hung Chang's cooler head prevailed.

Li conferred with the

/

Russian charge at Peking to resolve the future relations of the two
nations in Korea.

By the terms of their agreement of October 1886,

both obligated themselves to abstain from encroachment on the
integrity of Korea.

This agreement became the basis for Russian

policy until after the Sino-Japanese war. 21

Despite the peaceful

solution, Russia was again portrayed as an aggressor, as when the
New York Times mistakenly reported that the occupation of Port
Lazarev by Russia was a "menace to Corea too evident to be ignored." 22
In 1888 Russia's temporary "hands-off" policy toward Korea
was restated by a joint study conducted by the Governor-General of
Amur and the Head of the Asiatic Department.

They concluded that

Korea could not serve as a profitable trade market for Russia, but
might have important strategic advantages, being on the flank of
Manchuria.

However, they recommended no extension of territory,

because of the difficulties of defending Korea so far from the centers
where Russia disposed of its fighting forces.

The study also
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emphasized the vulnerability of the Maritime region, should Korea
be turned into a Chinese province.

The United States, judged the

report, was the only foreign power which had been unwilling to
encourage the designs of China.

Therefore, Russia should not oppose

the sending of American military instructors to Korea. 23

Such a

reasonable and restrained posture on the part of Russia, if it had
been relayed to the United States, might well have allayed American
suspicions and formed the basis for Russian-American cooperation in
Korea.
Subsequently, the Russo-Korean supplemental trade agreement
was concluded amicably.

Russia settled for a trading post at the

Tmaen River and not deep into Korea.

Despite the comparatively

undemanding terms of the new commercial treaty, the New York Times
predicted that the peninsula was "undoubtedly next on the road in
Russia's southern advance from Vladivostok." 24
without any direct cause.

This opinion lingered

Nothing happened specifically in Korea to

mar Russo-Americ.an relations for a number of years, yet a degree of
skepticism concerning Russian ambitions remained.

Most American

observers in Asia would probably have agreed with Minister Augustine
Heard:
The intentions of Russia may be perfectly harmless •
but we may be permitted to infer the future from the past,
and to imagine that she would not regret the pushing of her
boundary line further South. But her time has not yet
come. She is not ready yet.
As late as 1893 Minister Heard held to his views that Russia would
find a suitable opportunity one day to "swoop down on the north of
Korea" to find an ice- free harbor. 25
The United States itself was not entirely devoid of territorial
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aspirations.

By early 1887 Great Britain was prepared to relinquish

Port Hamilton.

The American charg~ at Seoul, William Rockhill,

thoughtthat Korea was not strong enough to hold the islands by
itself and that neither China nor Japan could take them without
provoking the other.

To him the obvious solution was to lease the

islands to a "friendly and entirely disinterested power," the United
States.

He pointed out that the Secretary of the Navy in his Annual

Report for 1884 had recommended that Port Hamilton be leased as a
coaling station for the fleet on station in northern Asian waters. 26
The subject came up briefly again after Benjamin Harrison took
office in 1889.

He and Blaine, once more the Secretary of State,

adopted a more active foreign policy than the previous administration.
Horace Allen, an American missionary-doctor in Korea since 1884,
had become another confidant of the king.

In 1887 Allen resigned

his missionary appointment to act as secretary to Korea's new
legation in Washington.

In conversation with Allen, Blaine expressed

a willingness "to pursue an active policy in Korea and • • • perhaps
ask for a United States coaling station at Port Hamilton thus giving
the Koreans genuine backing" against the Chinese and the Russians. 27
Although nothing came of this interest, it provoked garbled stories,
as Minister Heard attested:
Lately the newsmongers have been very active, and one
of their stories was to the effect that the American
minister was negotiating for the cession of Port Hamilton,
which was to be subsequently transferred to Russia.28
The Asiatic squadron was dependent for receiving coal and
other supplies from ports fully under the control of foreign nations.
Such ports as Yokohama and Chefoo might well be denied to American
ships in time of war.

Yet the presence of American citizens in Korea
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increased the need for the squadron to be able to operate freely off
Northeast Asia.

In assessing the requirement to keep a gunboat on

station in Korean waters, the navy accounted for 56 citizens of the
United States residing in Korea in 1892, considerably more than
those of any other western nation. 29

Aside from the legation staff,

missionaries had established a school, a hospital and an orphanage.
Several Americans served in prominent positions in the Korean government.

Others were engaged in commerce and acquiring concessions.

Earlier pessimism about the prospects for trade with Korea had
changed to guarded optimism, largely through the efforts of Dr.
Allen.

While in Washington during the years 1887-1889, he actively

promoted commercial development in Korea.

He kindled the enthusiasm

of politicians and entrepreneurs in a variety of projects--gold
mining, railroads, lighting and waterworks.

Most of these plans

never materialized, because the stories of political unrest in·
Korea discouraged the businessmen from risking their capital for
investments.

Nevertheless, a growing number of influential Americans

perceived the economic potential offered by Korea once that nation
achieved political stability.

They were also, no doubt, aware

that one of the forces undermining such stability was the threat of
Russia expanding into all or part of Korea.
As a result of the opening of Korea, the focus of American
attention in Asia was shifting perceptibly northward.

Deliberately

or not, England and France, preoccupied in expanding their own
spheres in Burma and Indo-China, seemed to leave the field in Korea,
and later in Manchuria, to the United States to compete with the
Asiatic powers and, of course, face Russia.

Among some Americans
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there was a proprietary concern for Korea as a client state.

Observ-

ing the Russian actions during the Kuldja Affair of 1880, the von
Mollendorf-de Speyer secret

negoti~tions

of 1885, and the Russian

demands for a free trading zone in northeast Korea in 1886, left
a legacy of suspicions behind.

Rightly or wrongly, the Americans

viewed the Russian intentions in Asia with increasing distrust.
Attempts had already been made deliberately to exclude American
merchants and whalers from Russian Siberia.

Now the concept of

Russo-American cooperation in Asia was being eroded further.

Neither

nation saw any community of interests with the other in Korea.
Russia showed every indication of "going it alone."

The United

States hoped that an independent Korea would be another link from
which to promote its interests in Japan and China and a buffer to
stop the southward advance of Russia.

Nor did American newspaper

accounts give Russia the benefit of the doubt based on a past
tradition of friendship.

Instead, they repeatedly printed false

rumors of Russian aggression.

In Washington these reported Russian

intrigues may have seemed far away and inconsequential in the overall
context of Asiatic politics, but the record would be recalled when
the next round of Russian ambitions in the Far East manifested itself.
One of those who would recall was William W. Rockhill who was on
the scene from 1884 to 1888, first as secretary to the American
legation in Peking and then cts charge' at Seoul.

As an "old Asia

hand" he would find it difficult to advise that the United States
remain aloof to further Russian advances.
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CHAPTER VI
"LET A RAILWAY BE BUILT ACROSS SIBERIA • • • "

The international scramble for position in Northeast Asia,
which started with the opening of Korea, might well have stabilized
after the Sino-Russian accord of 1886 had not Russia then embarked
on a far-reaching new Far East policy of its own.

Reacting to the

prevailing tension along its long, common frontier with China,
Russia decided to strengthen its position in Asiatic Russia many
fold by constructing a trans-Siberian railroad.
policy, centered on

its

Russia's comprehensive

Siberian rail system, evolved grarlually

over the years 1886-1894 and then governed Russia's subsequent
actions in the region over the next decade.

As details of Russia's

ambitious program unfolded and became known, the other powers with
national interests in Northeast Asia were forced to adjust their
own policies.

The railroad would take years to complete, but once

accomplished, Russia would be able to project its power in Asia far
more effectively and truly become a formidable power in the Pacific.
The impending threat caused China to look closer to its northern
defenses and probably precipitated Japan into instigating the SinoJapanese war before this Russian power could become a significant
factor.
In the United States no such coherent, official policy was
formulated until the railroad was nearing completion.

While the

164
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United States government was slow in recognizing the importance of
the approaching shift in power in Northeast Asia, individual Americans
appreciated the commercial prospects of the Siberian railroad from
its inception.

Many newspaper editors, financiers, diplomats,

politicians and railroad men saw new opportunities for hitching
American enterprise onto the Russian project.

They clung to the

belief that Russia both needed and welcomed American participation
in its internal development.

American interest in Siberia was

heightened because, during the years preceding the Sino-Japanese
war, there occurred the earliest realizations that the North American
continent was rapidly filling up and that a new frontier must be
sought.

Isolated earlier warnings that American interests in

Northeast Asia might eventually collide with Russian goals there
were generally ignored in hopes of a new accommodation.
Russia's Far East possessions had languished for years.

Far

from becoming a replication of the Mississippi Valley prosperity,
the Amur basin had remained, three decades after occupation, largely
undeveloped and underpopulated.

Despite a vigorous colonization

policy, most of the settlers never trekked beyond Western Siberia.
A more generous grant of land was offered by the government further
east, but the long land journey proved too much of an obstacle for
most.

Only about 600 new settlers reached the Far East annually.

With the military obligations taking up much of their attention,
the Russian population could scarcely feed itself.

The situation

improved slightly after 1879 when the government pressed the five
ships of the Volunteer Fleet into the Odessa-Vladivostok run.
Another 1000 peasants reached the Maritime Region annually by this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166
means.

Because of the slow, cumbersome transportation system, the

imperial government was forced to administer the Amur region as a
remote colony, much as it had Russian-America.

To a government which

prized centralized control, being cut off by weather from effective
administration of the colony for six months of the year proved to be
intolerable. 1
Gradually, the government was brought to the realization that
its hold on Eastern Siberia was extremely tenuous.

Lines of communica-

tion were vulnerable along wide stretches of frontier which were no
longer unpopulated buffer zones.

After the Treaty of Peking, China

reversed its long-standing policy of excluding Chinese settlers from
the Manchu homeland.

By the 1880s several million Chinese settlers

had moved into Manchuria proper and, because of the recurring diplomatic
crises with Russia, China had vastly improved its military preparedness there.

Most disturbing to Russia, though, were the Chinese who,

like the Koreans before them, were moving across the borders and
living in Russian territory.

The Russians had themselves used this

tactic of peaceful occupation often enough to be fully aware of the
dangers of this type of reconquest.

Some means needed to be adopted

to keep "Russia for the Russians." 2
A secondary, but nevertheless persistent, concern of the
tsarist regime was that the remote Siberian colony might break away
from European Russia.

Without a rail connection, Eastern Siberia

was more easily accessible from across the Pacific.

Many areas depended

on American supplies and included in these shipments were occasional
batches of material from the Russian radicals.

One of the reasons

that Constantin Pobedonostev, conservative adviser to the Tsar,
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organized the sealift of peasants to the Far East was to offset
American influence.

"If we do not send Russian vessels to those

shores, the non-Russian natives of the coast will altogether forget
that they belong to Russia," he declared in 1879.
Russian population too was a source of concern.

The Siberian
Russian radicals

exiled to Siberia, such as Petr Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin, often
turned to America for their political model.

Among the exiles there

was talk of creating "the United States of Siberia" to be federated
across the Pacific Ocean with the United States of America.

The

1880s also saw the beginning of a Siberian autonomous movement which
advocated self-government for the colony and an end to the practice
of deporting criminals and political dissidents to Siberia.

None

of these diverse secessionist tendencies posed any immediate threat
to Russia's control, but they did reinforce the idea that a serious
problem was in the offing.3
The solution was obvious:

build a continuous railroad from

Europe, across Siberia, to the Pacific.

Then the resettlement process

of peasants from Europe to Eastern Siberia could be accelerated.
Then troops and supplies could be rushed to defend against threats
to the frontier in a matter of one to two months, rather than years.
The railroads that spanned the North American continent, particularly
the Canadian-Pacific, were proof that it was feasible to build
a railroad in harsh climate through rugged terrain.

Responding to

the strategic necessity of defending his possessions, Alexander III
in 1886 decreed:

"Let a railway be built across Siberia on the

shortest way possible."4
A five-year delay ensued before any Siberian track was laid.
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While the strategic solution was apparent, practical difficulties
had to be faced.

A route needed to be selected and surveyed among

the many competing proposals.

And means to finance the huge under-

taking needed to be obtained from among other high priority projects.
By 1891 these obstacles had been overcome and the momentous decision
announced to the world.
at Vladivostok:

Tsarevich Nicholas read his father's rescript

"Let Your auspicious participation in the commence-

ment of this truly national task undertaken by Me serve as a fresh
proof of My desire to facilitate the intercourse of Siberia with the
other portions of My Empire."S

The laying of the first stone by the

heir-apparent proved to be more than a symbolic gesture.

Nicholas

was to become the only tsar ever to have visited the Far East.
During his journey, his travelling companion, Prince Ukhtomskij,
had so impressed upon Nicholas the notion of Russia's "oriental
mission," that his interest in Far Eastern affairs remained keen
thereafter. 6
Prince Ukhtomskij, long-time student of the Orient and editor
of the St. Petersburg Gazette, was typical of those influential
intellectuals, particularly among the Slavophils, who advocated
transferring the center of Russia's life to Asia.

The views of

these "Easterners" (Vostochniki) gained a wider acceptance and influence when Russia's pan-Slavic ventures were frustrated in the Balkans.
If the strategic necessities for a Siberian railroad needed an
ideological rationale, the Vostochniki had one ready at hand.

Though

expressing their thoughts in a variety of ways, the Vostochniki
tended to believe that the time had come for Russia to turn away
from Europe and, instead, work to spread its own unique blend of
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Eurasian culture throughout Asia.

According to them, Russia, with

its partly Asiatic heritage, was better equipped, geographically
and spiritually, to bridge the gap between East and West.

Dostoyevskij

expressed this sentiment:
In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go
to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in
Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia
will bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only
necessary that the movement should start. Build only two
railroads: begin with the one to Siberia • • • and at once
you will see the consequences.
The Vostochniki were convinced that the Asiatic people felt a greater
affinity toward Russian culture than the more materialistic society
of Western Europe.

They conceived that the Russian advance into

Asia would essentially be a peaceful, peasant colonization which
would not only protect Asia from the barbaric nomad of the Steppe,
but also sharply contrast with the commercial and industrial exploitation practiced by the other European powers.

To I. S. Aksakov,

publisher and political thinker, the ships of the European nations
were regarded as "messengers not of peace and happiness, but war
and the greatest calamities."
was

According to him the "task of Russia

to reconcile the exclusive featJres of East and West and to

transform the one and the other into one great whole."

The philosopher

Leontyev predicted that Russia would head "some new Eastern realm"
in which the "Slav-Oriental civilization may replace the passing
civilization of Latin-Germanic Europe."

The contest was foreseen,

not just for dominion over Asia, but for the world.

The Vostochniki

believed that the Asiatic nations looked to the Russians as liberators.
They cited Korea as an example of an Asiatic kingdom which had sought
brotherly protection from Russia.

Ukhtomskij expressed the essence
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of this idea:
Asia--we have always belonged to it. We have lived its
life and felt its interests. Through us the Orient has
gradually arrived at consciousness of itself, at a
superior life • • • • We have nothing to conquer. All
these peoples of various races feel themselves drawn to
us, and are ours, by blood, by tradition, and by ideas.
We simply approach them more closely. This great and
mysterious Orient is ready to become ours.
The path of civilization was, from the Russian standpoint, inevitably
progressing from West to East.7
With the decision to construct a trans-Siberian railroad,
the Vostochniki were able to leave the realm of theory and enter into
the province of real opportunities.

Leading them into action was an

unexpectedly hard-headed, financially-wise businessman.

Sergei Witte

was a self-made man who rose to position of enormous power when he
was appointed Minister of Finance in late 1892.
the demands of the

'~esternizers"

In him were synthesized

for modernization and the ideals

of the Slavophils which embraced autocracy and orthodoxy.

He was

undaunted by the organizational, financial and engineering problems
facing the immense railway project.

At the same time he could dream

of Russia's future in the Orient, predicting that "Russia from the
shores of the Pacific Ocean and the peaks of the Himalayas would
dominate not only Asiatic, but also European affairs." 8
Witte was fully in accord with the strategic necessity for
the Siberian railroad.

He was also well aware of the need to tie

Asiatic Russia to Europe by means of a better transport system.

And

he entirely supported the practical necessity for re-colonizing
peasants from overcrowded European Russian regions, because he
favored increasing the agricultural exports in order to help finance
the construction of the railroad.

His vision, however, went beyond
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these immediate goals.

He had far more in mind than the Vostochniki

dream of peasant colonization.

To him, the railroad was a means to

stimulate the industrialization of all Russia and particularly the
development of Siberia.

His plans called for much more than a simple

track across the Steppe.

In addition, he initiated geological surveys

of Siberia and planned spur lines to connect with the locations of
natural resources.

Waterway improvements were scheduled to supplement

and expand the rail system.

Even the Northern Sea Route was surveyed

as part of a whole Siberian development project.
have applauded his every move.

Perry Collins would

Witte's plans represented the actual

execution of Collins' own lofty dreams for the region, except for
one important detail.

Witte had no intention of inviting the Americans

to participate, as this would tend to delay the promotion of domestic
commerce and industry.
Indeed, two long-range goals set forth by Witte in 1892
would eventually disturb Americans as they slowly became more cognizant
of the full scope of Russian ambitions in the Far East.

First, Witte

envisioned that the railroad, beyond its strategic purposes, would
open up the commerce of Asia to Russia on a far grander scale than
that previously carried by the overland caravans and that rail commerce
with China would surpass and supplant commerce by sea.

He believed

that the teas and silks of China would someday move to European
markets by way of the Siberian railway.

In exchange, he expected an

increased demand for Russian manufactured goods which, in turn, would
stimulate Russian industry.

In time, predicted Witte, the railroad

would promote a Russo-Chinese economic unity.

The degree of commercial

competition that this would afford the American merchants only became
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apparent to them over the course of the next few years, as a greater
and greater percentage of American trade became concentrated in
Manchuria and Northern China. 9
The second impact on the United States caused by Witte's
blueprint for Asiatic Russia was his projection of Russian influence
beyond the Pacific shore line.

He revived Muravev 1 s dream that the

Amur region could become, not only an Asiatic bastion, but also the
pivotal region through which Russia would be a dominant Pacific
sea power.

He expected the Siberian railway to provide all the logistic

support needed to strengthen Russia's naval forces in Far Eastern
waters considerably, which "in case Gf political complications in
Europe or in the Asiatic East would acquire an especially important
significance in dominating all commercial movements in the waters
of the Pacific."

This view was at direct variance with the American

opinion which, after the purchase of Alaska, saw the United States
gaining the foremost position in the North Pacific.

Although not

fully exploited as yet, Americans fully expected their own transPacific destiny to prevail.

But Witte was not satisfied to await

the Americans on the Asiatic shore.

Rather, he foresaw the Siberian

railroad as an opportunity to open up "more direct relations with
the North American States."

He only erred in predicting that these

relationships would bring a closer "solidarity of political interests"
between Russia and the United States. 10

Instead, this thrust of

Russian commercial, naval and political power into Northeast Asia
and out into the North Pacific would increasingly be perceived as a
threat to America's own interests in the area.

These outreaches of

Witte's plans, of which the Siberian rail system was the central
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ingredient, foreshadowed an intense rivalry with the United States.
The actual construction of the railroad started to make real
progress only after Witte was named Finance Minister.

To oversee

the railroad project and all its auxiliary enterprises, a Railway
Committee was formed, at Witte's suggestion, representing all the
major departments of gavernment concerned.

This was the forum which

Witte used to cut through the normal bureaucracy and to coordinate
a consensus for his policies.

By a masterstroke, Witte persuaded

Alexander III in 1893 to appoint the tsarevich as president of the
Railway Committee.

Nicholas retained the position after his coronation,

thus ensuring his continued concentration on Far Eastern affairs
more than ten years.

Both emper0rs

fo~

were determiued that the railroad

would become a monument of achievement during their reigns.

Witte

was also able to garner public support from both the "Westernizers"
who approved of his plans to industrializeand modernize Russia and
from the Vostochniki who were eager to carry Russia's "historical
mission" to Asia.

Prince Ukhtomskij, who remained a close confidant

of Nicholas II, served also as a subordinate to Witte when he later
headed the Russian-Chinese bank.

Under the nominal leadership of

the tsar, Witte was able to forge, within the Railway Committee,
official backing for his ambitious policies.

Andrew White, the

American minister to St. Petersburg, was impressed that Russia intended
to press forward with such a gigantic undertaking.

He noted that

in the press and in all the highest quarters of government there
was a conviction that Russia had a great civilizing mission in Asia.
White compared this strong Russian feeling with the "manifest destiny
idea" in the United States a generation or two since.

White also
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reported that the "ultimate bearing of this Trans-Asiatic railway
on our own Trans-American system is so evident as to require no
disaussion." 11
During the years 1886-1894, when Russian leaders were
fashioning a new and comprehensive Far Eastern policy, the United
States government took little heed of the political consequences of
Russia's Siberian railroad and certainly articulated no foreign policy
of its own for the region.

Having succeeded in spanning the North

American continent with railroads, individual American entrepreneurs
could easily appreciate the incentives which drove the Russians to
undertake such a railway system.

They could also, from their similar

experience, predict the significant economic development which would
spring up along the route of the railroad.

In the construction work,

in the opening of the land for development, and in the subsequent
commerce, Americans perceived an opportunity for economic advantage.
What they failed to grasp at first, was that Russia had no intention
of sharing these lucrative prospects with Americans.

The Russian

advance eastward was intent, not only in protecting its own possessions,
but on dominating all of Northeast Asia.

Russia was bent on becoming

a competitor, not a partner of the United States.
Americans were misled by the comparative ease with which they
had previously operated across the North Pacific with little or no
opposition.

American whalers and fur trappers had scoured the Pacific

up to and on to the Siberian shoreline.

American naval ships had

charted the coastal waters and American telegraphers had surveyed
the terrain of Siberia.

American merchants had supplied and were

still supplying the outlying Russian settlements in Asiatic Russia.
However, these efforts, though widespread, were not in response to
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or even supported by any stated policy of the United States government.
Except for William Seward, Washington officials had been reluctant
to support actively an extension of America's economic or naval
role in Northeast Asia.

The State Department repeatedly ignored all

recommendations that the United States acquire a naval base off the
coast of Northeast Asia from which the Asiatic squadron could better
protect American interests.

The department often discouraged American

diplomats from using their influence to gain advantage for American
businesses in China and Korea, and ignored restrictions placed on
American merchants on the Amur.

Some of the hesitation, no doubt,

sprang from the generally weak staffing of the department, which
could not cope completely with all the world situations.

The

relatively remote region of Northeast Asia was not yet accepted as
the strategic key to China and, being outside the Western Hemisphere,
received low priority.

This reluctance to assert a positive and

consistent policy for the region, despite the long-term, but scattered
American presence there, stemmed from two prevalent attitudes.
First, until the last decade of the century, most Americans
remained unaware of the full economic potential of the region.
was largely an unknown territory.
and uninviting.

Manchuria

Siberia was still considered bleak

Korea was beginning to be appreciated, but believed

to be too unstable politically to risk much.

When Americans considered

commerce with the Orient, they thought mainly in terms of Japan and
China from Shanghai south to Canton.

They rarely glanced at the

possibilities in the interior of Northeast Asia.

The advent of the

Siberian railroad was one major factor in dispelling this attitude.
American interest was aroused from the beginning of the project and
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increased proportionately as each verst of track was laid.

Hereafter,

the region tended to represent more and more of an opportunity.
The second American attitude which hampered the formulation
of positive program for Northeast Asia was the accepted theory that
the United States need not be hasty.

America's superior position

in the North Pacific was assured, went the thinking, once Alaska
and the Aleutians were purchased.
States.

Time was on the side of the United

The bulk of the ocean commerce traversing the Pacific would

inevitably fall to American merchants.

And with commerce would

come American influence in Asia and western civilization, courtesy
of the Anglo-Saxons.

The historical course of empire from east to

west would continue to be followed as soon as the North American
continent had been consolidated and developed.
Coincident with the commencement of construction of the Siberian
railroad that time had now arrived in the United States.
was in a transition period.

The nation

The internal frontier of the West was,

according to the 1890 census, largely gone.

Energies which had been

devoted to developing the interior of the continent were now ready
to be turned outward to extra-continental enterprises.

To replace

expansion in the West, some began advocating overseas expansion,
not only as a new frontier, but also as an outlet for the surplus
being produced on farm and in factory.
to be articulated.

A broader world outlook began

Senator Platt urged that something beyond the un-

paralleled activity at home was needed:
The opportunity for the adventurous spirit of our citizens
to have free course is being limited as we are settling
up our lands, and it is to the ocean that our children
must look, as they have looked at the boundless West, for
the opportunity to develop their ambitions and their talents.
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Alfred Thayer Mahan termed this the United States "looking outward."
He and a growing number of spokesmen urged the nation to contest
vigorously for overseas markets and to expand commerce to all quarters
of the globe. 12

The growing tendency of the United States to look

beyond the Western Hemisphere was manifested in a variety of ways:
demands for a transisthmian canal connecting the Atlantic to the
Pacific, a program to modernize the navy, acquisition of bases in
Hawaii and Samoa, recommendations to increase the merchant fleet,
and demands to improve the effectiveness of the consular service.
Frederick Jackson Turner summed up this pressure for American
expansion:
For nearly three centuries the dominant factor in American
life has been expansion. With the settlement of the Pacific
coast and the occupation of the free lands, this movement
has come to a check. That these energies of expansion
will no longer operate would be a rash prediction; and the
demands for a vigorous foreign policy, for an interoceanic
canal, for a revival of our power upon the seas, and for
the extension of American influence in outlying islands
and adjoining countries, are indications that the movement
will continue.l3
Because of the advent of the Siberian railroad, Northeast Asia became
one of the quarters of the globe which attracted increased attention
as an outlet for American enterprise and influence.

One observer who

looked outward for a release of America's pent up energies was Henry
Adams.

He had sailed to the South Pacific to find an outlet for

American pressure, but found the islands not worth touching.

Instead,

he turned his attention to Siberia:
On the whole, I am satisfied that America has no future in
the Pacific. She can turn south, indeed, but after all,
the west coast of South America offers very little field.
Her best chance is Siberia. Russia will probably go to
pieces; she is rotten and decrepit to the core, and must
pass through a bankruptcy, political and moral. If it
can be delayed another twenty-five years, we could
Americanize Siberia, and this is the only possible work
14
that I can see still open on a scale equal American means.
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While Adams' opinion of Siberia as America's new frontier
may have seemed farfetched and premature, others took a more immediate
and practical tack.

American businessmen had kept themselves informed

of the Siberian project from its inception and speculated about its
consequences for them.

One result was a revival of the earlier

dream of developing the riches of the Amur basin in partnership
with Russia.

Newspaper accounts began to emphasize the wealth of

raw materials and the rich farm lands, rather than the bleak and
forbidding aspects of Siberia.

The "incalcuable treasures of iron,

coal, copper, lead, timber, platinum, petroleum, etc. which such a
railroad would pour without stint into the markets" were described.
It was estimated that the land, particularly the "black lands" in
the Lake Baikal region, could support a ten-fold increase in population.

The possibilities of this vast country were thought to be

"tremendous both commercially and industrially."

America, it was

expected, would reap the benefit of this "highway of commerce"
because the "railroad

~ill

take us into the heart of Northern Asia."

The rail system was foreseen as a "commercial trail into the confines
of Asia, India and Africa by way of the Pacific and Siberia."
During the famine in Russia of 1891, W.

c.

Edgar, editor of the

Northwestern Miller, headed a relief movement to send flour to
Russia.

One of the conclusions he derived from his visit was that

an enormous trade would flow between Vladivostok and San Francisco,
bringing the two nations into closer commercial relations to their
mutual profit.lS
Commentators in both Russia

a~d

the United States were of

the opinion that the Siberian railroad would bring the two nations
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into closer proximity.

Novoye Vremya thought that "when Russia has

bound itself by a railway to the Pacific Ocean, it will stand face
to face with the new world, and who knows--will not this event contribute to bring into close accord Russia and the United States."
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle agreed that Russia "will have
become a next-door neighbor" and that transit between the heartlands
of the two nations will become simple and direct.

Speculation went

so far as to dwell on the possibility of an intercontinental railway
linking Asia and North America.

In 1888, at an early stage in the

planning of the Siberian line, General Annenkoff, the man largely
responsible for directing the construction of the trans-Caspian railroad, expressed a wish to extend the Siberian railroad along the
Aleutians to connect with an American line on the Pacific coast.
Although he reportedly endeavored to interest American capitalists
in the enterprise, the scheme apparently never was taken up seriously
by the Russian government.l6
William Gilpin, the first American geopolitician, had a
similar dream of connecting the continents.

Land transportation,

he thought, had far more advantages than communications by sea.
Gilpin noted that both Russia and the United States had followed
comparable paths.

Both were large and strong and growing more so,

while the other powers of Christendom were falling into decay.
had expanded continentally to the Pacific shores.

Both

Pointing to the

previous cooperative effort on the intercontinental telegraph project, he proposed that the two nations jointly construct a "Cosmopolitan Railway" which would cross the Bering Strait by car ferry
and then cross Siberia to connect with the European systems.

By
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cooperating on this joint effort, Gilpin foresaw the United States
and Russia joining hands against the rest of the world, militarily,
commercially, and industrially.

The "Cosmopolitan Railway" would

become the "chief highway of the nations."

Gilpin urged the United

States to look to Asia, not Europe, for the future.

Speaking of

the "boundless expanse of almost uninhabited country," he prophesied
that Siberia would be civilized by the railroad and that the ' 1United
States will become Asia's schoolmaster."

Soon after Gilpin's book

was published, the New York Times editorialized that the old project
of connecting America and Asia by rail was one step nearer to
practicality. 1 7
While the intercontinental railroad never went beyond an
exercise of imagination, the news of the trans-Asiatic railroad
spurred more practical efforts to link the two continental rail
systems by means of trans-Pacific steamship service.

Since the

inauguration of regular American steamship service across the Pacific,
the shipping lines had largely been under the control of the transcontinental railroads of the United States.

The Pacific Mail

Steamship Company, operating ships from San Francisco to the Orient,
was directed by railroad magnates such as Jay Gould, Collis P.
Huntington, and Edward H. Harriman.

Starting in 1893, the Pacific

Mail began to modernize its operations.

By 1904 it had a fleet of

large, steel steamers in regular service including the Korea, the
Siberia, the Manchuria, and the Mongolia.

As the enthusiasm for

Asiatic trade mounted in the United States, these railroad men would
look for means to control the transportation services into the
interior of Manchuria and Siberia. 18
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Of all the American railroad builders, James J. Hill took
the greatest interest in trade with the Orient.

His Great Northern

Railway opened for through traffic to Seattle in 1893.

Since his

ambitions went beyond the Pacific coast, he began to plan an ocean
link to Asia.

Hill hoped to create a huge market in the Orient for

the wheat of the Dakotas and Minnesota, for the cotton from the
South, and for the steel products from the eastern states.

For

ten years he sent competent men to study Asian markets and their
relation to American business.

In the process, he spent more money

in this research than the government, according to President Cleveland.
Although his shipping ventures later failed, during the 1890s Hill
offered, through his transport system, rosy prospects for Midwest
and Southern farmers and Eastern manufacturers. 1 9
News of the Siberian railroad also brought great expectations
that Americans would actively participate in the construction.
Americans had had a long association with Russian railroad building.
Two Americans, George Whistler and
the "fathers of Russian railroads."

Tho~as

Winans, have been called

Invited to Russia in 1842 by

a mission studying American rail construction methods, the two were
instrumental in building the St. Petersburg to Moscow line, the first
major Russian railroad.
locomotives.

They also established a plant to manufacture

The Winans firm continued to manufacture products for

the Russian rail system until bought out by the government in 1868.
After that, as its rail network expanded, Russia often purchased
locomotives from the Baldwin Locomotive Company.

It was not surpris-

ing, therefore, when Russia initially considered letting concessions
for constructing the Siberian railroad, that General Annenkov
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broached the possibilities of an American concession with Wharton
Barker, a Philadelphia banker.
the Russians.

Barker was a familiar figure to

He had acted as their financial agent in 1878 for

the purchase and outfitting of four ships to be used as commerce
raiders.

In 1892 Barker travelled to St. Petersburg to form a

syndicate to finance construction of the railroad, but was unable
to raise the needed investment capital without a firm commitment
from the imperial government.

Meanwhile, Witte had decided to have

the state finance the entire enterprise, supported by loans from
France. 20
Americans still hoped to furnish the bulk of the railroad
supplies, as they were able to manufacture locomotive engines and
steel rails far more cheaply than Russia, despite transportation
costs.

The United States had previously shipped large quantities

of machinery into Siberia and it was anticipated that orders would
increase.

Americans thought that they had a special advocate in

Prince Khilkov, the Minister of Ways and Communications.

Khilkov

had come to the United States in 1857 as an apprentice to learn
every facet of railway building.

Despite these good omens, American

manufacturers were to be somewhat disappointed.

Witte's

pr~gram

was designed to promote national economic self-sufficiency, so that,
whenever possible, domestic sources were favored.

The Baldwin

Company did sell hundreds of locomotives to Russia during this
period, but at the same time, symptomatic of Witte's policies, plans
were made to re-locate an entire locomotive manufacturing plant
from Philadelphia to St. Petersburg. 21
Again in 1894, when Daniel Butterfield, a New York banker,
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tried to obtain a concession for the building of the rail line to
Siberia, his offer was refused.

That same year, in response to an

application from Senator Gordon, the American minister to St.
Petersburg inquired whether American contractors would be afforded
the opportunity of b;i.dding for the construction of any of the segments
of the Siberian railroad.
remain in Russian hands. 22

He was advised that all construction would
The refusal of the Russian government

to countenance outside contractors did not entirely discourage all
Americans.

The idea that the United States could gain its economic

ends in Asia through cooperation with Russia persisted for many
years in the face of these repeated rebuffs.

The

~respects

of

opening up a vast new territory proved overwhelmingly tempting.
The seeds of optimism sown first by Perry Collins and then repeated
by William Gilpin would be planted time and again.

This segment of

American opinion refused to believe that Russian and American interests
in Northeast Asia, far from coinciding, were actually on the verge
of coming into direct conflict.
In contrast to its good reception in the United States, news
of the proposed Siberian railway was perceived in China, as early as
1887, as a distinct threat to Manchuria.
minister to China, shared these views.

Charles Denby, American
He was persuaded that, once

the Siberian railway reached the Pacific, Russia might well become
the "greatest power on that ocean" and would not "be slow in seizing
a more southern port."

To counteract this threat, Denby was convinced

that China must build its own rail system to the Amur and Korea.
Herein Denby also spotted an opportunity for American business.

His

work as a diplomat had been criticized, but no one faulted Denby's
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enthusiastic support for American business interests in China.
Throughout his long term in office, he diligently promoted American
rail enterprises.

The Chinese viceroy, Li Hung-chang, was the key

to any hopes for American involvement in Chinese rail concessions.
He was one of the few in government who did not automatically oppose
foreign loans and modern transportation systems.

Denby worked hard

during this period and later to demonstrate to him that the American
rail system was best suited for China.

Abortive attempts were made

by American capitalists in the 1880s to obtain concessions.

One of

these was by the ubiquitous Wharton Barker who dV;cussed the establishment of a Chinese-American bank with Li to finance railways and
mining.

However, not until 1891 was the first railway authorized to

be built from Peking to the Great Wall at
only under Chinese auspices.

Shanhaikuan,

and then

It was intended that this northwest

line would eventually be extended into Manchuria for strategic
defensive purposes.

Ironically, the threat of this Chinese line

provided the final spur that goaded Russia into its all-out effort
on its own Siberian project. 23
During this period before the Sino-Japanese War, when
American interest in Northeast Asia was being stimulated anew, other
events were causing the remembrance of the "traditional friendship"
with Russia to fade.

As transport and communications systems improved,

the distance between the two countries narrowed further.

The American

public became better informed about Russian l1fe and institutions.
Criticism of the "remote northern empire" had largely been withheld
during the reign of Alexander II in the expectation of genuine
reform.

By the early 1890s these hopes had been, for the most part,
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dashed.

News of the Russian advance into Asia was, therefore,

received ambivalently.

On the one hand, Americans acknowledged

that in many parts of Asia, Russia had brought increased security
and prosperity.

Russia seemed to have a "genius for colonization"

and a talent for "assimilating the populations of other races." 24
On the other, Americans had difficulty in reconciling tyranny and
absolutism, as they viewed Russia, with a truly beneficent civilizing
force.

George Kennan sparked indignation in the United States with

his exposure of the Siberian penal system.

Commencing in 1888, his

magazine articles, lectures and his book Siberia and the Exile System
forcefully reported on the intolerance, oppression and harsh treat25
ment accorded to political dissidents.
The increasing number of Russian immigrants arriving in
America, too, made it more difficult to ignore the despotism of the
tsarist regime.

The political refugees were especially outspoken

against the Russian government.

They organized a Russian-American

National League to urge a "Free Russia."

Toward the same end,

another society, calling itself the "Friends of Russian Freedom"
was formed in 1891.
Howe, T.

w.

Among the prominent members were Julia Ward

Higginson, Mark Twain, William Lloyd Garrison, John

Whittier, James Russell Lowell, Phillips Brooks, Lyman Abbott and
George Kennan.

The cause of the immigrants and their friends were

presented with an issue in

1893~

when an Extradition Treaty between

Russia and the United States was signed.

Opponents of the treaty

showered resolutions and petitions of protest on the Congress,
arguing that between the political institutions of the civilized
world there was "no gap as great as that which separates those of
Russia and the United States."

It was claimed that Russia showed a
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"conte".:Cptuous disregard of the principles of honor and integrity"
and that a convention with a "lawless and barbaric despotism" was
dangerous.

Political exiles should not be subject to surrender to

Russian injustice. 26
Concurrently, Russia was alienating the Jews in America by
its flagrant anti-Semitic policies.

In 1882 a Russian edict had

proscribed certain professions from the Jews, limited their travel,
and prescribed places of habitation for them.
being enforced strenuously.

A number of indigent Jews, who could

not subsist within the confines
many to the United States.
became known.

By 1890 the edict was

of the Pale, were forced to emigrate,

There the full story of their sufferings

Prominent Jewish-American leaders such as Jacob Schiff,

Oscar Strauss, and Jesse Seligman brought the matter to the attention
of Washington.

Congress considered several resolutions asking the

Tsar to mitigate the severe measures directed at the Jews and President
Harrison addressed the issue in his annual message of 1891.

Harrison

was concerned that upward of a million Jews might be forced to leave
Russia within a few years and he remonstrated with Russia regarding
this harsh treatment. 27
In reply to the mounting adverse public opinion against
Russia, Pi<!rre Botkin, a secretary at the Russian Legation in Washington, attempted to dispel these "erroneous statements" concerning his
country.

According to Botkin, convicts were not treated inhumanely

in Siberia and Jews were not subject to persecution in the empire.
He hoped that many Americans would venture to Russia upon completion
of the Siberian railway and see conditions in Siberia for themselves.28
Despite his pleas, never again would Russian authorities be able to
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evoke the "traditional friendship" with America without the grim
reminders from the Jewish community and the Russian refugees.

This

growing aversion to the Russian system of government was a factor
which increasingly turned many Americans away from a policy of
continued acquiescing and cooperating with the Russian advance in
Northeast Asia.
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CHAPTER VII
EXPORTERS AND FRANCHISE SEEKERS

The Sino-Japanese War proved to be the decisive turning point
in American involvement in Northeast Asia, both economically and
politically.

Heretofore, individual Americans had been periodically

fascinated by the region and lured by the prospects.

But American

interest had only been sporadic and easily diverted.

Large-scale

enterprises were usually short-lived and often encompassed unrealistic
goals.

Lacking sustained government support or sponsorship, initial

enthusiasms quickly waned.

However, because of these previous

activities, abortive though they may have been, there was greater
acceptance that Northeast Asia represented a great untapped frontier
awaiting American involvement.

Russia's planned construction of the

Siberian railroad had spurred renewed American interest.

And the

pace of this new interest was accelerated considerably a few years
later as the Japanese victory promised additional access into Asia.
Although some Americans still thought of Asiatic Russia as the key
to China and Central Asia, many others were coming to the hard
realization that Russia was not only stubbornly resisting American
penetration of Siberia, but also had designs of its own on the
regions south of the Amur.

These Russian designs coincided with

the increasing attention which Americans were beginning to center on
Manchuria as an alternative strategic approach to Northeast Asia.
191
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A wide range of American business interests were convinced,
based on diplomatic observations, that China, after its humiliating
defeat, would be forced to abandon her age-old lethargy, to modernize,
and to reform her ways by accepting western-style civilization.
These business interests viewed post-war China as presenting two
interrelated economic opportunities, ready for exploitation.

First,

China appeared to be the much sought after market for the overproduction of American industrial and agricultural products.

Al-

though the vast "China market" proved largely illusory in most areas
of China, the expansion of American exports into Northern China and
Manchuria became marginally important enough to be considered worth
nurturing and protecting.

As the market opportunities grew steadily,

it was expected that the American exports would be further stimulated
by the second economic factor--development franchises granted by
the Chinese government to American business.

Here, too, North

China and Manchuria looked to be the most promising region,

not

just for its reported wealth in natural resources, but primarily for
its strategic geographic position.

American entrepreneurs, borrowing

from Collins and Gilpin, saw Northeast Asia as pivotal to an
integrated, world-wide transportation system connecting America's
trans-continental railroads via Pacific shipping with Asia and Europe.
And whoever constructed and controlled the railroads in this strategic
nexus would command the entire system and all the ancillary commercial
and industrial activity.
During the immediate post-war years, the remaining years of
the Cleveland administration, economic interest in Northeast Asia was
on a much larger scale than previously, engaging the efforts of merchants,
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financiers, politicians, manufacturers and railroad men from all
sections of the United States.

As they attempted to put their exploita-

tion schemes into practice, they found, to their surprise, that they
would have to struggle to win franchises and to compete actively
for commercial advantage.
this struggle.

The United States was ill-prepared for

The chief competition came from an unexpected source,

that erstwhile friend, the Russian Empire.

The United States had

long recognized Russia's penchant for territorial expansion, but
now it was faced with the realization that Russia was fully capable
of substantial economic penetration on her own.

Russia, too, had

assessed the strategic potential that Manchuria and North China
offered in conjunction with Asiatic Russia.
government became directly involved, there

And once the imperial
ensued an unequal struggle

for concessions in the very sphere in which American businessmen
thought that they had prior claim.

As the American diplomats and

businessmen became aware that they were in serious danger of losing
the scramble for franchises in China, they urged government backing
for their projects.

While the Cleveland administration, particularly

after Richard Olney assumed office as Secretary of State, reluctantly
retreated a bit from its early "hands-off" policy, American entrepreneurs
eagerly hoped that a new Republican administration would initiate a
policy supportive of United States interests in the Far East.
President Cleveland had been ill-prepared by both temperament
and experience for setting an aggressive foreign policy in the Far
East.

He was generally indifferent to other cultures and lacked know-

ledge of past diplomatic history.

He cared little for affairs outside

the hemisphere and opposed any form of extra-continental imperialism
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of expansion by the United States.

His first Secretary of State,

Walter Gresham, was equally loathe to carry out a vigorous foreign
policy, either to prevent the hostilities between China and Japan
or to exploit the subsequent peace-making process.

Gresham, too,

was staunchly anti-imperialistic, believing that a free government
should not acquire territory outside its own continent.

He was

opposed to a large army and navy, without which the practice of
diplomacy was limited. 1

While both Cleveland and Gresham opposed the

imperialism of foreign powers in the Americas, their concerns did not
extend to the territorial integrity of Northeast Asia.

They deplored

the war between China and Japan, but declared that the conflict
"endangers no policy of the United States in Asia." 2

They took a

friendly interest in the welfare of Korea and its people, but never
went beyond advising moderation on the governments of China and Japan
before Korea became a battlefield.

Korea was cautioned not to expect

any intervention on the part of the United States.

The two belligerents

were well aware of America's neutral stance, as was Russia. 3
While the Cleveland administration believed that the conflict
deserved the "greatest consideration by reason of its disturbance of
our growing commercial interests in the two countries," the United
States made no determined effort to prevent or end the war.

At the

outset of hostilities the United States had been invited by Great
Britain to join with the European powers in intervening between
China and Japan.

The Cleveland administration abstained, wishing to

avoid the entanglement of joint diplomatic representation.

Although

cooperation with other nations during previous interventions into
China's affairs was not without precedent, the United States, in this
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instance, chose to await the outcome in a pose of strict neutrality
and impartiality.

The distrust of foreignentanglementoutweighed

any desire, either to protect the Korean people, or to advance American
interests in Asia by influencing the peace settlement. 4
The attempts to maintain an "attitude toward the belligerents
of an impartial and friendly neutral, desiring the welfare of both,"
were not entirely successful.

The United States did become involved

in a number of messy, minor situations.

The United States volunteered,

for example, to look after the interests and property of each
belligerent in the opposing nation, which presented some problems
for American diplomats.

Also, in protecting the lives and property

of its own citizens residing in Korea and China, it was found necessary
for the American navy and marines to conduct a number of rescue missions
ashore on foreign territory.
Nor was Russia anxious to intervene in support of either
belligerent during the course of the war, but Russia's reasons were
in stark contrast to America's motives.

Russia stayed neutral, at

the outset, in order to assess which course of subsequent action
would be in their national self-interest.

The imperial government

did not desire to be "captivated by any one-sided proposition made
by one or the other of the two powers hostile to each other." 5
Instead, the government retained its freedom of action.

When it

became apparent that Japan would soundly defeat China, a conference
of Russian ministers adopted a preliminary policy in February 1895.
They decided that Korean independence must be maintained, that the
Russian fleet in the Pacific must be strengthened to be superior to
that of Japan, and that collective action against Japan would be sought
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should Japan threaten any vital interest of Russia. 6

Unlike the

passive role accepted by the United States, Russia planned to take
action, if necessary, to protect its national interests.
China was desperate after suffering a series of disastrous
military defeats.

With Japan poised to march on the very gates

of Peking, China searched for the least humiliating peace attainable.
She pleaded with the United States to mediate a peace settlement.
The American government was willing, but Japan insisted on dealing
directly with the defeated empire.

Therefore, China was reluctantly

drawn into direct negotiations, but not before employing a series of
diplomatic ploys by which she hoped to mitigate Japan's demands.
One of these stratagems was to engage as many Americans as possible,
even as private individuals, in the peace process.

Viceroy Li,

who had been appointed as the chief Chinese negotiator, had been
advised "flatly and firmly" that the United States' government would
not intervene on China's behalf.

Nevertheless, Li learned from Denby

that American businessmen were already anticipating increased markets
and valuable franchises in post-war China.

Li was fully

to dangle the commercial prospects in front of Americans.

prepare~

He led

Denby to believe that the United States would be in the fore of
guiding China into modern ways.

In return, Li no doubt hoped that

the American presence at the negotiating table would influence
Japan toward more lenient terms.

Li asked Denby to accompany him

to Shimonoseki to assist him, but Denby, because of his position,
could not serve.
Li's entourage:

However, a number of Americans were included in
his secretary, William Pethick; a Chinese-American

student, Dr. Lin Luen Tai; an American missionary, Dr. B. C. Atterbury;
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and most prominent of all, John Watson Foster, former secretary of
state under President Harrison. 7
Foster had been the United States minister to Russia during
the Kuldja affair.

At the urging of Marquis Tseng, his Chinese

colleague in St. Petersburg, Foster had suggested to the Russian
foreign ministry that the imperial government moderate its demands
on China.

Foster was never certain whether his words were heeded,

but the Chinese government was grateful, and now hoped for a repeat
performance.

Between 1886 and 1890 Foster had acted as counsel to

the Chinese legation in Washington.

In the year before the war

Foster had travelled to China and subsequently had maintained business contacts there.

When China was forced to sue for peace, it

was natural to turn to him again for advice.

As a well-known

Washington figure, Foster had the aura of an official American
representative, despite Gresham's efforts to publicize the private
nature of Foster's role.
During the several months of preparation for the peace
negotiations, the American legations in Peking and Tokyo served as
conduits for the exchange of messages between the warring nations.
This communication service gave the American ministers a unique
opportunity to proffer advice to each side, but the state department
took no advantage of the situation.
on the post-war settlement.
middleman role.

Washington expressed no opinions

It declined to capitalize on this

The United States exerted no official influence on

the peace process, although Foster may claim some credit for ameliorating some of Japan's initial harsh demandso

Nor did the United

States exact any explicit compensation for its services.

Rather,
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the American government favored a quick return to peace and seemed
utterly indifferent to the terms of agreement.
The United States was apparently unconcerned that the balance
of power in Northeast Asia was at stake.

Not only was the ascendancy

of Japan evident as a future competitor in the area, but also the
threatened dissolution of the Chinese empire was certain to bring the
European powers into a race to partition China.

The American silence

on the subject cannot be attributed solely to lack of awareness.
The American ministers in Peking, Tokyo, and St. Petersburg kept
the state department remarkably well advised in long analytical
messages, which accurately forecast the situation months prior to
the negotiations.

In early October 1894, for example, Denby thought

that the dissolution of the empire only a remote possibility.
the end of the month he was reporting that the "empire is

By

crumbling~'

and if a rebellion should take place that the "formation of an independent Manchu principality north of China would be a natural
consequence."

Further, this "principality might easily be converted

into a Russian dependency." 8

As the negotiations commenced, Denby

speculated that "Japan will claim the Liao Tung Peninsula, including
Newchwang, Port Arthur and some adjacent parts of Manchuria."

To

Denby, at least, the troubles in China seemed an opportune time to
plan for Americans to carve out their own share.

He suggested that

American diplomacy be directed toward securing post-war commercial
privileges, since "there would no doubt be combinations to form,
rivalry with other nations to conciliate, partitions with them,
perhaps to be made." 9

Denby's advice was not heeded.

From St. Petersburg, Minister Breckinridge kept Washington
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equally apprised concerning Russia's moves.

A few weeks after the

Russian ministers had agreed on their preliminary policy, Breckinridge
presented a detailed prognosis to the state department.
Russia's concern for a war being waged on her borders.

He acknowledged
Russia, in

his opinion, was ready to partition China, if that was indicated by
the peace settlement.

He alerted Washington for the first time that

routing of the Siberian railroad directly through Manchuria was a
logical outcome.

And he correctly surmised that Russia's prime

concern would be to prevent Japan gaining a foothold upon the continent.

Russia would not mind if China were crushed by a large war

indemnity, but most of all, on the Northeastern Asian mainland,
Russia wanted a "free hand and a fair field for the future."

To

back up its policies, Breckinridge reported that Russia had sent a
squadron of ships to the Pacific, which brought her fleet there to
four times its normal strength.

10

In addition to these official notifications, American newspapers were filled with speculation about the fate of a defeated
China in face of the expected territorial demands of a victorious
Japan and the awaiting European powers, particularly Russia.

Con-

fronted with these prospects for the partition of China, the United
States did not even register verbal support for China's territorial
integrity.

The Commercial and Financial Chronicle reflected the

American mood that China might not be worth preserving in its present
shape:
There has been much foolish talk about the danger of the
breaking up of the great Chinese empire. We have been
asked to look upon such a possible result in the light
of a world-wide calamity. We confess to some difficulty
in seeing where the danger lies. Indeed, is it not
possible that the world-wide calamity might prove to be
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rather a world-wide blessing? • • • Might not the final
result be good not evil? Is China worth preserving?ll
The complete indifference of the United States to the partition of
China was perhaps not surprising in the context of the American tradition of non-involvement outside the Americas, but is noteworthy when
juxtaposed with the strikingly opposite attitude adopted by the
American government toward this same region four years later.

The

aloof stance adopted by the Cleveland administration in 1895 may well
have misled Russia later in discounting the degree of American
subsequent interest in Manchuria.
For its second diplomatic ploy, China tried in every possible
way to entice the European powers to intercede in her behalf.

During

the course of the peace negotiations, China kept the world explicitly
informed of the Japanese demands.

Though reluctant to relinquish

Formosa and the Pescadores, China particularly argued against Japanese
acquisition of the Liaotung

Peninsula in Southern Manchuria.

Chinese diplomats claimed that the occupation of Port Arthur would
inevitably lead to Japanese control of the Gulf of Pechili, the
complete separation of China from Korea, and the eventual domination
of Peking by the nearby Japanese forces.

These arguments, unlike

in the United States, hit a responsive note in the Russian capital,
where these very issues were being debated.

Russia had two choices:

join in the post-war scramble for territorial concessions in Northern
Manchuria, or oppose Japanese claims in Southern Manchuria.

The

latter course would pose the danger of war with Japan before the
Siberian railway was yet complete, but would have the decided
advantage, if diplomatically successful, of retaining a weak China
for her immediate neighbor, rather than an aggressive Japan.

Led by
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Witte, the ministers decided at a special conference on April 11,
and the tsar approved on April 16, to forego territorial annexations
by Russia at China's expense at this time.

Instead, it was declared

that Russia would "not allow occupation of Southern Manchuria by
Japan and that in the case of failure to realize our aim • • • to
take appropriate measure."

Should Japan, contrary to expectations,

not listen to this diplomatic insistence, the Russian fleet "would
be ordered to open hostilities. 1112
Next day, the very day that the peace treaty was signed at
Shimonoseki, Russia's new Foreign Minister, Aleksej Lobanov, officially
asked Germany, France and England to join in the protest against
Japan's acquisition on the mainland.

Only England refused.

other three powers acted quickly and decisively.

By April 23

The
they

had sent identical notes to Japan stating that "the possession of
the peninsula of

Liaotung~

claimed by Japan, would be a constant

menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory
the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle
to the peace in the Far East."

At the same time the Russian minister to

Peking advised the Chinese government to delay ratification of the
treaty until Japan acceded to the three-povJer demand.

To back up

its position, Russia assembled its recently augmented fleet off
Chefoo, the ratification site.

American observers, among others, noted

that the Russian ships were stripped down and ready to fight--9 men-ofwar and 3 torpedo boats. 14

The Russian fleet movements, in conjunction

with its allies, convinced everyone that war was imminent if Japan
did not modify its demands.

On May 5, Japan yielded.

In return for

a larger war indemnity Japan agreed to retrocede Southern Manchuria
back to China, which it did in November 1895.

By any standard,
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Russia had pulled off a diplomatic masterpiece.

The Russian govern-

ment had clearly assessed its national interests, weighed the risks,
and adopted a far-reaching policy.

In a short time frame Russia

had mustered important allies, marshalled the necessary forces to be
convincing, and had achieved its goals.

This coup would provide

the foundation for the Russian ascendancy in Manchuria for the next
ten years.

No Russian diplomat had advised Li at

Shimonos~ki,

but China had practical reasons for being grateful to its seeming
protector.
In lieu of any policy guidance from Washington, American
representatives were content to have China suffer any losses in
order to terminate the fighting.

Denby had urged Chinese officials

to be prepared to face sacrifices and Foster continued this theme.
At one point in the negotiations, when Li thought it better to
continue the war rather than give up so much territory, Foster
reminded him of the "extreme danger to the reigning dynasty and the
autonomy of the empire if the war should be renewed and the contest
prolonged."

When Li returned to China, he discovered that most of

the generals and viceroys were petitioning the emperor not to ratify
the treaty.

Li persuaded Foster to go to Peking in his stead and

defend the onerous terms before the privy council.

Thus it transpired,

during the latter days of April, that Count Cassini was arguing
for a delay in theratificationin order to save Southern Manchuria
for China, while Foster was defending the treaty which would cede
this same Chinese territory.

Foster, albeit a private adviser,

nevertheless was lodged at the American legation, used a legation
interpreter, and his advice was not gainsayed by Denby.

15
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The United States had hoped to ingratiate itself with both
warring nations by its even-handed approach.

And no doubt Japan

was grateful for the non-intervention of the United States, the open
pu!:>lic support in the American press, and the use of American "good
offices" to facilitate the peace negotiations.

But looking at the

situation from the opposing camp, China had little for which to be
thankful.

The United States had neither interveued to protect

China from Japanese aggression, nor been particularly successful
in helping to achieve a less humiliating peace.

Americans had not

shown confidence in China's ability to protect foreign nationals
and had arrogated that right to themselves.

The American newspapers

had castigated China as backward and barbarous,
whelmingly with the Japanese cause.

sympathizing over-

Then, before the war had actually

ended Americans were already scurrying for economic advantage.
From a Chinese perspective it was not surprising for China to look
elsewhere for post-war support.

Nevertheless, Americans naively

persisted in the view that the China market would be opened primarily
to them, because, as Denby put it, the United States has an "enormous
prestige and overshadowing influence in China."

John Foster, that

other close observer on the China scene, agreed.

He thought that

the American diplomatic efforts had come out of the war with "better
grace" than other countries, because the United States was "recognized
by both belligerents as purely disinterested." 16
The Cleveland administration may have failed to recognize
that China would have appreciated material help rather than a disinterested
approach, but Americans were forced by the war to face a few military
and political realities concerning their interests in the Pacific.
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The Sino-Japanese War had caused a significant change in the United
States' naval posture in Far Eastern waters.

At the outset of the

war the Asiatic squadron had declined in strength to two ships, and
one of these was far from seaworthy.

Three gunboats from the Bering

Sea patrol were quickly ordered to the China coast and these were
soon thereafter reinforced from the West Coast.

The American govern-

ment, while pursuing a neutral course, was nevertheless sensitive
to pleas for protection from its citizens threatened by riots in
China.

The war increased the difficulty of operating off Northeast

Asia without assured coaling stations and nearby bases.

The new ships

being constructed for the modern navy were all steam driven and
completely dependent on coal supplies.

In peacetime, shore support

was readily available, but once hostilities commenced Japan declared
that only two foreign warships could visit her ports concurrently.
China went further and threatened to close its ports entirely by
blocking the entrances and removing navigation buoys.

If American

gunboats were to become the "forts along the Asiatic frontier,"
as suggested by the New Orleans Picayune, the Asiatic squadron badly
needed a safe haven in Northeast Asia for upkeep and replenishment.
Once the war was over the Cleveland administration made no move to
resolve this base issue.

By 1895 the American squadron still only

consisted of 8 ships, displacing approximately 18,000 tons.

Russia,

by contrast, supposedly committed primarily to land power, had
dispatched a potent squadron of 17 ships, displacing 59,000 tons.
They, too, were searching for suitable ice-freeports to support
their forces.

This became one of their primary aims in their post-

war talks with China. 1 7
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The at-sea phase of the Sino-Japanese War, particularly the
Battle of Yalu, provided renewed stimulus for the proponents in
congress of a big, modern navy.

The supporters of a more vigorous

foreign policy believed that an accelerated battleship construction
program and a "few outposts" would serve to promote and protect
America's foreign commerce.

During the debate on naval appropriations

in early 1895, proponents from all sections of the nation cited
Japan's naval actions as vindication for Captain Mahan's theories on
seapower.

They urged the immediate construction of a large number

of battleships so that American naval forces in the Pacific could
be expanded.

Doubts were expressed whether the Asiatic squadron,

despite its build up, was sufficiently strong to protect American
lives, property and commerce.

It was

reco~~ended

10 battleships be based in the Pacific.

that as many as

Congressmen were concerned,

not only for the defense of Hawaii and the West Coast, but also for
the protection of the "agricultural products of the South and the
West on the seas."

The Sino-Japanese War helped embark the United

States on a "big ship" navy concept, justified in part by expected
Asiatic commitments in the years ahead. 18
Nor could the American public completely ignore that, as a
result of the war, the political balance in Northeast Asia was precarious.

The post-war diplomatic and editorial assessments differed,

but most agreed that further changes and threats of war in the region
were probable.

No one seriously believed that Russia would not

eventually seek compensation from China for its services.
question was where and when.

The only

The predictions included Korean ice-

free ports, a railway right-of-way across Manchuria, and according
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to one prescient observer, Russia really coveted the strategic
Liaotung

Peninsula for itself.

Minister Breckinridge, echoing

the Russian press, raised the vision of a unified and regenerated
"Yellow Race" more powerful than all of Europe.
ascen dant J apanese as

.

pos~ng

Others saw the

•. 19
a d anger to Hawa~~.

American comment concerning Japan was favorable.

However, most
The Commercial and

Financial Chronicle, which was unconcerned about a Japanese hegemony
in Asia, thought Japan had been robbed of her rightful conquests.
The Chicago Tribune thought that all the western nations owed a
"debt of gratitude" to Japan which had earned the "respect of the
world" for civilizing China.

The New York Times was comfortable

with the idea that the war had added to Japan's power and prestige
enough to make her dominant in Asian affairs.

Americans were ready

to welcome the "Yankees of the Orient" as partners in western
civilization.

They especially appreciated the commercial reforms

which China had been forced to accept as part of the peace treaty.
The United States anticipated sharing equally in the benefits deriving from these reforms.

Because of this overwhelmingly favorable

opinion toward Japan, the United States was much more likely to side
with Japan in any future conflict in Northeast Asia.

Japan was

pictured as "good" and "progressive" and upholding a free marketplace
policy.

20

During the treaty ratification process, there were even
rumors th.·.t: the three maritime, merchantile powers with the greatest
stake in China, that is, England, Japan and the United States,
·;vould band together to oppose Russia and her allies.

American

sympathies, according to the New York Times, were against the
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aggression of Russia.

While the United States at that time was

unwilling to be more than a very silent and inactive partner, such
a concept would germinate in the ensuing years.

Heretofore, the

United States had consistently been content to follow along and take
advantage of any concessions that England had won in opening up
China.

Now, Americans were perfectly willing for Japan to act as

its surrogate.

Japan had showed what it could accomplish and England

was no longer evincing the same interest in maintaining the balance
of power in Northeast Asia.

It was visualized that Japan could

be useful as a counterweight to Russia.

Theodore Roosevelt, for

one, in commenting on the capabilities demonstrated by Japan in
the war, considered that Japan would be a "formidable counterpoise
to Russia in the Far East. 1121
The post-war economic possibilities of increased trade with
China loomed, for the time being, far larger in the American mind,
than any worries about new power struggles in Asia.

American manu-

facturers and growers were eager to sell to the 400 million potential
customers.

As a result of the commercial reforms, it was anticipated

that the market for American goods would be wide open.
were to be opened.

New ports

Trade into the interior was to be allowed.

Foreign industries were to be permitted to be established in Chinese
cities.

And best of all, China 1 s internal provincial tax levies were

to be abolished.

Forecasters of future trade volume in China's

trade needed only to compare the growth statistics of the trade
with Japan's mere 40 million customers

ove~

the previous thirty

years to determine the enormity of the China market potential.
American consular officials were particularly energetic in
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stirring up interest in the China market.

Consul-general Thomas

Jernigan in Shanghai typically predicted greatly increased trade
relations with China.

According to him, the field for American

businessmen was very inviting since the United States held a
"commanding position" because China was convinced that the United
States had "no aggressive design save in the legitimate field of
commercial a·nli industrial enterprise."

During the week that the

peace treaty was being ratified, Jernigan urged the presence in
China of some of the most enterprising American merchants so that
the "opportunities presented by the general 'break-up' can be utilized."
American

ne~vspapers

also hailed the beginning of a "new industrial

and commercial epoch for China."

The Commercial and Financial

Chronicle foresaw:
The awakening of the people of Eastern Asia and the
development of industry among them cannot be contemplated
by the citizens of the United States but with hopefulness.
Such awakening--such development--will be an immediate gain
to us, and will build up and give an entirely new character
to our Western coast.22
Regardless of their early start and their high expectations
of good fortune, Americans achieved only a modest success in increasing
exports to China.

Looking back, the magnitude and the importance of

American-Chinese trade had grown steadily until the American Civil
War.

For the next four decades, however, the trade activity had

leveled off at between 20 and 30 million dollars per year.

In

relative terms, the importance of this trade had declined sharply from
3.2% of the United States total foreign trade in 1860 to a mere
1.75% in 1894.

Only about 6% of China's trade was with America at

the time of the war with Japan and the bulk consisted of imports
into the United States. 23
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Of the many causes for this decline in trade, most were still
applicable in 1895, despite the renewed interest in trying to revive
the China trade.

Consular officials had repeatedly called attention

to deficiencies in the American approach and would continue to do
so.

First, the decrease in trade was caused, in part, by the

steady decline in the American merchant marine.

In 1860 nearly all

the China trade with the United States was carried in American ships;
by 1893, only 13%.

Of the 2,178 merchant ships which visited Shanghai

in 1897, only 50 were American.

James J. Hill complained that his

Great Northern Railroad had to refuse shipments of 60,000 tons of steel
rails and 30 million pounds of cotton for lack of sea transport
from Seattle to Asiatic ports.

Even allowing for some exaggeration

on Hill's part, the lack of American shipping hindered the United
States from seizing a larger share of the China market. 24
Second, was the failure over the years of many of the pioneer
American mercantile establishments in China and the seeming lack of
ability and vigor on the part of those remaining.

Only one new

American trading firm was established in China after the SinoJapanese War.

For the most part, American goods were not only

carried in foreign hulls, but also displayed and sold by foreign
merchants.

Moreover, the American commercial community was

severely handicapped by the absence of a single American-controlled
banking and financial establishment in China.

Yet American consuls

warned, year after year, that to expand the export trade properly
American merchants needed to be on the scene, have the proper
credentials; spend time to cater the product to the customer; show
the Chinese the actual products, not depend on brochures; be
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acquainted with the fluctuating currency exchange; and be ready in
person to settle disputes and pay claims.

Although many American

businessmen visited China for short periods, they were unwilling to
risk the long-term commitment in time and effort which was required
to increase American export trade significantly. 25
Third, the American consular service in China was undermanned
for providing a full range of service to American businessmen.

And

the consular staffs which were available, were stationed in the wrong
places to stimulate American exports.

American consuls were available

in the southern ports where the bulk of the trade consisted of
Chinese exports.

In the North, at such ports as Chefoo and Newchwang,

where American export goods predominated, the United States depended
on merchants, often foreign nationals, to act as part-time viceconsuls.

An American consulate was not established at Chefoo until

1896; at Newchwang, not until 1900.

Thus, the Shantung peninsula

and Manchuria were poorly served during a period crucial to market
expansion.

In sum, the circumstances which led to the stagnation

of American-Chinese trade over the past four decades left a legacy
which was difficult to overcome in a few years.

A high degree of

interest and optimism were not sufficient to build a substantial
market.

When the glowing prospects failed to materialize fully in

the first few years, American businessmen were reluctant to blame
their own practices and shortcomings.

Rather, they attributed their

lack of instant success to the policital machinations of the other
foreign powers in China, especially Russia, and the lack of a
business-oriented administration to support American economic interests
overseas.
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The story of American successes in exporting to China can
be summed up by considering just two key products:
cotton goods and refined petroleum (kerosene).
Table I tell the tale.

manufactured

The statistics in

From these data one may conclude that in

absolute terms, the American exports to China were negligible, being
only about 1% of the total annual exports world-wide.

Cotton products

and kerosene represented the only sizeable export, accounting for
80-90% of the exports to China.

Of more significance to those two

industries, the China market turned out to be a considerable portion
of their world-wide exports:

40-50% for cotton and 5% for kerosene.

The port of Chefoo alone, for example, received more American cotton
goods than any country or colouy in the world and received more
American kerosene than the United States sold throughout the Caribbean.
The market for these two products was excellent and the prospects
for expanding sales was good.

In 1897, when foreign cotton piece

sales to China dropped off due to local manufacture, American sales
actually increased slightly.

In quality and price, the American goods

were competitive and they sold the market. 27
The most remarkable statistic concerns the geographical
distribution of American £xports to China.

In 1897 Consul Fowler in

Chefoo noted the overwhelming importance of North China and Manchuria
to American trade, a situation that had apparently gone unnoticed
heretofore.

Nearly 8.4 million dollars worth of American goods,

about three-fourths of the total, entered the three ports of Chefoo,
Tientsin and Newchwang.

American exports into Chefoo alone exceeded

those from Great Britain ten times.

This emphasis on North China

cannot be explained either by a more elaborate consular system or
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TABLE I
1895
1896
1897
1898
(in millions of dollars)
Total

u. s.

u. s.

exports to China

Total

u. s.

u. s.

imports from China

u. s.

cotton exports to China

Total

u. s.

u. s.
u. s.

exports worldwide

825

1,006

3.7
802

imports worldwide

1,100
ll.3

9.8
682

21.8

1.256

743

12.3
635

17.7

23.1

17.4

6.0

6.5

6.9

16.2

14.8

15.5

kerosene exports to China

2.8

3.4

2.4

kerosene exports worldwide

51.6

54.6

47.0

cotton exports worldwide

TABLE II
Per Cent of China's
Kerosene lmEorts
Point of Origin

1880

1890

1894/95

1900

United States

100

80

62

45

Russia

0

20

36

37

Other

0

0

2

18
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a more efficient American mercantile network, quite the contrary.
One reason for the American success may have been that American mills
produced heavier cottons, more suitable for northern climates.
It seems more likely that England deliberately chose to concentrate
her economic sphere along the Yangtse River and south.

For whatever

reason, the path of American trade expansion was unconsciously set
to the North of China and Manchuria.

Of all the regions of China,

the United States would be most sensitive to keeping an open market
there. 28
Already, Russia was a strong competitor in the sales of
kerosene.

Before 1890 the United States was the sole supplier of

kerosene to China.

By 1900 the Russian share of the market was

nearly on a par with the American, as shown in Table II.

American

consuls kept careful track of Russia's progress in selling this
-:~·''IVOI!l\1\,·~•-.1.,'11,'

commodity.

American oil was reported to have the edge in quality,

but sold fractionally higher.

The New York Times, noting that the

price of oil had risen in two years from 53¢ a barrel to $1.80,
complained that "should oil continue to go higher • • • the miserable
Russian oil will take its place."29
Aside from these two products, the American concept of the
China market, limited as it was by its own mercantile system, was
largely based on wishful thinking.

A consul could predict a "market

for millions of bushels of wheat and corn annually," but the tastes
and customs of the Chinese did not change all that rapidly.

Increasing

amounts of American wheat flour did reach China late in the century,
but the consumers were mostly the growing English, German, and Russian
communities in Northern China.

Similarly, such claims as "the
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National Association of Manufacturers can find no better field than
China" were empty unless American entrepreneurs could obtain mining,
railroad, and like franchises.3°
When it became obvious that China was losing the war, Denby
accurately forecast the ecc-nomic necessities which would face the
imperial government in the post-war years.

The situation offered

unlimited opportunities to American enterprise.

Realizing that

China would be hard-pressed to pay off her war indemnities, Denby
concluded that China would be forced
meet her obligations.

to sell valuable franchises to

It was Denby's purpose to alert American

syndicates, at an early stage, to be preparen to bid successfully
for the rights to build railroads, construct ships, open mines and
establish banks.

He considered that the United States would have

every advantage.

Repeatedly he urged that diplomatic influence

be exerted to assist American groups in securing these privileges
against expected rivals.

In interviews with Viceroy Li he went so

far as to recommend that the franchises for modernizing China be
placed only in the hands of "English speaking people." 31
By the time that the peace treaty was signed, a great amount
of interest in China was being exhibited by American

busines~men.

As early as May 1895, Denby was overwhelmed by applications for
assistance.

Existing instructions, however, limited the direct

assistance that he could render.

Denby had previously been directed

to abstain from furthering any individual plans or contracts connected
with China until they had first been approved by the state department.
Seeking up-dated, explicit instr•:. tions to guide him in the new postwar situation, Denby recommended that, in the absence of any relaxation
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of the rules, the department select among the dozen or so competing
American syndicates so that he could advocate its intereste and
disregard the others.

Otherwise, Denby warned, China would rely

on those European powers which had provided her with the signal service
of forcing the retrocession of Southern Manchuria. 32
In an ambiguous reply, Denby received little relaxation
from the restraints under which he was operating.

In exercising his

best judgment, Denby was advised by telegram that he might hereafter:
introduce American citizens to the Chinese government with
such representation as their character and responsibility
as known to warrant, but without using your diplomatic
character or influence to further their business enterprises.
Though Denby stretched these rules to the limit, he was not able to
capitalize fully on whatever store of goodwill that the United States
may have engendered.

He continued to express to Chinese authorities,

"on all proper occasions," the preeminence of American railroad construction and manufacturing products, but essentially he wielded
little leverage.

American syndicates were forced to scramble for

concessions against foreign competition without United States backing
or guarantees.
When Foster's role as adviser to the Chinese peace negotiators
became public in December 1894, he, too, was besieged by friends and
would-be clients with a multitude of grand schemes for the exploitation
of post-war China.

Financial firms were interested in lending China

money to cover her war indemnity.
modernize China's navy.

Shipbuilding companies wanted to

A steel company offered to sell and trans-

plant an entire plant to China.

Standard Oil thought they might have

some business requiring his attention.
were those with railroad

proje~ts

The most numerous applicants

in mind.

According to his memoir,
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Foster put aside all these various schemes and gave his undivided
attention to his "imperial client."

In return for his services,

the Chinese government offered Foster an opportunity to reside in
Peking and act as an adviser to the cabinet and the emperor in moves
to reform the government.

In this capacity he would have been able

to give material help to American syndicates, but, convinced that
the task was too difficult, he declined the post.

Nevertheless,

through his previous service and with his wide acquaintance among
Chinese officials, he managed to act as adviser to a number of
American concerns. 34
The large war indemnities did make China seek foreign loans.
Recognizing that the lending institution chosen would gain substantial
leverage in China, financiers of many countries vied for the opportunity.
Among these was a syndicate represented by John Foster.

Unlike other

bidders, the American group was unsupported by its government, and
its bid was not accepted, probably because the privately sponsored
American syndicate could not, or would not, match the favorable
terms of the Russo-French combine.35
Russia had severe handicaps of her own in contemplating a
loan to China.

She was just recovering from a period of famine, the

expenses of the Siberian railway construction were heavy, and, on
balance, Russia had generally been a borrower of foreign capital
to support her own industrialization.
at the chance.

Nevertheless, Witte jumped

At his instigation a combination of six French and

four Russian banks granted the loan to China at four percent interest,
the lowest rate ever offered to China.
capital, supplied the bulk of the loan.

France, with a surplus of
Russian financial participation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216
was minimal, but the Russian government did guarantee the loan.

By

successfully negotiating this loan, Russia had gained advantage over
the other foreign competitors in the scramble for economic influence
in China.

Denby thought that Russia, being the practical creditor

of China, "will exercise an overwhelming influence over this weak,
distracted country." 36

Russia's lead was somewhat overcome when

China went to the world's financial markets again in early 1896 to
meet the second installment on her payment.
German syndicate granted the loan.

This time an Anglo-

A persistent effort by a group

of American banks represented by the American Trading Company was
again unable to offer suitable terms. 37
To the same consortium of French and Russian bankers, Witte
next proposed the formation of a Russo-Chinese Bank.

As before,

the French would provide the major portion of the funding and the
Russian government would guarantee their investments in the event of
international crisis.

The bank was deliberately organized for the

purpose of spearheading the economic penetration of China.

In

addition to normal banking operations connected with the Russian tea
trade, fleet operations and government loans, it was planned that
the bank would set up subsidiary commercial and industrial enterprises
within China, such as the construction of railroad and telegraph
lines.

The bank was chartered in December 1895, and within a few

years had branches in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Chefoo, and
Vladivostok.

The bank was placed under the sponsorship of the

Railway Committee.
affairs.

In this way, Witte was able to control its

Prince Ukhtomskij was named the chairman of the bank.

One of its first functions was to provide a special fund from which
the Russian minister to Peking could bribe Chinese officials.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
Looking at the success of Russia in establishing her own financial
apparatus in North China, Denby could only wistfully note that he
had "greatly hoped that American financiers would enter this field." 38
Only one did, but in a very feeble manner.

Wharton Barker

returned to China in August 1895, with an elaborate scheme to establish
an American and Oriental Trust.

He hoped that the Trust, in turn,

would be granted contracts for railroads, ships, mines, steelmills,
and textile factories.

To capitalize this far-reaching plan, Barker

had only been able to raise fifty thousand dollars of venture capital
from his backers.

Like so many other American franchise seekers in

China, Barker hoped to secure the franchise first, and then use the
franchise as the basis for raising money.
astute for that.

The Chinese were too

Li encouraged the formation of a private American

bank, but he was not prepared to grant unrestricted economic power
to foreigners, not even Americans.

Barker made repeated proposals

over the next several years, chiefly through the Chinese consul in
New York.

Unlike other frustrated American franchise seekers,

Barker did not blame his failure on the political machinations of
Russia.

Barker was one of those Americans who never lost faith

that Russia would endorse American development in Northeast Asia. 39
The most sought after concessions in China were franchises
to build railroads.

Americans were convinced that control of the

rail system would not only bring profit, but would open the interior
of China to subsidiary industrial franchises.

I t was thought that

the railroads would modernize China and permit the resources and
productive capacity throughout the great nation to be harnessed
under foreign, hopefully American, direction.

Both the American and
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the Russian railroad promoters chose to concentrate their efforts in
the same geographic sector, Manchuria.

Both looked to control that

vital transportation link between the markets of populous North
China and the Siberian railway.

Before the war, Americans were

interested in being charged with extending a railroad northward
from Tientsin into Manchuria, but China had decided to commence the
project on its own, reaching the vicinity of the Great Wall.
war strengthened and revived American resolve.

The

Since the days of

Perry Collins, they had held the thought that Northeast Asia was an
open field for American expansion and now the time had arrived.
The cooperation of Russia was believed to be assured, only the
permission of China was required.
The best organized, most persistent, and nearly successful
effort to win a railroad franchise was displayed by the AmericanChina Development Company.

The plan was originally conceived by

A. W. Bash, an ex-collector of customs in the state of Washington.
Representing a nucleus group from the Northwest, including Governor
McGraw, Judge Hoyt of the Supreme Court, and ex-Senator Dolph of
Oregon, Bash arrived in Peking before the peace treaty was ratified.
With the aid of Foster, he was able to present his ideas to Viceroy
Li and to the Dowager Empress.

Receiving sufficient encouragement

from Chinese authorities, Bash returned to the United States to
enlist financial support.

By December 1895, the American-China

Development Company was incorporated with a capital stock of one
million dollars.

The announced purpose of the company was to operate

railways, steamships, telephone and telegraph lines in China.

Former

Senator Calvin Brice of Ohio became president of the company which
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numbered an impressive list of stockholders associated with a wide
spectrum in the mainstream of American business and government:
Levi P. Morton, former vice-president; Thomas

c.

Platt, senator

from New York; W. D. Washburn, former senator from Minnesota;
Frederick P. Olcott, president of Central Trust Company; John Waterbury, president of Manhattan Trust Company; James Stillman, representing Rockefeller interests; George F. Baker, president of the
First National Bank of New York: Charles Coster, of J. P. Morgan
and Company; Jacob H. Schiff, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company; E. H.
Harriman, chairman of the Union Pacific Railway; G. R. Hegeman,
president of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; Clarence Cary,
New York lawyer; and others representing the Chase National Bank,
Bank of America, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the American
Sugar Refining Company, and Carnegie Stee1.

40

Denby used the first visit of Bash to China to underscore
and remind the state department of the restrictions which were hampering him from helping Bash in any material fashion.

He told Washing-

ton that if the "administration could get the glory of greatly
increasing and spreading American interests in China, it would be a
grand consummation."

The administration did not give in to this

appeal to their vanity.
their own resources.

Bash and his associates had to rely on

Denby himself may not have been completely

aware of the extent that the Bash plan called for interaction with
Russia.

He certainly knew that the plans were "farreaching and

comprehensive" and were confined initially to North China. 41

The

full scope of the ambitions of the American-China Development Company
were included in Russian correspondence, for they were extremely
sensitive to the idea of American encroachment into Manchuria,
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however tentative and immature.
In the spring of 1895, during his first trip to Peking, Bash
broached his plans to the Russian minister, Cassini.

According to

Cassini, he was informed that a large American syndicate composed
of prominent politicians, financiers, and commercial activities planned
to construct railroads and extract mineral riches, preferably in
Northern China and parts of Manchuria.

The syndicate fully under-

stood that Manchuria, espacially, would enter into the Russian sphere
of influence and did not wish to act without the full approval of
the tsarist government. When asked for support and sympathy for
the American project, Cassini evaded the question by referring the
matter to St. Petersburg. 42

Prior to Bash's second trip to China,

Foster laid the groundwork by enlisting the aid of William Pethick.
As secretary to Viceroy Li and a director of the Shanhaikuan
railroad, Pethick was a valuable point of contact with Chinese officials
and a conduit for inside information.

Foster assured Pethick that

the American-China Development Company had the "capacity to command
control

~£

all the capital necessary for the accomplishment of any

enterprise in China."

In his turn, Pethick attempted to smooth the

way for Bash by writing to Cassini on behalf of the syndicate.

He

advised Cassini concerning the eminent membership in the syndicate,
the vast scale of their financing, and their lofty intentions "in
harmony with Russia to open the gates of Northern China" to security
and progress. 43
As Bash further explained the American plan to the Russians
in the spring of 1896, it was indeed grandiose.

The first step was

the "construction of a line through Manchuria in order to join the
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Siberian line with the railways of Northern China."

Connecting lines

would then be extended to Korea and the Gulf of Liaotung.

This

undertaking was conceived as a complete monopoly with the "right to
exploit mines and timber in Manchuria and adjacent areas of Mongolia."
For a period of thirty years the Chinese government would be unable,
without the consent of the company, to construct any other railroads
or rail branches in Manchuria.

The next step planned was for the

syndicate to "swallow up the existing Chinese railroads--Tientsin
to Shanghei and Tientsin to Peking" whose operation was impossible
under the clumsy Chinese management."

Finally, the syndicate planned

to extend or join trunk lines southward to Hankow and then on to
Canton.

In presenting the

A~erican

plan to Cassini, Bash claimed

to be able to tap capital funding of 250 million dollars.

The only

hurdle visualized was the attitude of the Russian government.

The

prevalent view was that Russia would seek compensation in Northern
Manchuria for passage of the Siberian rail line.

To the Bash group,

the route of the Siberian line was immaterial, as long as their
system could connect with it.

Bash again recognized the preeminent

influence of Russia in Manchuria and acknowledged that his group
could only proceed with their plans with the "full knowledge and
approval of the Russian government."

To make the American plan

more palatable, Bash offered to give preference to Russian investors
interested in purchasing shares in the American-China Development
Company. 44
In trying to reach this "secret understanding" with Russia,
Bash and his associates foolishly disclosed the entire scope of
their endeavors, while the plans of the Russians were truly being
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kept secret.

Like their predecessors, the American syndicate held

the illusion that Russia would welcome, or at least tolerate, the
involvement of American business and industry in Eastern Siberia and
Manchuria.

As late as June 1896, the American consul at Tientsin,

Sheridan Read, was predicting that the Bash syndicate had the "inside
track" to build the Manchurian railways under the protection of

I believe Russia would look with favor upon the building
and owning of railroads in China by Americans and I
think China can be persuaded to see such a course as a
safeguard to herself.
It must have come as a complete shock to the American-China Development Company tc have their plans for Manchuria thwarted, not by
China, but by Russia.

Cassini flatly advised them that the Russian

government, unknown to them, was proceeding with its own plans for
Manchurian railroads and was not going to apply to any foreign
company for help.

Having conceded the political influence of

Russia in Manchuria, and being unable to contest with Russia, unsupported by its own government, the American-China Development
Company had no other choice except to give up its original plans and
change goals.

The syndicate decided to concentrate its efforts

on franchises for railroads in central and southern China to serve
as feeder lines to the Manchurian-Siberian network.

The forlorn

hopes of working together with a friendly Russia in Northeast Asia
were seriously dampened, but not completely dashed.

Bash himself

held on to his Manchurian dreams until at least late 1897.

And

Denby, even while reporting that the Russian survey parties were
already engaged in Manchuria, still hoped that Americans would
construct the connecting lines to the Siberian railroad. 45
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The details of the American plan had been received by Cassini
at a fortuitous time, for he had been instructed concurrently to
negotiate with the Chinese government concerning Russian railway
concessions in Manchuria.

The stakes were high.

The outcome of

the railroad negotiations of 1896 were pivotal as to which nation
would dominate Manchuria.

Witte insisted that Russia not only must

be allowed direct access through Manchuria for its Siberian rail
line, but also "must make every effort to divert into her own hands
the network of rails in Northern China." 46

Russia intended for

Vladivostok to become the principal port of entry into Manchuria.
Witte feared that another terminus, constructed and controlled by
a foreign power, such as the United States, would give the commercial
advantage to the seaborne powers.
The American-China Development Company had pointed out the
advantage to China in "entrusting the development of Manchuria to
citizens of a power which is uninfluenced by political interest or
ambition touching on the affairs on this continent."

That argument

was simply not persuasive enough to counter Russian political pressure
and willingness to offer protection.
inevitable.

Concessions to Russia were

The only question was one of dimension and what China

might expect in return.

Unknown to the Americans, the setting for

the negotiations had already shifted to St. Petersburg, both to avoid
the diversions of foreign claims and to use the coronation of Nicholas
II as a cover.

Viceroy Li was designated in February 1896 to be the

Chinese representative to the coronation with plenipotentiary authority
to conduct negotiations with Russia.

To hasten discussions and to

bypass the other European capitals, Prince Ukhtomskij arranged to
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meet Li at Alexandria and to transfer him and his entourage to a
Russian ship for a passage direct to Odessa.

The Chinese delegation

arrived in Russia three weeks before the ceremonies, which allowed
for the parties to come to an understanding.

In June, Witte,

Lobanov and Li signed a secret treaty of alliance between China and
Russia.

The treaty was facilitated by a bribe of three million

rubles to Li.

The terms of the treaty called for the joint defense

of either country in the event of an attack by Japan.

The agree-

ment also permitted Russian naval vessels to use Chinese ports as
part of the defensive alliance.
China had to pay a price.

For this increase in security

The Russo-Chinese Bank was given the

privilege of constructing and operating a railroad through Manchuria
to connect at each end with the Siberian line.

A few months later

the bank let a contract for the construction of the

railroad to a

newly formed joint stock company, the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company.

By purchasing the majority bloc of

th~

shares in the company,

the Russian government, i.e., Minister of Finance Witte, was able to
control the company, hire employees, administer the settlements
along the railroad and police the leased right-of-way.

In addition,

Russian and Chinese tariffs were lowered on all of their own goods
transported on the railroad.

For the time being, Russia was denied

the right to exploit mineral rights or to construct branch lines
into Northern China.
objectives.

Nevertheless, Russia had achieved its immediate

Russian penetration of Manchuria had cotrunenced and the

Americans had been shut out. 47
Aside from the Russians, the Bash syndicate had to contend
with rival American franchise seekers, the principal group being one
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headed by General James H. Wilson and John J. McCook.

Though never

as formally organized as the American-China Development Company,
Wilson and McCook had equally pretentious ideas.

They, too, conceived

of a vast, integrated Eurasian rail network with the core of the
eystem lying in North China and Siberia.

They aimed to form an

American s)rndicate of the "best men" to build and operate this core
system.

Wilson was familiar with the rail needs in China from his

travels there in the mid-1880s.
railroad promoter.

McCook was already a prominent

Instead of rushing in like the Bash group,

Wilson-McCook bided their time, gathering information and cultivating
what they hoped were useful contacts.

They prcbably were expecting

that the overseas investment climate would improve if a Republican
administration were elected.

Although invited to join the Bash

group, they chose to follow their separate enterprise, often engaging
in undercutting the rival syndicate.
of the peace process.

John Foster kept Wilson apprised

Major J. G. Pangborn of the World's Transporta-

tion Commission provided them with the results of his eighteen-month
study of the Chinese and Russian transportation needs.

News from

the state department was passed along by William Rockhill.
Korea they corresponded with Horace

Allen.

In

From China they were

in touch with Minister Denby and with Pethick.

Their Russian contacts

were both Minister Breckinridge and Herbert Peirce, secretary of the
legation. 48
Wilson and McCook saw as their first step the winning of
preliminary approval from Russia and China for American participation
in developing the rail network.

Since McCook was attending the tsar's

coronation also, they used this opportunity to sound out the two
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individuals that they deemed were key to gaining this approval:
Viceroy Li and Prince Khilkov.

McCook had several audiences with

each and arranged for further talks later, when each was scheduled
to visit the United States.

Being encouraged by these preliminary

discussions, McCook and Wilson began to approach the "best men"
to finance the second step of their plan.

They hoped to raise

$250,000 in order to send a businessman, a lawyer, and a diplomat
to St. Petersburg to work out details with the Russian government.
They were undeterred by news from Pethick concerning the Russo-Chinese
treaty.

Pethick's opinion that all Manchuria, Mongolia, and Northern

China would come under Russian control, only confirmed to them that
the proper approach was through Russia.

Wilson and McCook were

gripped by the same delusion that the traditional friendship between
the United States and Russia was still in full force,

that Russia

needed American knowhow and would welcome American participation in
Northeast Asia.

Wilson went so far as to advocate the outright

partition of China. 49
The objective of the Wilson-McCook syndicate being formed
was to make a vigorous, systematic "effort to control the railway
building and kindred business, not only in China, but in Siberia."
Among the prominent businessmen whom Wilson and McCook approached
for backing were:

George Westinghouse, Chauncey Depew, George

Pullman, Collis Huntington, Philip Armor, August Belmont, John D.
Rockefeller, J. Pierpont Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, Frank Thom?son,
John Converse, and Henry Flagler.

The results were disappointing.

They were generally met with either disinterest or a refusal to
consider the project at such a preliminary stage.

50
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With their grand plans temporarily side-tracked for lack of
financial support, Wilson and McCook turned to a third step in
their scheme.

They proposed placing William Rockhill as minister to

China, Wilson as minister to Russia, and McCook in the cabinet.
By occupying these strategic posts, they anticipated that the "plant"
would have been established whereby the project could flourish.
An impressive list of business and political figures importuned
McKinley on their behalf, but only McCook received an offer. 51
Thus, without capital and without political position, the WilsonMcCook scheme came to a halt.
American franchise seekers across the Yalu River found a
completely different set of circumstances from those prevailing in
Manchuria.

In Korea, many nations competed for concessions, with

Japan initially having the predominant influence.

Russia was satisfied

with the simple independence and territorial integrity of Korea.
She had no missionaries, no franchises, and only thirteen subjects
in all of Korea.

Then, in October 1895, the Japanese made the mistake

of supporting an unsuccessful coup which backfired.

The king sought

asylum in the Russian legation and again petitioned the Russian
government for protection.

A secret Russo-Korean protocol was

arranged, which called upon Russia to protect the king and palace;
to train and officer the Korean army; and to provide financial and
economic advisers to the Korean government. 52

Until late 1897,

Russia held primary sway over Korean affairs.

The tsarist government

moved cautiously during this period.

Witte considered Korea a

secondary theater to his main objective, Manchuria.

In this time

of Russian ascendancy, Horace Allen saw an opportunity to push for
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an American concession for the Seoul-Chemulpo railroad.

He had been

striving to win such a contract for six years, but had always been
thwarted by Japanese claims.

Having worked closely with the Russian

/

Charge Weber during and after the coup, Allen again requested that
the grant be awarded to the American Trading Company.

This company

had been unsuccessful in its bids for several franchises in China,
but with the concurrence of Russia won the Korean railroad contract
in March 1896.

Unlike the situation in Manchuria, Russia was

endeavoring to offset Japan's growing monopoly in Korean economic
affairs.

Or, as Allen thought, Russia approved the American contract

because "it gives a fine appearance to Korean independence on the
outside."

From here on, Allen would hold a pro-Russian bias, at

least vis 'a vis the Japanese.

However, this attitude did not become

widespread enough to countervail the hostile picture of Russia
being engendered by her advance into Manchuria.

American investors

were still wary of Korean projects, and, in the end, the American
Trading Company was forced to sell their concession rights to the
Japanese, because insufficient American capital was available. 53
The fate of the other major American concession in Korea
was more profitable for its investors.
help, James Morse was awarded the Unsan

In July 1895, with Allen's
gold mining concession,

which eventually proved to be very valuable.

Morse sold the franchise

rights to Leigh S. J. Hunt, a Seattle financier, and J. Sloat Fasset,
a New York businessman.

They established the Oriental Consolidated

Mining Company to exploit their claim.

Although some of the officers

of this cowp3ny had political connections, they did not become involved
in any international quarrels with Russian officials in Korea.

Korea
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remained a relative backwater for American interests.

54

Stymied by Russia in the North, the American-China Development Company had focussed its efforts on securing the Peking-Hankow
franchise through which the Americans again hoped to "control the
industrial progress of China."

Alert to the importance of the negotia-

tions, Denby was concerned that the American capitalists would look
only to the immediate profits and not have the long-range vision to
obtain lasting results.

Denby feared that, if the opportunity

represented by this franchise were lost, the economic domination of
China would pass into the hands of men of other nationalities.
Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Secretary Olney strengthened
Denby's hand by directing hirn, for the first time, to:
use your personal and official influences and lend all
proper assistance to secure for reputable representatives
of such concerns the same facilities for submitting proposals, tendering bids or offerring contracts, as are
enjoyed by any other foreign commercial enterprises in
the country.SS
Having been encouraged to use his judgment and experience,
Denby took his strongest stand yet with the Chinese government.
Treat Americans fairly, he insisted, or else "Americans might develop
bad feeling among our people at home and make them less friendly
than they always had been to China."
the pressure was successful.

For a time it appeared as if

The American company held a temporary

contract, but in the end, the Americans wanted more stringent terms
and more guarantees than the Chinese were willing to concede.

A

Belgian syndicate won the contract under such unfavorable terms that
Denby suspected that the syndicate was a blind for political maneuvering.

Later, it was confirmed that the Belgians were fronting for

French and Russian interests.

The Russo-Chinese Bank acted as their
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financial agent.

Again, what seemed to have been a promising American

franchise was thwarted.

In the opinion of Denby, and no doubt shared

by others, the long American effort to secure railroad and other
franchises had "failed because it was frowned on at St. Petersburg."56
Serious American efforts to construct and control railroads in
Northeast Asia had been thoroughly frustrated and were not to revive
until after the Russo-Japanese war.

In the interim, the United

States was chiefly concerned that Russia not obtain too solid a
foothold.
In the scramble for concessions, the Americans were overmatched by the Russians at every turn.

From the outset, Americans

proceeded under the false premise that China and Russia, out of
friendship and good will, if not necessity, would welcome Americans
to their continent.

Americans were too optimistic concerning their

prospects and not prepared for a long, hard struggle.

With only

lukewarm government support at best, the American syndicates were
at a severe disadvantage against the other foreign powers which did
not hesitate to exert imperialistic political pressures.

Often the

Americans had to operate with only spotty intelligence information-they were unaware of key negotiations going on elsewhere or tried to
influence lesser leaders, instead of the top officials, such as
Witte.
manner.

Nor was the Yankee business always conducted in an effective
American businessmen failed to realize that their success

in developing America was not necessarily transferrable overseas.
Far more capital investment, far less undermining of other Americans,
far more patience, far more attention to foreign customs--all were
needed.

Most of all, private enterprise was unwilling to assume any
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degree of risk.

The concept of American investments in foreign

countries was still in its infancy. 57
Russia, on the other hand, had a singleness of purpose,
which eluded the American companies.

The Russian government could

offer China the security of a defensive alliance and the semblance
of a return to normal self-respect.

The treasury of Russia could

be used to guarantee against short-term losses.

Through the facade

of joint stock companies, Russia was able to control the franchises,
while giving China a face-saving device to cloak foreign ownership
of Manchurian railroads.

The relative success of the United States

and Russia in gaining franchises can be measured by the amount
invested:

by 1902 the United States investments in China amounted

to 19.7 million dollars; Russia's, 246.5 million dollars. 58
Before the McKinley administration fairly got underway,
American interests in Northeast Asia appeared to be at a dead end.
Details of the secret treaty between Russia and China remained
murky, but rumors credited Russia with gaining far more than she had
actually accomplished.

Russian spokesmen did nothing to discourage

the impression that they were invincible in the area.

The Governor

of Vladivostok, General J. Dolanka, commented, while passing through
Saint Paul, Minnesota, that the "Tsar might be emperor of Asia
tomorrow.

Vladivostok will be the principal port on the Mongolian

seas, and America will not have the interest she now has in the
quarrels of the Orient."

The Chicago Tribune apparently agreed,

repeatedly crediting Russia with becoming the "master cf the situation
on the Pacific coast" and poised to annex Manchuria, Korea and all
China north of the Great Wall, if not absorb all of China.

Prince
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Khilkov also made the sweeping claim that a Russo-Chinese company
would not only operate the trans-Manchurian line, but also the
extensions into China proper.

Denby, too, was convinced that Russian

influence now predominated in Peking and that Russia scarcely veiled
her dictation of policy to the Chinese government:
In all important matters touching Manchuria the Russian
legation is consulted and no enterprise within the borders
thereof is undertaken without Russian consent.
Li Hung-chang, upon whose influence the Americans had previously
depended, was now considered an "obedient servant of Russia."
this gloomy assessment, Denby saw a ray of hope.

Despite

He thought that

future American commerce and contracts could depend that the "goodwill
of Russia will prove a valuable assistance."

Therefore, Denby

recommended, in the teeth of much contrary evidence that:

"in the

interest of our manufacturers, our friendly relations with Russia
should be enhanced.

She ought to be encouraged, in every way, to

deal with Americans, who are her historic friends."

Only a few

weeks later Denby had decided that "Russia intends to pursue a
separate and imperious course in China."

This ambivalence was

typical of the changing American attitude toward Russia.

They had

been forced to acknowledge that American interests had collided with
Russian interests in Northeast Asia and Russia held the upper hand.
At the same time Americans were reluctant to give up their ambitions
in Manchuria and resisted the abandonment of the concept of a traditional friendship which might re-emerge to their advantage. 59
Russia, in the immediate post-war years, took little pains
to mollify the Americans.

In previous decades her policy had been

to dangle promises and offer a semblance of cooperation to the United
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States in order to avoid potential conflict.

Even in Eastern Siberia

Russia had acted circumspectly toward American surveyors, whalers
and traders.

Whether Russia was too wrapped up in its own projects

to curry favor with American opinion or whether she believed that
its relative military and political strength no longer required a
tactful approach, was not clear.

Whether through miscalculation or

deliberate action, Russia's impending advance into Manchuria had
weakened the ties of the "historic friendship" in the eyes of
Americans.

From his vantage point in St. Petersburg, Minister

Breckinridge, in November 1896, sensed the growing rift and reported
his misgivings:
I fear that our country has ceased to be warmly or seriously
taken into account by Russia. Pleasant memories remain among
the people, that is all • • • • we abstain from any policy
that could make our resentment seriously effective upon
other continents, and thus we are practically left out of
the count. The neglect of our claims, the disregard of
our representations, the marked contrast • • • in the
reception of our men of war • • • all show a distinct
change and disregard • • • • Our people cherish the mistaken
ideas that in time of trouble Russia would help us. That
time is past • • •• I should predicate nothing more upon
traditional friendship • • • • I believe it would be well,
when occasion affords, if in some suitably marked way our
government would show conspicuous disapprobation of the
course of our relations with Russia. She does not reciprocate--she does not deserve the consideration we have always
shown her.60
Breckinridge had unequivocally set forth the new circumstances affecting
relations between the United States and Russia.

In a large measure,

it depended on the next administration whether to allow the relationship to drift aimlessly or whether to confront Russia in Northeast
Asia where the national interests had most closely intersected.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE RELUCTANT EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898

Until 1898, Russia and the United States had pursued similar
goals in North China and Manchuria.

Each, although by totally

different means, had sought the peaceful economic penetration of
the region without territorial aggrandizement.

The Russian govern-

ment, through deliberate policy decisions, had eschewed the territorial
partitioning of China at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War.
Since that time, led by Finance Minister Witte, Russia had opted
for a course which overtly called for a "free hand and fair field"
in Manchuria, while covertly using pressure to gain economic monopoly.
Witte had hoped to continue Russia's economic advance into North
China without the use of political force and at a deliberate pace.
Russia had to forego this policy when Germany occupied Kiaochow on
the Shantung peninsula in November 1897.

Germany's action forced

Russia reluctantly to reexamine its position with regard to the
partition of China.

Russia's subsequent acquisition of Chinese

territory revealed more clearly than ever Russia's ultimate designs
on the region.

Thus alerted to the threat to American interests,

a strong reaction advocating opposition to Russia's domination of
Manchuria was set in motion in the United States by the press, by
business groups and within governmental circleso

Russia's actions

stirred just the sort of attention that Witte had hoped to avoid by
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his own more cautious approach.
The strain on Russo-American relations was aggravated again
a few months later when the United States had suddenly to confront
the consequences of Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila.

Gradually and

reluctantly the United States, too, was forced to adopt a policy
toward Asian colonial possessions.

The acquisition of the Philippines

altered America's perspective of its own role in Asian affairs.

By

its adventure into trans-Pacific imperialism the United States had
demonstrated the military means and the will to support national
interests overseas.

Russia was rightly concerned whether this new

attitude and this naval militarism would extend to Northeast Asia,
particularly if coupled wi.th the existing English opposition to the
Russian advance into Manchuria.

Heretofore, the competition between

Russian and American interests had been one-sided in favor of Russia.
No diplomatic governmental clashes had yet occurred.

When Russia

easily blocked American railway projects, only a degree of private
ill-will had been engendered.

As a result of the territorial

expansion of each, undertaken however reluctantly, both nations moved
closer to abandoning their traditional

frien~.~.hip

in favor of an

old-fashioned rivalry for the domination of Northeast Asia.
The first step which brought the possibility of this conflict
closer to reality was taken by Russia.

Having nullified previous

American attempts to gain an economic development foothold in
Manchuria, Russia still had a long way to go before consolidating
its own economic hold on the region.

Russia needed, as its next

logical step, permission to build a branch rail line from the Chinese
Eastern Railway to a port on the Yellow Sea.

However, throughout
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1897 Li Hung-chang had rejected Russian overtures to this end.

In

order to regain some independence of action in Manchuria, China once
more proposed to extend its own rail system northward under the
supervision of a British engineer.

Aggravating the Russians further,

an Anglo-American group of mining engineers had also been permitted
to make a survey of mineral deposits in Southern Manchuria.

The

Russian charg~ in Peking in June 1897 thought that any further extension
of Russian railroads into Manchuria might prove hazardous "when
the feeling of distrust and suspicion among the Chinese toward our
plans in Manchuria is still far from dissipated and when the feelings
are being specifically encouraged in them by foreigners."

Included

in those "foreigners" were representatives of the American-China
Development Company, who inspired articles in the Shanghai press
critical of Russia.

1

Also lending a sense of urgency to the Russian

demands, was news of a renewed attempt by the Bash group to build
railroads in Manchuria.

Bash claimed to the Russian charg~ in Washing-

ton in January 1898 that he had concluded a contract with the Chinese
imperial railway administration for building and operating lines
from Shanhaikuan to Mukden and Kirin, and from Port Arthur to
Mukden.

As a result, the Russian foreign officer notified Peking

that permitting the Americans to build railways in Southern Manchuria
was absolutely undesirable.

Coupled with this action, Russian

diplomats themselves advised the American engineers travelling in
Manchuria to leave the country or else face "various inconveniences. 112
This stand-off ended dramatically in November 1897, when the
German navy precipitated matters by occupying Kiaochow in retaliation
for the murder of two German missionaries.

China immediately appealed
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to Russia for assistance and, hoping to invoke their defensive
alliance, opened up all Chinese non-treaty ports to Russian naval
vessels.

This invitation confronted the Russian ministers with an

entirely new situation.

The new Russian foreign minister, M. N.

Muravev, favored using the German action as a pretext for the iumediate
compensatory seizure of an ice-free port on the Yellow Sea, long
one of the goals of Russian expansionists, and a goal shared by
Nicholas II.

Witte argued successfully, for a time, that the acquisi-

tion of such a port should remain secondary to a policy of restraining the European powers from a scramble for Chinese territory.
Witte feared that, if others gained territorial compensation, then
Japan would seize territory also, which might very well lead to
war.

The Russian government decided to equivocate.

With the

"consent" of China a Russian squadron was ordered to be "temporarily
stationed" at Port Arthur in December 1897.

Unlike the Germans, no

occupying troops were sent ashore for the time being.

Two British

cruisers entered Port Arthur shortly thereafter to emphasize that
England demanded equality of treatment in Chinese ports.

No American

ships were dispatched. 3
Concurrently, the Chinese government was faced again with
the necessity of negotiating for a foreign loan in order to pay off
the last installment of its war indemnity.

Witte agreed to under-

take the loan, but only if China accepted a virtual Russian
monopoly of all railways, mining and industry in all of Manchuria
and Mongolia.

And, bowing to the tsar's desire for an ice-free

port on the Pacific, Witte also demanded that Russia be permitted
to construct a harbor on the Yellow Sea to serve Russian ships.
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China, desperately trying to stave off these concessions, turned to
the British.

Their initial offer, which was none too generous

either, included the ingenious demand to open Talienwan as a treaty
port.

This would have tended to stall Russia by ensuring an open

door for commerce into Southern Manchuria.

Faced with two sets of

onerous conditions, China at this point probably would have welcomed
an American loan offer, despite higher rates of interest.
forthcoming.

None was

Finally, the Chinese government accepted a loan on

February 1, 1898 from an Anglo-German banking group with the stipulations that there would be no alienation of the Yangtse basin except
in favor of England and that Germany would be allowed to lease
Kiaochow. 4
With the loan question settled, Witte lost his financial
leverage for attaining the economic monopoly which he preferred.
Muravev was successful in pressing China for a lease of the southern
part of the Liaotung peninsula, including both the ports of Talienwan
and Port Arthur.

Russia also gained the right to construct a

Southern Manchurian Railway connecting the Chinese Eastern Railway
with these ports.

The final lease was signed March 27, 1898.

Russia

had not yet achieved its maximum goals, but had taken a giant stride
toward securing Manchuria as its fief.
The other powers quickly availed themselves of the opportunity
to help themselves at China's expense.
in the North, England leased

Weihaiwei

its sphere of influence in the South.

To counteract Russian influence
in April.

France extended

Fukien province opposite

Japanese Formosa was recognized as falling within the Japanese

sp~ere.

Also, to placate the Japanese, Russia agreed to withdraw its military
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and financial advisers from Korea and to acknowledge the special
economic interests of Japan in Korea.

Of all the Pacific powers,

only the United States refrained from seeking advantage from China,
though the Navy Department considered it.

In February 1898, Secretary

John D. Long asked Admiral Dewey for his recommendation regarding
the best obtainable Chinese port "for the benefit of our ships, and
the extension of our commerce, as are enjoyed by some other nations."S
While Great Britain had actively opposed the cession of
Chinese territory to Germany and to Russia, the United States government decided "to keep a watchful eye upon the situation as it
developed."

It was generally agreed that American interests and

privileges should be protected, but that it was unnecessary to act
until these interests were specifically threatened.

Expressing

these views in an interview with the Philadelphia Press, Secretary
of State, John Sherman, claimed that the partition of China was
unlikely, but even if partition were to occur, American "commercial
interests would not suffer." 6
This "wait and see" policy of the administration was a
disappointment to those growing segments of American opinion which
were increasingly sensitive to American successes and possible
failures in Northeast Asia.

From China, Charles Denby, perhaps

emboldened by his lame-duck status, expressed his anxieties in late
January.

He warned that "armed strife" between England and Russia

might occur should Russia attempt to dominate Manchuria.

Further,

if "Russia should claim to control Manchuria and exclude other nations
from equal rights •
States and Russia."

the question may come up between the United
Partition of China "would tend to destroy our
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markets" in the Pacific which was "destined to bear on its bosom a
larger commerce than the Atlantic."

Having such an interest in

China, why should the United States "remain mute should her autonomy
be attacked," asked Denby.

Instead, Denby recommended that the

United States make a stand, take an interest in the "territorial
question," assert a "moral influence" and not hesitate to announce
disapproval of acts of "brazen wrong, spoliation, perpetrated by
other nations towards China." 7
Upon his return to the United States, Denby refined his
"Doctrine of Intervention" and published it in the Forum.

Simply

stated, the doctrine pronounced that it was the duty of the United
States' government to "intervene in all matters occurring abroad
in which it is our interest to intervene."

In a similar vein, his

son, Charles Denby, Jr., who had served as the secretary of the
American legation in Peking, writing for the North American Review,
concluded that there must be a "manifestation of a greater interest
by the American government in the political and commercial affairs
of the Orient • • • the American merchant should be assured that
his government is supporting him."

8

The tenor of the Denbys' opinions was echoed in other

~uarters.

The United States should "do something" positively; not be bound so
tightly by strictures against "entangling alliances."

Richard Olney

put these views into a legal framework as he decried the "International
Isolation of the Un:i.ted States."

During his term as secretary of

state, Olney had gradually toughened his stance in favor of aiding
American businessmen in China.

Consequently, in his address at

Harvard in early March 1898, he was not nearly as sanguine as Sherman.
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Olney found nothing in Washington's Farewell Address which would
prevent America from exercising its "right and duty" to resist
any European state from setting "vexatious and discriminating duties
and impositions, to utterly ruin the trade" between China and the
United States.

Moreover, Olney recognized that the United States

had previously benefitted by the British single-handed struggle to
keep the ports and territory of China free and open to trade.

From

this he concluded that it was time for the United States to offer
Great Britain more than "moral support" in continuing this aim.
He suggested that a temporary Anglo-American alliance, for such an
extraordinary emergency, would be a more creditable part for a
great nation to play. 9
Clarence Cary, who, as lawyer for the American-China Development Company, knew first-hand the odds facing American businessmen
when they competed against government-sponsored foreign rivals, made
the most direct attack on the administration's "somnolent policy
of merely trusting to luck" in the Far East.

Cary thought that

Sherman's views were "quaint and dangerous."

Any assurances that

the territorial cessions would be open freely to trade were discounted
by Cary as temporary at best.

Instead, he looked ahead to a time

when "the territory north of the Great Wall ••

when in possession

of Russia may be surrounded by a Russian tariff expressly calculated
to create an exclusive market for her own people."

Urging that

Washington not "let matters drift in happy-go-lucky fashion," he
recommended that the United States make "one forceful protest now,"
rather than a volume of tardy diplomatic remonstrances and inquiries
later.

The United States, no longer able to depend solely on Great
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Britain to act, must itself watch over and safeguard American trading
. h ts Ln
. Ch"Lna. lO
rLg
New York City, perhaps because it was more susceptible to
London influence; or perhaps because the cotton merchants were
headquartered there, was the center of those advocating a more
vigorous policy in safeguarding American interests in China.

The

New York Times, taking the lead among American journals, was appalled
that China was threatened by Russia with becoming a "field for
colonization and conquest."

For nearly a year the newspaper had

published only one editorial concerning China.

Then, in the space

of four months, commencing in December 1897, more than a dozen
editorials dealt with tbe crisis.

At first, the comments were

limited to expressions of sympathy for the British efforts to
guarantee free trade.

By January, the danger of a monopoly develop-

ing was recognized more clearly.

It was concluded that England should

not be alone in championing the forces of progress and civilization
against the forces of reaction and barbarism; the United States
should declare its "entire and hearty approval" of the British
stance.

There then began a series of complaints that the administra-

tion was slow in acting to "assert the rights of American commerce
and defend its field from hostile encroachment."

While applauding

Cary's article, the New York Times claimed that the "headless"
state department was displaying "ignorance and apathy about our
commercial interests." 11
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle was slower to recognize
that the partition of China represented any danger to American
interests.

Spheres of influence are "no misfortune to trade and

civilization."

By April, however, the Chronicle had made the
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significant correlation between Northern China and the expanding
export of American cotton goods.

Apprehensive about the "contingency

of Manchuria being added to the Czar's dominions" the Chronicle
thought:
The loss of this trade by absorption of Manchuria in the
Russian customs area would be of considerable importance,
and this fact obviously strengthens the motive for opposing
such a serious change • • • • Russia would be disposed to
yield to strong representations in favor of keeping trade
on equal terms to all nations • • • if these be pressed
with sufficient earnestness and decision.
For the purpose of preserving free trade, the Chronicle agreed that
no "union of the two great Anglo-Saxon powers could be more creditable.1112
Another "old China hand," General James Wilson, assessed
"America's Interest in China" during this period.

He assumed from

his observations that the Russians intended "to hold on to what they
have taken, and even take more as opportunity offers."

Reluctantly,

he concluded that American interests corresponded with that "ancient
antagonist, England" and against those of our "ancient allies,
France and Russia."

Having occupied the whole of America's own

vacant land, the Americans "must necessarily turn their attention
more and more to the commerce of the Pacific islands and beyond."
Therefore, circumstances might arise in Asia, according to Wilson,
when it would become the duty of the government "to exert its
power to the utmost" and, if need be, "to accept even the
cooperation of Great Britain
interests beyond the Pacific."

• for the maintenance of our common
13

More explicitly, John Proctor,

president of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, urged that the
United States, as a nation with large interests in the open ports
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of China, should join with England and promulgate a new Monroe
Doctrine proclaiming that China was no longer regarded as a "place
for conquest or colonization by any European or other Power.ul4
In addition to the press criticism of the administration's
inaction, a group of businessmen, whose firms were financially
involved in China, organized a Committee on America's Interest in
China.

James McGee of the Standard Oil Company presided.

The

committee began its campaign to transform America's policy by persuading sixty-eight firms to sign a petition urging that chambers of
commerce in major cities send resolutions to the government demanding
that American commercial interests in China be safeguarded.

Within

four months ten resolutions to this effect were sent by chambers of
commerce, commercial or trade organizations around the nation.

The

New York resolution served as a model and had the greatest impact
when it earnestly urged:
that such proper steps be taken as will commend themselves
to your wisdom for the prompt and energetic defense of the
existing treaty rights of our citizens in China, and for
the preservation and protection of their important commercial
interests in that Empire.l5
Concurrently, there was a virtual tide of British public and
private pressure exerted on the United States to join in the maintenance of an "open door" in the Far East.

Both Ambassador John Hay

and the secretary of the legation, Henry White, had abundant opportunity to learn of and sympathize with the English conviction that
it

was imperative to check Germany and Russia from obtaining a

monopoly.

British statesmen were far more skeptical that these

powers would keep their promises to keep their ports open to trade
any longer than it suited their convenience.

White reported that
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the consensus in England was that the British government would have
"the sympathy and the support of the people of the United States
and not improbably of our government also."
for disappointment.

In this they were due

Sympathy was forthcoming; support, no. 16

Despite these pressures to "do something," the American
government did not immediately react.

In early March the British

Ambassador to Washington inquired confidentially whether his government "could count on the co-operation of the United States in opposing
action by foreign powers which may tend to restrict freedom of
commerce for all nations in China either by imposing preferential
conditions or by obtaining actual cession of Chinese coast territory."
In reply, the United States advised that there was no indication of
foreign occupation which interfered with trade or aimed at exclusive
privileges.

Therefore, there was no "present reason for the departure

of the United States from our traditional policy respecting foreign
alliances." 17

In this instance, the McKinley administration sounded

much like its predecessors.
When the formalities were finally signed, the state department
made no protest, jointly or unilaterally, to the cessions of Chinese
territory, but did bestir itself to ascertain from the Russian
government what it proposed concerning foreign trade through its
ports in Southern Manchuria.

Muravev explained to the new American

ambassador, Ethan Hitchcock, that Port Arthur would be developed
solely as a military and naval base, but that Talienwan would serve
as a maritime commercial terminal, replacing Vladivostok.

Further,

according to Muravev, Russia had no desire "to interfere in anyway
with the trade of other nations with China, her policy being to
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develop home industries for supplying her home markets, under a
protection policy, aided by increased transportation facilities •
and toward the maintenance and profit of which last she would be
only too glad to have foreign commerce contribute."

To Hitchcock,

this ambiguous statement appeared to be an assurance of "equality of
opportunity" to all nations. 18

No one seemed to question how Russia

expected to profit from the enormous expenses of its Siberian and
Manchurian railroads.
Not all departments in Washington were prepared to ignore
completely the Russian advance into Southern Manchuria and the
possible consequences.

Frederic Emory, Chief of the Bureau of

Foreign Commerce, in his April 1898 introduction to the annual Review
of World's Commerce, noted two recent trends:

the "American invasion

of the markets of the world" and the increaing preoccupation of
European diplomacy to secure new spheres of influence "for their
own special benefit."

Specifically, he went on record that:

China has for some years been one of the most promising fields
for American enterprise, industry, and capital • • • • The
solution of the problem of the future commercial conditions
of the Chinese Empire has, therefore, an immediate and most
important relation to the expansion of our export trade,
especially that of the Pacific slope.
Because of economic requirements, Emory concluded that "international
isolation" of the United States was a thing of the past and the
government could "no longer afford to disregard international
rivalries." 19
William Day, the assistant secretary, replaced John Sherman
as secretary of state in late April.

This change permitted a gradual

shift in the administration's Far East policy, but, of necessity, the
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United States was by then concentrating the bulk of its efforts
towardprosecuting the war with Spain.

The surprising element was

that Americans devoted as much concern as they did over Northeast
Asia during the four months of the developing crisis in Cuba.
in wartime, China was not completely forgotten.

Even

In June, Day

submitted a proposal to congress to send a fact-finding commission
to China to study commercial conditions now that "European powers
have established themselves at points of vantage in that Empire which
will enable them to exercise direct influence upon its commercial
destiny."

The proposal made it clear that the present was a "golden

opportunity" for enlarging commercial intercourse, "not only in
China itself, but in the contiguous possessions of Russia • • •
provided the conditions are thoroughly understood and proper advantage
taken."

The congress did not authorize the commission, but the

shift in the administration's thinking was evident.

A month later,

in explaining to Ambassador Hay why the war precluded any AngloAmerican effort in China, Day did foretell that "the outcome of our
struggle with Spain may develop the need of extending and strengthening our interests in the Asiatic continent." 20
The aggressions of Germany at Kiaochow, and especially of
Russia in Southern Manchuria, had done much to clarify American
thinking toward Northeast Asia.

First, these seizures created an

atmosphere which tended to soften the historic antipathies which
some Americans held for the English.

In the Pacific, the United

States had generally cooperated, at least tacitly, with the British
policy.

During this crisis period, the realization of an Anglo-

American identity of concerns for an open door policy was reenforced.
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Two influential Republican members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations turned away from an independent policy abroad and professed
a willingness for the United States to work jointly with the British
to protect free trade with China.

Cushman Davis stated to the

press that if American commerce were threatened in Asia, the
United States would be "justified in departing from its time-honored
policy and if necessity required seek a coalition with England."
And Henry Cabot Lodge, erstwhile Anglophobe, was sufficiently concerned
about the seizures in Northeast Asia to declare:

"I should be glad

to have the United States say to England that we would stand by her
in her declaration that the ports of China must be open to all nations
equally or to none." 21

Americans, then, werevariously prepared to

do nothing, to offer "sympathy" to the British, to tender "moral
support" for their stance, to enter into joint protests, or to take
the ultimate break with the past and make a temporary Anglo-American
alliance to forestall the exclusive systems the continental European
powers might impose on Chinese trade.

This half-way change in

attitude from hostility to friendship was only one facet of the
Anglo-American understanding which was reached at the end of the
century, but, because of the locale and the issues involved, it
tended to undermine one of the bases for the traditional RussoAmerican friendship.

The latter had always relied rather artificially

on each partner holding an equal grudge against Great Britain.

In

Northeast Asia it was now abundantly apparent that the grudge was
not against England; the rival was Russia.
Second, the government became more prone, though still
cautious, to offer its support to American commercial endeavors in
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the Pacific region.

In Manchuria particularly, the direct stake

that American cotton mill owners and cotton exporters had there was
becoming more widely recognized.

This new willingness at least to

contemplate backing American business in China was reflected in
President McKinley's annual message to Congress:
The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of
the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire,
whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing
under the control of various European powers • • • • Our
position among nations, having a large Pacific coast and a
constantly expanding direct trade with the Orient, gives
us the equitable claim to consideration and friendly
treatment in this regard, and it will be my aim to
preserve our large interests in that quarter by all means
appropriate • • • .22
This increased willingness to engage in "commercial imperialism" in
China, though coincident in time, did not spring directly from the
so-called "large policy" of imperialism.

The Lodge-Mahan-Roosevelt

group of imperialists were preoccupied with the approaching conflict
in Cuba.

Mahan, while a staunch advocate of Pacific naval bases,

such as in Hawaii, did not seriously address the "Problem of Asia"
until two years later.

Roosevelt, when asked to support the New

York Chamber of Commerce position replied uncommittedly:
I do not believe in any entangling alliance, but neither
do I believe in any entangling antipathies. Russia, and
Russia alone, of the European powers, has been uniformly
friendly to us in the past. I have no question that this
friendliness came almost solely from self-interest, but
with that I need not deal • • • • If our trade relations
with China are valuable, I should most unquestionably side
with or against any European power out there purely with
regard to our own interests.23
The American reaction to the threatened partition of China, though an
accidental adjunct of the new aggressive mood in the nation, was more
defensive in nature and, at the beginning, a far cry from any thoughts
of territorial aggrandizement.

Later, the idea of readier access to
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the China market would serve as one more justification for the annexation of Hawaii and the keeping of the Philippines, but beforehand,
there was no connection between the foreign cessions in China and the
American conflict with Spain.

Even many of the anti-imperialists

who spoke out against the war and colonialism favored the more subtle
form of economic expansion.

Men like Edward Atkinson, Carl Schurz,

David Starr Jordan and William Graham Sumner preferred an "informal"
empire based on American economic superiority and equal, if not
special, access to commercial privileges and naval support facilities.
They appreciated the importance of American trade with regions such
as Northeast Asia, but failed to specifically address how a commercial
empire could be achieved in the face of any concerted effort by
another nation, such as Russia, to deny American equal participation
in the market. 24
Third, Americans were far more concerned by the Russian
acquisitions than by those of the other powers.

The others, particularly

Germany, as the first to seize territory, drew some adverse comment,
but the intentions of Russia provoked overwhelming distrust.

Americans

realized that their prime market now lay within the Russian sphere
with the dire prospects that the sphere might eventually extend into
all of Northern China.

Russian promises to keep the region open to

trade and not to discriminate against other nations were not completely
accepted.

Unlike the other foreign spheres of influence which were

distant from the European states, Manchuria was contiguous to Asiatic
Russia.

Americans knew from their own experiences in continental

expansion that an initial presence can be transformed into absolute
sovereignty.

Moreover, the parallel examples of Russian absorption
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of the Central Asian states and the Amur region did not encourage
optimism.
unease:

The American consul in Tientsin expressed this sense of
"Russia is rapidly fortifying Port Arthur and the feeling

is growing that as soon as the Siberian railroad is completed and
a secure foothold is gained that Manchuria will be forever lost to
China. " 25
American observers, intent upon the approaching conflict in
Cuba during the early months of 1898, may not have entirely appreciated
the full scope of these nascent changes in the American attitude
toward events in Northeast Asia.

But the Russian government was

fully attuned to the subtle hints emanating from New York and Washington that American policy in the Far East might be on the verge of
shifting toward a rapprochement with the English in blocking the
Russian advance into Manchuria.

As early as 1895, the foreign

minister had advised the Tsar that England was "our most dangerous
adversary in Asia," but "as soon as any kind of Asiatic difficulties
cropped up the friends of England always were our enemies and vice
versa."

To this assessment Nicholas II commented "Naturally."

During the next few years, the Russian foreign ministry became "well
aware what kind of aspirations direct Americans in their corr®ercial
and trade enterprises on the entire Western seaboard of the Pacific
Ocean."

The ministry was also in receipt of estimates from both

London and Washington of the "English agitation" attempting to draw
the two Anglo-Saxon nations "toward a common position on Far East
events."

Russia's objective was to counteract the growing American

spirit of cooperation with Great Britain and to forestall the American
government from engaging in more vigorous competition for Manchuria.
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Russia did not want to quarrel with the United States and sought to
avoid any overt economic or political rivalry.26
To accomplish this end, the tsarist government took several
measures, the first of which was to nominate, in early February,
Count Cassini, a veteran diplomat and Far East expert, as the Russian
representative to Washington.

At the same time each nation's

diplomatic envoy was raised from the ministerial level to that of
ambassador.

Muravev lost no time in attempting to re-cement the

"traditional friendship."

On the occasion of the mutual exchange of

acceptances of the.new diplomatic rank, he confidentially informed
Hitchcock that the Spanish government's solicitation for support
over Cuba had been plainly refused since "the warm friendship
existing between our Governments made it quite impossible for the
Imperial Government to entertain any propositions which could be
construed to be unfriendly to the United States."

Hitchcock was

gratified at this "expression of the cordial and friendly feeling of
Russia." 27
The instructions provided to Cassini upon entering his
ambassadorship also were revealing of the Russian strategy.

Having

been provided with a summary of the historical foundations of the
Russo-American friendship, Cassini was directed to maintain and
strengthen ties with the United States and to "evince complete
sympathy with the interests of the Americans."

Of the current American

concerns, the foreign ministry believed that the two nations could
find a solution to the problem of pelagic seal hunting in the North
Pacific.

Similarly, the self-interest of the two nations coincided

over Hawaii.

Russia was pleased to support the United States in the
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annexation of the islands rather than have them fall into the less
friendly hands of Great Britain or Japan.

Second, Cassini was

instructed to "make every endeavor to create conflicts between the
Federal Government and England and Japan" while at the same time
"remaining in the aura of Russo-American friendship."

In particular,

he was to pay careful attention to the relations of the United States
and Canada.

The secession of Canada from Great Britain was important

to Russia, but the foreign ministry was not quite certain whether
the union of Canada with the United States might not strengthen the
latter into an even greater Pacific threat and competitor.

The last

and most difficult task assigned to Cassini concerned American
enterprises in Asia.

He was to use his background knowledge to pay

"special attention to the significance to us (Russia) of the development of American industry in the Far East."

Cassini was supposed

to make a distinction bett.Jeen American enterprises, promoting those
which would be favorable to Russia and taking energetic action
against those which would "impinge on our sphere of influence."

28

In this delicate policy of distinguishing between good and
harmful American enterprise lies the key to understanding what appears,
at first glance, to be an incongruous strategy.

For, over the next

several years, American exports into Asiatic Russia tripled and
quadrupled.

And more dramatically, millions of dollars worth of

American goods were suddenly in demand in the Russian sector of
Southern Manchuria.

To build the port facilities, to construct the

Manchurian railroads and to feed the growing Russian population there,
the tsarist government needed to import foodstuffs, coal, steel rails,
locomotives and all manner of machinery.

It was estimated that 80%
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of the equipment and material used in Russia's Manchurian zone was
purchased from the United States, by 1900 perhaps four million
dollars worth.

American exports to Asiatic Russia increased sharply

also during a four-year period (in millions of dollars):
1897

.45

1898

1899

1900

1.4

1.86

2.64

Selecting the United States to be the major supplier, not only seemed
to make good economic sense, but also good diplomatic sense.
a tactic that Russia had used successfully before.

It was

By appealing to

the short-term commercial instincts of the Americans, Russia may have
hoped to divert attention from Russia's long-term political and
economic penetration of Manchuria.

Instead, the tactic tended to

emphasize that all Northeast Asia was a market to be prized and
protected. 29
During 1898 there were numerous examples of Russia exercising
this cautious trade policy with the United States, wary of becoming
economically dependent on the United States, but yet hoping to soften
relations through the offer of temporary trade advantages.

To

stimulate trade through Vladivostok, for example, no tariffs were
imposed on imports.

In view of the growing importance of this trade,

the United States proposed placing an American consul there, but
this was rejected by the Russian government.
was allowed in Asiatic Russia.

Only a commercial agent

Again, Russia repeated once more its

intention to construct the Manchurian railroads by itself, but
awarded

a contract for 36,000 tons of steel rails for these lines

to the Maryland Steel Company.

Later, when some contract difficulties
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arose, Witte settled the matter personally by directing that "financial
conditions being equal, the order for rails should be given to the
Americans."

Similarly, Russia was prepared to give an American firm

a lumbering concession in Siberia, but only for the 6-8 year period
necessary to learn American technology.

Also, while Russia was plac-

ing large orders for American locomotives and air brakes, the longterm prospects for this type of export to Russia were limited by the
successful trial run of the first locomotive built domestically,
albeit with American machinery and under American supervision.

The

prospects for the sale of American ships, sewing machines and
agricultural equipment were all encouraging, at least for the time
being. 30
Hitchcock had been sent to Russia with instructions
trade and he was making progress.

t~

push

Why then was American foreign

policy not affected by this sizeable "Siberian market" to the same
extent as by the "China market"?

For one thing, the Siberian market

never received the same ballyhoo from the American press, consular
officials or business circles.

No Siberian lobby was formed to

influence the government to safeguard commerce with Asiatic Russia.
Most Americans were no longer deluded that friendship with Russia
meant American access to the development of the Amur basin.

The

Americans knew that Russia, unlike China, was capable of and intent
on establishing domestic industries and once in operation would,
like the United States, protect their output with high tariffs.
Reports had already been received from Enoch Emory, an American merchant engaged in importing American goods into Siberia, of rumors
that tariffs v1ere about to be reimposed at Eastern Siberian ports.
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Emory operated on a large scale, having eleven warehouses.

Siberiau

merchants had already complained about American competition and demanded that American products be excluded.

When queried as to this

possibility, Witte acknowledged that the matter of duties on imports
was under consideration, but not for the immediate future.

The

Novoye Vremya, a few years later, portrayed the Russian dilemma:
Siberian merchants are beginning to feel the pressure.
Some are demanding the exclusion of American imports.
The buyers of American products protest against any such
action on the ground that in Siberia there is an
industrial standstill, no enterprising spirit exists,
and that the prices are extremely high. During the time
that we are quarreling about a tariff and the abolishment of the free port of Vladivostok, the Americans will
have taken possession of the Siberian markets and erected
factories and mills of all kinds. We are now building
a railway into China, but the chances are that the
Americans will benefit more from the Chinese markets than
the Russians.
Eventually, it was expected that American exports into Asiatic Russia
would have been restricted and the United States would have no recourse
to prevent that happening.

For that reason, American diplomatic

efforts were concentrated on Manchuria and North China where there
was a better opportunity to keep the avenues open indefinitely. 31
The Spanish-American War brought a further testing of RussoAmerican relations.

Though sympathetic with a fellow European monarchy,

the tsarist government could not afford to antagonize the United
States by seriously considering joining any European concert to
intervene in the conflict on Spain's behalf.
assured

Hitchc~ck

in the war.

Instead, Muravev

officially of Russia's strict and impartial neutrality

Unofficially, he offered friendly assurances personally

and on behalf of his government.32

If the war had been confined to

the Caribbean, these declarations would have sufficed.

When, however,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

261
Admiral Dewey gained his naval victory at Manila, this Pacific
dimension to the war complicated Russia's problem--what stance should
she take on the disposition of the Philippine Islands?
placed the Russian foreign ministry in a quandary.

This question

Outright opposi-

tion to America's ambitions in the Philippines would alienate the
United States further and bring the Anglo-American rapprochement
one step closer.

Supporting permanent occupation of the islands,

on the other hand, would be to encourage the full-fledged participation of the United States in Asian affairs, not just as a passive
voice of moral persuasion, but possibly as a first-class naval power
with forward bases.

In any new role as an active Pacific power,

the United States might well be more inclined to unite with England
in trying to stop Russian expansion into Manchuria.
At first, one month after the American victory, Muravev
assured Hitchcock that "Russia felt no interest whatever in the
Philippines," implying that Russian interests were centered entirely
in North China.

Nevertheless, rumors persisted that Russia was about

to join Germany and France in settling the future status of the
Philippines.

These rumors gained some credence when a St. Petersburg

newspaper insisted that "America must voluntarily submit her pretensions
to a tribune of the powers."

Other press comments urged the Russian

government not to lose a moment in seizing a portion of the Philippines
for itself as a coaling station.

American diplomats had difficulty

in gauging the degree of government influence on individual newspapers.
All, they were certain, were cautious of censorship; some, they
believed, actually reflected government policy accurately.

Again,

Muravev dismissed these rumors, declaring that toward the United States
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"we were friends, we are friends and we intend to remain friends." 33
From Washington, Cassini reported his belief that the United
States intended to annex all of the Philippines.

Rather than console

himself with the "passing of the Philippines into the hands of our
friends, the

Americans~

whom we love and value," Cassini regarded

the impending annexation with "considerably less well-wishing."

He

foresaw the Americans using the Philippines as "a point of departure
in the Far East" and bringing a new factor into the Far Eastern
political situation.

He was particularly concerned that the circum-

stances would lead to a closer agreement between the "two great
naval powers," should the United States share or transfer the islands
to Great Britain.34
In July the influential Novoye Vremya published comprehensive
recommendations regarding the policy that Russia should follow on
the Philippine question.
European powers.

Russia should not join any concert of

Russia's interests in Northeast Asia were too

far removed from the Philippines to coincide with the commercial
interests of the others.

The islands should remain undivided under

the control of the United States.

An immediate categorical declara-

tion by Russia on this point would be as decisive as the movement of
the Russian squadrons to American ports during the Civil War. In
reward for this friendly attitude, Russia would "get what would be
necessary for us," including the lease of coaling stations in the
Philippines. 35
However, the Russian government hesitated and never made
such a categorical statement backing the United States.
and Japan did.

Both England

When Herbert Peirce, American charg~, took the
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initiative and inquired specifically of the Russian foreign office
whether Russia intended to interpose any objection to the American
claim to the islands, Count Lamsdorff disengenuously answered that
his government had never occupied itself with the matter.

When

word of this unauthorized query reached John Hay, the new Secretary
of State, he was greatly irritated.

Peirce was told, in no uncertain

terms, that the acquisition of the Philippines was solely the concern
of Spain and the United States.

Hay had no intention of the United

States appearing to be beholden to Russia for its war-won gains.
Far from seeking cooperation and backing in Asian affairs, as had
been frequently sought in previous decades of American policy,
Hay was determined to strike a course independent of Russia. 36
Russia had hoped that America's newly demonstrated "naval
militarism" could be confined to the distant Philippines and kept
entirely separate from America's previously passive and purely private
commercial concerns in Northeast Asia.

Despite the two thousand mile

separation, this proved to be wishful thinking.

Once the United

States commenced to occupy the islands, American affairs throughout
Asia were inextricably intertwined.

Although Americans who favored

annexation primarily prized the intrinsic commercial value of the
islands and their potential as a trading entrepot off Southern China,
interest was not limited to the immediate geographic sphere.

Imperial-

ists saw the islands as a gateway to all the markets of East Asia.
Heretofore excluded from the territorial scramble on the mainland,
here was .a chance for getting a "share of what is going on in Asia."
Holding on to the Philippines would serve to protect American trade
with China, provide "naval and military force on the western shores
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of the Pacific," and pave "the way for future interventions on the
part of the United States in the affairs of the East."

Far from

providing a substitute for their commercial interests in Manchuria,
American businessmen were encouraged that this taste of imperialism
foreshadowed more active governmental backing in keeping the China
market open in the North.

Instead of forestalling or diverting a

potential conflict of Russian and American national interests in
Manchuria, the acquisition of the Philippines brought the rivalry
one step closer to reality. 37
In Russia it was also recognized that the American victory
probably presaged a new era in American diplomacy throughout the Pacific.
Novoye Vremya, in acknowledging the now proven naval power of the
United States, thought that Manila Bay would only be the "first
trial of the American fleet."

The newspaper, probably reflecting

the government's own views, went on to examine Russo-American relations
in light of these developments:
We really cannot understand what could induce the government of the American republicans and democrats to break
the century old friendship and alliance which exists
between Russia and the United States or that it would allow
the lightest cloud to darken these relations. It is
impossible that the reason could be the empty question of
the "open door" in Corea or Manchuria. For our opinion
the Americans should not be blinded by such narrow ideas
• • • • The desire of Russia as one of the Asiatic Powers
is much more modest: we only claim that the countries
touching Russia's boundary in Asia not be disputed • • •
the extent of Asia is great enough to satisfy all the
other Powers including the United States • • • • Neither
on this account nor on account of the cession of the
Philippines shall we in any way interfere • • • but we
feel a moral right to claim from the United States a
reciprocation of this kind feeling by not interfering in
Russia's political action in the Far East.38
But the United States had no intention of so reciprocating and leaving
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Russia a free hand in Northeast Asia.

American eyes were turned to

the Pacific as never before and keeping trade open to Manchuria
remained an important consideration.

Having faced down the possibility

of foreign interference in the Philippines and in its new mood of
confident imperialism, America was far readier to meet challenges
to its commercial interests in North China.

One instance of this

feisty mood cropped up in response to reports that Russia had
prevented British investors from constructing a rail line to Newchwang,
Manchuria's principal seaport.

To the New York Times, this was a

premonition of a Manchurian shut-down.

The United States should

stand by Great Britain against the "unjustifiable aggressiveness of
Russia."

According to the Times, the United States should be heard

with more respect since the Battle of Manila and, if necessary, the
American navy should keep Newchwang open. 39
Russia's concern about America's growing militarism had some
validity.

Dewey's victory had been a dramatic demonstration of the

use of seapower as an instrument of national policy.

While the

ultimate disposition of the Philippines was being debated thoroughly,
few doubted that the United States should, as a minimum,
naval base there.

acqu,,ir~ ..

a

Nor were the arguments favoring a trans-Pacific

projection of naval strength limited to Hawaii and the Philippines.
It was also recognized that a base further north would be required,
closer to the center of America's commercial interests.

Admiral Dewey

had not had time in early 1898 to find a suitable port in North
China and, unfortunately for the United States, the spheres of
influence established within the next several months had reduced
their availability drastically.

In October the American consul in
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Chefoo was urging that the United States secure a base along the
North China coast "to protect our interests in North China, by our
own guns, and by our own coal."

A month later the new minister to

Peking, Edwin Conger, recommended that the United States "either by
negotiation or by actual possession" should "own and control at least
one good point from which we can potently assert our rights and
effectively wield our influence."
this problem.

The navy, too, had been considering

The Naval War Board studied the navy's need for coaling

stations worldwide.

Among their findings was the requirement for a

station one thousand miles north of Manila in the Chusan Islands off
the mouth of the Yangtze River.

Commander R. B. Bradford, chief of

the bureau responsible for supplying coal to deployed naval ships,
also thought that "with the recent concessions made by China in the
way of granting territory to other first-class nations, it would
appear that the United States might, with becoming modesty, ask for
one of these islands (the Chusans)."

Intermittently in the past,

individual Americans from Perry to Rockhill had foreseen the need for
an American base along or off the coast of Northeast Asia.

By the

end of 1898 the need was becoming more apparent and being expressed
f rom a

.

var~ety

o f quarters. 40

Once the fighting ceased, the McKinley administration was
better able to view the Far East situation as an interconnected whole.
Another concept which tied Manchuria to the Philippines was the idea
of an open trade policy.

The New York press had early pointed out

that the United States, to be consistent with its demands for equal
trading opportunity in all parts of China, must afford the same
treatment in its own Asiatic possessions.

In this vein the President

first outlined an American concept of a broad open door commercial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

267

policy for his peace commissioners to follow:

"We seek no advantages

in the Orient which are not common to all • • • • Asking only the
open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to
others. 1141
Using Robert Beisner'a concept as a model, 1898 was the year
of the transition of the United States to a new
Northeast Asia.
shape.

diplom~cy

toward

The components of the "new paradigm" began to take

Americans had long believed that the United States would

eventually become the dominant force in the North Pacific.

Now it

appeared as if this was no longer in the indefinite future, but about
to happen.

Americans commenced to see the United States as a first-

class world power with its share of responsibilities to assume in the
Far East, unshackled by the shibboleths of the "old diplomacy."
Events in Northeast Asia assumed a more direct impact and a more
immediate significance.

American exports to Manchuria and elsewhere

in North China became a "vital" concern.

Safeguarding that commerce,

even at the expense of vitiating a traditional friendship, became a
matter of national priority.

All that the new diplomacy lacked in

1898 was a "policy," crafted and planned from Washington, not solely
as a response to outside opinions or individual actions, but as a
carefully considered determinant in controlling events. 42
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CHAPTER IX
CHANGING SIDES

At first glance, the most puzzling of the many questions
raised by the American intervention into China's affairs that resulted
in the first "open door" notes, was why did the United States Government, during the latter half of 1899, suddenly consider it necessary
to engage in this diplomatic venture outside of its hemisphere?
Why this drastic departure from a long-standing policy of governmental
non-involvement at a time when no new, major crisis in China seemed
imminent?

The most recent cessions of Chinese territory, which had

taken place eighteen months previously, had hardly caused a ripple
in the administration.

Since then, minor attempts by Italy and France

to nibble away at the Chinese Empire had easily been turned aside.
The predominant influence of Russia in Manchuria had apparently been
accepted in the United States as an accomplished fact.

American goods

were not only still flowing into Manchuria and North China, but
business with Asiatic Russia was booming as well.

As yet, Russia

had raised no obstacle to commercial equality in the region.

Under

the old diplomatic rules the state department would have let the
situation be.

No initiative would have been taken without being pro-

voked by some immediate, direct cause, and perhaps not even then.
By choosing to champion the open door policy at this time, the United
States was, for a change, attempting to anticipate events and take
271
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the lead.
This change in diplomatic stance was facilitated by the rapid
dissipation in the traditional Russo-American friendship, which had
previously obscured a realistic appraisal of America's prospects in
Northeast Asia.

At the same time, the full extent of the stake that

Americans thought they had forged across the North Pacific and
thought that they should be allowed to lay claim to was not only
being appreciated by a larger segment of the American public, but
in most cases greatly exaggerated.

During the century, the Americans

and the Russians had met in the North Pacific in a multitude of
situations and been able to accommodate each others' ambitions in a
reasonably amicable fashion.

But over the past decade, deeply held

suspicions had accumulated as the United States watched Russia's
unilateral advance into Manchuria.

These suspicions were based

partly on factual diplomatic observation, partly on an extrapolation
of Russia's previous behavior, and partly on conjecture and rumor.
And, beginning during the latter part of 1898, these suspicions were
aired and given widespread credence by a spate of publicity, which
borrowed heavily from the anti-Russian views expressed by English
writers.

Joining in this propaganda campaign were "old China hands,"

academicians, business associations with interests in China, the
New York press and a few members of the administration.

The publicity

ranged from discussions of the very real dangers to American commercial
interests in Northeast Asia to the more extravagant, and perhaps more
irrational, fears that Slavic Russia was intent on the suC'cessive
domination of Asia, the Pacific, and the world.
For their part, the

Ru~sians,

too, were experiencing a growing
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feeling of anti-Americanism. The old friendship was ebbing in the
course of heightened American imperialism.

Russian leaders no doubt

distrusted this new mood and reappraised the aggressiveness of the
Americans, who seemed to be pushing their own interests, at the
expense of Russia, and on the Russian side of the Pacific.

In a

counter-campaign of propaganda, Russian spokesmen attempted to offset
the British influence, to allay American fears, and to persuade the
United States to concentrate its ambitions in its own hemisphere.

1

The backdrop of British and Russian propaganda attempting to
capture the American mind and influence policy was only quasi-official.
Although the arguments did not always emanate directly from either
of the foreign offices, the opinions offered to the American public
coincided closely with the official positions.

The propaganda did

not present any strikingly new information or concepts, but it did
tend to focus American attention more sharply on the potential problems in Northeast Asia.

Materially and ideologically, the arguments,

particularly those of the English writers, struck a responsive chord.
These same ideas had been gathering in America's collective memory,
but now were being expressed comprehensively and with a sense of
urgency.

The debate clarified the issue and narrowed the choice:

either follow Britain's course and try to stem the advance of Russia,
or follow Russia's advice to remain neutral and trust, based on
past friendship, that American interests would not be discriminated
against.
Lord Charles Beresford was one of those prominent in the
development of an American climate of opinion favorable to a
reaffirmation of an "open door" for China.

Under the auspices of
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the British Associated Chambers of Commerce, Beresford travelled
extensively in China commencing in October 1898, inquiring into
commercial matters with British merchants.

Before leaving England,

he discussed his plans with Ambassador Hay, who urged him to talk
with American merchants also.

What Beresford observed alarmed him.

At nearly every stop he found the merchants apprehensive of Russia's
increasingly dominant military position in North China.

Manchuria,

he discovered, was rapidly becoming a Russian province, garrisoned
with Cossacks.

English influence in China was correspondingly

slipping, as the position of the "hostile northern power" improved.
The commercial open door to North China was entirely dependent on
the goodwill of Russia and then, Beresford asked, what would happen
in a few years when the completion of the Siberian railroad closed
Russia's strategic gap?

To counteract this threat to "Anglo-Saxon"

trade, Beresford urged first, Anglo-American collaboration in securing
the integrity of the Chinese Empire against the impending break-up.
Second, he recommended that the "four trading powers"--England,
Germany, Japan and the United States--join together to reorganize
and unify China's

int~rnal

defenses, a move obviously designed to

check Russia's military advance. 2
In February 1899, Beresford toured the United States on his
return trip to England.

He spoke to the Chambers of Commerce in

San Francisco, Chicago and Buffalo, as well as to the American Asiatic
Association in New York.

In Washington he met with President McKinley

and had lunch with Secretary Hay. 3

Everywhere he stressed that the

"open door" was essential to American trade in China.

His trip and

speeches evoked wide interest in the press of other cities and he
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was the recipient of much correspondence on the subject.

His complete

report, Break-up of China, was published in book form soon after his
return and was widely reviewed in the United States.

This was

followed by a special appeal to American readers in an article for
the North American Review, in which Beresford summed up his recommendation for a coalition to guarantee the independence of China--implicitly
against Russian aggression.
his book:

Or, as Beresford put the question in

"Are the great trading nations of the world going to

allow the powers that seek only territorial aggrandizement to
blockade the wealth of China and shut the door in their faces?"
The New York Times, in reviewing Beresford's work, knew precisely
which power the coalition should be directed against:
Has not Russia shut a long line of doors very tight in
the northern street of China? And is she not preparing
for future encroachments? And there is no power on earth
that will prevent future rulers of Russia from possessing
an extensive seaboard on that Pacific Coast which was
once called China.
His solution might not prove to be entirely palatable, but Beresford
had successfully transmitted his sense of urgency to the American
public as well as to key members of the McKinley administration. 4
Archibald Colquhoun, an English engineer, explorer and commercial pioneer, in his widely read and reviewed China in Transformation,
had presented an even gloomier prognosis of the political situation
in China.

In his opinion, England had lost its opportunity to

influence imperial China.

British diplomacy was failing to stem the

Russian advance, which was obeying the law of "sunward and seaward."
He was deeply concerned about the rise of Asiatic Russia, which being
semi-Asiatic, knew how to deal with China and make itself feared.
England only wanted Chinese trade; Russia wanted Chinese provinces.
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Having posed as a protector of China against Western aggression,
Russia would organize Manchuria and advance on Peking and the Yellow
River basin.

Then, utilizing resources of China and with millions

of Chinese to work and to fight for her, Russia was destined to
dominate all of East Asia.
unjust.

To Colquhoun this outcome was patently

Russia did not deserve a place in China because its trade

was insignificant.
were illusory.

Russian promises of "equal trade" in Manchuria

Manchuria, in particular, was too full of valuable

resources, too splendid a country to let fall to Russia.
according to Colquhoun, was a "white man's country.n

Manchuria,

Therefore,

the mercantile, maritime nations must press on China administrative
reforms and a "comprehensive policy of opening the country."

Colqu-

houn called on England, Australia, the United States and Germany to
stop the "new Genghiz."

The "Anglo-Teutonic races" must avoid

domination by the Slav. 5
For his American readers Colquhoun wrote two articles, one
in Harpers and the other for the North American Review.

In these he

emphasized that, commercially and politically, the United States,
as a nation with an enormous stake in the future of the Pacific,
should be deeply concerned about the China question.

Americans would

be hard pressed to sell their cotton and oil in Northeast Asia
without some guarantees of equal treatment, but commercial enterprises must go hand in hand with government policy.

China and the

Far East now lay practically at the back door of America because
of its recent acquisitions in the Pacific.

The United States had

a "great mission" and an opportunity for "national enlargement,"
but must choose between the "sweet words" of Russia or join England
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in the struggle to prevent the Pacific from being turned into a
Russian lake. Colquhoun, also believing that the ultimate question
was the future of the Teutonic race, appealed to the Anglo-American
bonds of race, language, religion and form of government. 6
Colquhoun's dire predictions were echoed in the Outlook:
More important than the development of commerce is the
great issue--ominous of dire results if Russian ambition
is unchecked--whether a crushing autocracy shall, by
military conquest and political intrigue, use the three
hundred hundred and fifty million inhabitants of China
as an instrument to bind Asia to itself and threaten
the world.
The Sewanee Review, noting that Manchuria was rich in valuable minerals
and populated by an industrious people, was concerned that the region
was becoming a "Cossack camp."

The completion of the Siberian rail-

road would further endanger China and the peace of the world.

No

longer, according to this journal, could the United States ignore
events in the distant Far East, which more properly should now be
considered the "Near West. 117
After these opening salvoes, Vladimir Holmstrem and Prince
Ukhtomskij, in a "Plea for Russo-American Understanding," offered a
rebuttal to the English commentators.
at length along two main lines.

They argued the Russian case

Their first plea, renewing an

earlier concept, urged that Russia and America each concentrate its
efforts in its "own half of the globe."
which the United States predominated.

America was a "universe" in
The "absorbing, all-embracing

and determining interest" of Americans should center on their own
continent and foster h2althy "Americanism."

North America should be

emancipated from English influence, casting off the "shackles of
British tutelage."

At the same time, Russia, as an Asiatic power,
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must assume guardianship of the East, because "its consolidation means
our consolidation."

The influence of Asia had been the dominant

factor in the history of Russia--"she crushed us, but has also
regenerated us."

It was now the duty of Russia to develop peacefully

the Asiatic nations along strictly national lines in accordance with
the characteristic individuality of its races.

Only if forced by the

machinations of non-Asiatic nations, would Russia adopt a "policy
of absorbing a nation of four hundred million souls." 8
Too many Americans had played a role in the North Pacific
and in Northeast Asia, over too many decades, and with too many
expectations to retreat now to the North American continent.

From

fur traders to whalers, from Commodore Perry to Secretary Seward,
from Perry Collins to William Gilpin, from railroad entrepreneurs
to cotton sheeting exporters--the vision of an American North Pacific
economic empire had persisted and grown.

One terminus of this

empire was conceived as being firmly planted in Northeast Asia.

For

many the "Far East" had, in reality, become the "Near West."
Americans were not surprised to meet an expanding Russia on the
Asiatic side.

That had long been foretold.

The only question was

whether the meeting would result in confrontation or cooperation.
And the former was seeming more likely, for Holmstrem's veiled
threat to absorb all of China accorded more and more with the idea
which many Americans held was the true, underlying purpose of Russia
in Asia and that the first step was nearing completion in Manchuria.
Realizing, at this juncture, the improbability of the United
States completely abandoning its interests in Northeast Asia and
confining its attention to the Western Hemisphere, Holmstrem developed
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a second plea.

The United States and Russia should cooperate in

supporting the independence and integrity of China.

The presence

of Russia in Asia, it was claimed, was the only factor inhibiting
English aggression against China.
only an English subterfuge.

The cry for an "open door" was

If the United States joined in any

anti-Russian combine, it would only lead to the immediate dismemberment of China.

Instead, Holmstrem argued that the destinies of

Russia and the United States in the Far East were interwoven and
drawn together by "invisible ties of friendship and goodwill."
Only one condition was necessary for continuing this fine relationship:
America "must come over to our (Russian) side and accept the Eastern
conception," as opposed to the concept of imposing Western, revolu9
.
·
ch·Lna.
tLonary
re f orms Ln

Among those who sympathized with this Russian view was
Andrew Carnegie, a fervent anti-imperialist, who believed that the
United States should not hold onto the Philippines and certainly
should not enter a contest for further possessions.

Carnegie was

afraid that a war in the Far East was in the offing, but thought
that the United States was too ill-prepared militarily to engage in
a major power struggle.

He did not want America to be at the mercy

of stronger nations or the "catspaw" of England.

Carnegie had no

illusions about Russian intentions in Northeast Asia, but Russia
had always been the "friend of the United States."

Besides, the

Russian expansion was "legitimate, because it is over coterminous
territory, which Russia can absorb and Russianize."

Of those who

rushed to print in the 1899 debate over the Far East question,
Carnegie was one of the few who still evoked the memory of Russian
friendship. 10
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The Reverend Gilbert Reid was another who did not consider
Russia an aggressor in Manchuria.

Reid had been attempting to

establish an International Institute of China in Peking, ever since
1898.

During the course of his work he became well acquainted with

Prince Ukhtomskij, who praised Reid's educational mission, comparing
it favorably in a number of editorials as the antithesis of the normal
crass materialism of the other Americans in China.

In turn, Reid

thought that Russia's intentions toward China were entirely friendly
and peaceful.

Russia had not, in Reid's opinion, yet possessed

Manchuria and the area was still open to foreign trade.

Only if

the other nations began the dismemberment of China would Russia be
prepared to seize Mongolia and Manchuria.

11

American missionaries in China and those that had returned
home were an important factor in keeping public interest in the
China situation at a high

~itch.

As a group, the missionaries were

deeply concerned about keeping China open to Western civilization and
American commerce, so they generally welcomed state department initiatives along these lines.

Whether they yet recognized, by 1899, any

threat posed by Russia's advance into Manchuria is problematical.
Manchuria was not in the American sphere of missionary endeavor and
may not have held

th~

same degree of significance for them as it

held for American merchants. 12
Through the lengthy Holstrem-Ukhtomskij plea the administration
no doubt gained a clearer understanding of Russian objectives, but
in return, no long-term guarantees were vouchsafed that American
trade would continue to enjoy equal opportunity within the Russian
sphere.

Significantly, no further commercial enticement was dangled
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before the American businessman to sway his opinion, as had been
tried in the past.

Russia's plea

for understanding failed to con-

vince the New York Sun
that Russia does not contemplate the acquisition of all
that part of China which lies north of the Yangtse basin
and of the section of Shantung claimed by the Germans;
that is to say, the part of the Celestial Empire to which
most of our trade is, at present, confined. Neither does
he (Holmstrem) give us reasons for believing that, after
Manchuria, Liaotung and Chih-li and the rest of Northern
China have been absorbed by Russia, which is wedded to a
protective policy, American products will have as free
access to that vast region as they have today.l3
Nor was the New York Times persuaded.

Holmstrem's article was dis-

missed as a plea for an "Anglo-American misunderstanding."

It saw

no basis for an understanding between an Asiatic despotism and a
Western Republic, whereas the Anglo-American understanding was a
reality.

The United States no longer needed to "take sentimentally

and at least passively the Russian side."

The plea to "hate England

• because Russia hates her" proved no longer to be an effective
appea1. 14
The Russian ambassador to the United States, Count Cassini,
having been briefed along lines similar to the Holmstrem plea, tried
valiantly to stem the tide of hostility which he saw in the American
press.

In one interview he explicitly declared that Russian policy

did not conflict with the interests of the United States in China.
It was not the purpose of the Russian Government to annex Chinese
territory.
China. 11

In his opinion, there would be "no real par1:ition nf

In another interview Cassini did hi.s best to ccmnteract the

arguments of Lord Beresford, emphasizing once Qore that the door to
China was not shut.

According to Henry Adams, Com.<t Gassini "let

few days pass without appealing through the press to the public."
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The New York Times thought that "the very able representative of
Russia to Washington" was doing too good of a job and "was able to
befog the minds that were never clear upon the question (open door)."
In his endeavors Cassini was reportedly aided by certain American
newspapers which had "actually been subsidized from the secret
service fund at the disposal of the Russian Embassy, so difficult
was it to explain their utterances on any other hypothesis."

While

Cassini had prevented the "administration from perceiving and
pursuing our National interests in the East" previously, Secretary
Hay, it was hoped, would not be duped by the "cleverness of a Russian
Ambassador. nlS
The countrymen of both Russia and England were assiduously
courting the favor and support of American public opinion on the
open door question.

Soon after the publication of the Ukhtomskij-

Holmstrem article, two English re-rebuttals appeared, one in the
North American Review by Archibald Little, an English author who
had travelled extensively in China, and the other in the Forum by
A. Maurice Low, an English journalist writing on American affairs.
Aside from a rehash of previous arguments, Little elaborated on
one point which had only been touched on by Beresford.

He stressed

the importance of the treaty port of Newchwang as the major entry point
for American exports to Manchuria.

Also, he reviewed England's

unsuccessful negotiations with Russia concerning rail concessions
in North China.

Russia had refused to promise not to discriminate

against non-Russian merchandise, thus raising the spectre of American
products being subject to premium transportation rates, while competing
Russian goods would have their transportation costs subsidized.
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took another tack.

He began the process of debunking the historical

myths which had been used previously to underpin the traditions of
Russo-American friendship.

He summed up by reiterating the proposi-

tion that the United States must choose between the way of Russia
or the way of England, between the "militarism of the Slav" or the
"freedom of the Saxon."

16

In this broader dimension the debate began to assume geopolitical, ideological and even racist overtones which had been latent
in American thinking since mid-century, and which were now being
revived and expanded upon by American writers.
that Russia

~·Jas

The growing concern

bent on the military domination of China which would,

in turn, lead to the control of the Pacific, all of Asia and then
the world took two general forms.
question was posed:

Most frequently, the explicit

"Which shall dominate--Saxon or Slav?"

David

Mills, the Canadian Minister of Justice, raised exactly this issue
in the North American Review.

He predicted that, as a natural con-

sequence of the commerce of Asia falling to Russia, it would then be
the dominant sea power and the "Pacific Ocean would be a Russian Lake."
Unless the United States joined the Anglo-Saxon community in stopping
the ascendancy of Russia, the "leadership of the Saxon would be
at an end and that of the Slav would begin."

George Burton Adams,

a professor and historian, writing in the Atlantic Monthly was more
optimistic about the prospects for Anglo-Saxon expansion.

He saw

the nineteenth century as only an "age of preliminary and introductory
expansion" preparing the way for vaster expansion in the twentieth.
But this would only be accomplished if the whole Anglo-Saxon race
were brought into line on a common policy and shared common burdens.
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Gardiner Hubbard, founder and first president of the National
Geographic Society, thought that the destiny of Asia was most
intimately connected with Russia and that Russia would "become the
leading nation of the Orient," but voiced no particular alarm at
the prospecta

On the ether hand, James K. Hosmer, minister and

historian, believed that the Anglo-Saxon fraternity must inevitably
confront Russia.

He thought the world faced two alternatives:

the reduction of the human race to vassalage under a "Czar installed
in the position of dictator," or the development of the human race
with "Anglo-Saxon freedom." 18
Frederick Wells Williams, son of Commodore Perry's interpreter
and a prominent Orientalist in his own right at Yale, also viewed
the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon as competitors for control of the world:
These are the only races whose territories and consequently
whose potential strength in population and material resources,
are adequate to the stupendous task, whose subjects are
colonizers in the true sense that comprises both the
peopling of vast spaces and the assimilation and subjection
of foreigners to their institutions. These great rivals
have already been long at work, each in characteristic fashion,
fulfilling • • • their manifest destiny, each a participator
in the conquest of Asia •
• Behind one or the other must
sooner or later be ranged all the potential forces of the
world.
The contest, which according to Williams had already begun, allowed "no
alternative between victory on the one side and destruction on the
other." 19
Andrew Raymond, President of Union College, saw the prominence
that Russia had gained in the affairs of China as the "greatest danger
that threatens."

For him, the heart of the Far East question was

whether Anglo-Saxon or the inferior Russian civilization would prevail
in China.

Russian ambitions were unquestioned.

Unless checked, that
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nation would absorb more and more of China.

Such an extension of power

by the Slav would become a "serious menace to the rest of the
civilized world."

To prevent this from occurring, Raymond advocated

that England and America work together through diplomatic means
and the presence of naval and military force to preserve the integrity
of China.

20

The concern about Russian world domination took a second,
related form.

In this, the semi-Asiatic nature of Russia was stressed.

The point of this argument was that Russia had demonstrated a great
capability for assimilating people.

If Russia should arm and train

the legions of Central Asia and North China, history might repeat.
For as Williams noted, it was here that have been "bred in the past
the

races which overran and dominated the civilized West and where

these swarms were once raised other millions may spring in the
future to obey the call of the conqueror and spread devastation
among those more cultured but less lusty people who represent our
race." 21

Theodore Roosevelt had much the same thought, suggested

first by his friend Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, a British diplomat:
Indeed, Russia is a problem very appalling • • • •
Russia seems bound to developing her own way, and on
lines that run counter to what we are accustomed to
consider as progress. If she ever does take possession
of Northern China and drill the Northern Chinese to
serve in her Army, she will indeed be a formidable
power • • • • The growth of the great Russian state in
Siberia is portentious.22
This growing concern for the strategic necessities in the
Pacific stemmed, in part at least, from the increasingly prevalent
view that the United States was now a world power and that certain
responsibilities accrued to this new status, especially in Asia.
The United States, the one major power which had not seized Chinese
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territory was looked upon as the "arbiter" of China's future.

If

China were to be saved from breaking up, it depended on America.
England had proved incapable of stemming the Russian menace alone.
Now it was up to the United States somehow to take the lead to
preserve and reform the ancient civilization.

The first necessity

was to sustain and press for an open door policy for China.

According

to the New York Times:
Since it (open door) tends strongly to promote not only
the prosperity of the American people but of the world, and
general peace, it is clearly our duty to maintain it with
all the resources at ou~ command. It is the true mission
that we have to carry out as a "world power."
The Nation agreed that interest and honor both prompt such a course.
Again, the Times called upon:
Americans to organize her vast resources during the next
four years when the trans-Siberian will be finished • • • •
American individuals and American capital can put strength
into the inert mass without involving our Government in
the least. Let us pursue our way without alliances and
see whether the Great Democracy cannot win the prize from
the Great Despotism by raising the Chinese to higher levels
without asking them for an acre of land.23
The idea of the "Great Democracy" competing with the "Great
Despotism" for the sway in Asia harked back to a long tradition.

Which

would prevail--"plowshares" or "swords;" "freedom" or "servitude?"
Could American reliance on the "unguided exertions and common-senses
of the citizens" offset the authority of a society centered in a
single arm?

Alexis De Tocqueville had asked these questions as early

as 1835 when he observed:
There are, at present time, two great nations in the
world which seem to tend towards the same end, although
they started from different points • • • • Their startingpoint is different, and their courses are not the same; yet
each of them seems to be marked out b2 the will of Heaven to
sway the destinies of half the globe. 4
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De Tocqueville's oft-quoted prophecy remained a portion of the intellectual legacy of both Russians and Americans and was still being cited
during the 1899 debates.
The idea that America

and Russia would contend for supremacy

was, at the end of the century, being expressed more frequently and
vociferously, less encumbered by constraints of friendship.

Moreover,

the drumbeat of warnings strongly suggested that the United States,
as a young, increasingly powerful partner in the Anglo-Saxon community,
must take the lead, and soon.

Many of the concepts of manifest destiny,

which had provided the rationale for American expansion across a
continent and into the distant Pacific, were viewed as having equal
applicability to Northeast Asia--perhaps not by outright, blatant
territorial acquisition, but certainly through economic development,
political guidance, and the civilizing influence of Christianity.

In

1899 one needed only to renew the precepts trumpeted by Strong, Fiske,
Mahan, Turner and Burgess to accept the responsibility for the salvation of China.
Manchuria.

A new frontier beckoned in Siberia, as well as in

Henry Adams had earlier conceived of the notion for the

Americanization of Siberia.

Now with the increasing trade with

Asiatic Russia there began a resurgence of interest in the region
that Collins had first travelled.

Within a few years, a number of

articles, books and travel accounts would focus on Siberia.

The

Harper's Weekly visualized "Siberia as a field for Americans" urging
American youth to "Go West, young man, go West to the Far East."
Vladivostok was depicted as the "doorway of American interests in
northern A.s ia. n 25
A scattering of Americans had long predicted that the North
Pacific would become an avenue of foremost strategic importance to
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the United States.
heightened.

By the end of the century, this perception had

Trans-continental railroads had reached the Pacific

west coast and soon Asia would be spanned by rail.

The Pacific states

were rapidly increasing in population and the same phenomenom was
occurring in Northeast Asia.

Men like John Proctor, head of the

U. S. Civil Service Commission, and John Barret, former minister to
Siam, revived the forecast of Seward fifty years earlier that the
placid Pacific would soon supplant the Atlantic as the "theatre of
stirring events."
being occupied.

The time was at hand when points of advantage were
If the United States were to assume its rightful

position as the "paramount power in the Pacific," it must take
cognizance of this threat.

Any occupation of the Chinese Empire

by Russia would be "dangerous to the peace and safety" of the United
States.

The development of Russia into a great naval power would

introduce a "disturbing factor" into the Pacific Ocean.

If necessary,

Barret thought it advisable to "secure a port in northern China."
Mahan saw Russia's "aggressive advance moving over the inert Asiatics
like a steam-roller."

To him, only the prospect of America and England,

side by side, demanding that China be left open for trade, would
cause Russia either to change her policy or go to war.26
Paul Reinsch, political scientist at the University of Wisconsin,
assessed the great importance of the Pacific as a highway of commerce
in glowing terms:
More than half the population of the globe lives in countries
approachable by the Pacific. The resources of this portion
by far exceed those of the older parts of the world, so that
the commercial and industrial possibilities are of a dazzling
nature. To no country is this change more important than
to the United States, because, of all civilized nations, we
are nearest to China. Even Russia, although connected with
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China by railroad, is, for commercial purposes, much
farther off than the United States.
Similarly, in summarizing the history of America in the Pacific, William
Eliiot Griffis, educator and clergyman, traced the movement of American
pioneers into the great ocean over the past century and predicted
that the main body of the American people had now joined up with the
advance guard and were preparing for further national development and
new

.

enterpr~ses.

27

Charles Conant, prominent New York banker, likewise pictured
Americans as the "children of the Anglo-Saxon race," embarking, for
the purposes of self-preservation and survival, on the path of
imperialism.

But Conant's imperialism had an economic basis.

He

called for energetic political action to keep the markets of China
open to American commerce.

In an analysis of Russia as a world

power, he warned that Russia was organizing the machinery of its
economic system such as to make it an "early and dangerous rival"
in the

"competition for political and commercial supremacy."

Specifically, he observed that, while Russia had always been a grain
producing rival, it had also become a serious competitor as an exporter
of petroleum.

He also predicted that the completion of the Siberian

railroad would shift the centers of trade away from the existing ports
and create new centers in the heart of Asia around which would gather
civilization.

From this heartland Russia, in a generation, would be

the great competitor of the Anglo-Saxon race for the commercial and
military supremacy of the world.28
Brooks Adams synthesized these various attitudes of imperialism,
racism and militarism and added in a mixture of his own perspective of
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historical processes and his own analysis of economic forces.

All of

this was tempered by ideas and critical comments from his brother
Henry.

Previously discouraged about the course of civilization,

Brooks was stimulated by the American successes in the war with
Spain into believing that vigorous national action could reverse the
"law of decay."

In two articles, Brooks presented his arguments for

an Anglo-Saxon coalition, under the leadership of the United States,
to form a great empire extending over a goodly part of Asia.

He

believed that the economic center of the world had already moved
across the Atlantic and that within two generations, American interests
would center on the Pacific, which it would cover like an inland sea. 29
Shading Brooks' optimism was the real and clear danger of
Russia thwarting these plans.

He, too, was worried that Russia

intended to reverse the flow of the China trade away from the maritime
powers.

But American expansion depended on an available market for

its surplus products, which only China had the boundless capacity to
absorb.

Manchuria was already in Russian hands and all of North

China was threatened.

Should these natural outlets for American

trade be closed, Brooks thought that American society would be shaken
to its foundations.

He was also worried about Russia's seemingly

limitless capacity to assimilate adjacent populations.

In the case

of China, this would permit Russia to concentrate powerful economic
forces, based on the abundance of natural resources and a mass of
inexpensive labor.
to grasp.

East Asia was a prize awaiting an energetic nation

To Brooks, the struggle for survival of the two competing

systems--the Anglo-Saxon maritime coalition and the Russian-led continental system--seemed imminent.

He saw the inevitable conflict
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breaking out on the "shore of the Yellow Sea."

In his view the

United States must compete for this iiseat of empire" and it was his
duty to bring this message home to the American public and their
leaders in Washington.30
It is difficult to measure how seriously these various public
expressions of the coming global confrontation between the Anglo-Saxon
and the Slav, American and Russian, were taken by the McKinley administration.

In the face of dealing with a real-life Philippine insurrection,

they probably seemed somewhat exaggerated and futuristic.

Nevertheless,

the repeated airing of these concerns about Russia dominating Asia
and the Pacific probably provided additional incentive for the
solving of the most immediate problem, safeguarding American commercial
interests from Russian encroachment.

We can be positive that Henry

Adams, intimate friend and adviser to John Hay, seriously believed
that the future portended a struggle between the two world powers,
Russia and America.
Though far more cautious and less an avowed imperialist than
his brother, Henry did provide a conduit for Brooks' ideas.

Henry's

own approach to Asia was far less simplistic.

He thoroughly agreed

as to the importance of Asia and the Pacific.

But while he believed

that American interests would inevitably move eastward, he could not
help seeing the difficulties.

He drew back from his earlier predictions

concerning the Americanization of Siberia, perhaps in light of Russia's
recent demonstration of might in Manchuria.

For a time Henry thought

Germany might be submerged into the Russian Empire as a province.
Together, the two nations would then represent too large a mass, too
central a position, and an unassailable opponent for the United States
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whose geography stopped at the oceans.

But all this wavering took

place before the Spanish-American War. 31
When Hay was summoned from London to Washington to become
secretary of state, Adams followed shortly thereafter in response to
Hay's request for Adams to be an associate in his new responsibilities.
Hay's experience and background suited him for his new position admirably,
except for his lack of any first-hand knowledge of Asian affairs.
Hay probably thought that Adams could be of assistance in Washington
in dealing with problems arising in that sensitive region.

Adams

had travelled in the Pacific area, and though he had intended his
trip to include China, he never reached there.

But he had studied

and read about China under the tutelage of Rockhill in preparation
for the journey.

William W. Rockhill, then serving in Athens, did

have the requisite China experience, so Adams urged that he be returned
to Washington to bolster a "very weak" state department staff.

As

for himself, Adams concluded that:
Hay will greatly need some man who can take real
responsibility. Even Rockhill is not quite strong
enough for that. Hay needs an alter or double; some-body like me • • •• 32
Adams was to be disappointed.
own staff.

Hay had no power to select his

A position was eventually secured for Rockhill in Washing-

ton as the Director of the Bureau of American Republics, from which
he could also serve as a Far East consultant.

Adams was forced to

remain in ..:he background in his familiar role as a "stable companion
of statesmen."

Although Adams modestly disclaimed any influence on

Hay's foreign policy, he had ample opportunity to share his views with
his inseparable friend.

The two lived in adjoining houses in Washing-

ton and it was their practice to take an hour's stroll together each
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afternoon discussing the "day's work at home and abroad."

This

interlude lasted from November 1898 until the end of March 1899.
Adams then departed once more for Europe, months before the open door
notes were actually being drafted, yet he was present during a
period when Manchuria's fate was much discussed.

Not being privy

to the Adams-Hay conversations on the subject, one can only glean
Adams' input from his views expressed in earlier and contemporary
correspondence.33
Adams habitually gave vent to wide-ranging geopolitical views,
alternating between extreme confidence and deepest pessimism in his
world view.

Of all the world powers he remained "more immediately

curious about Russia."
secret of Russia.

He never claimed to fully understand the

Following Russia's successful intervention at the

close of the Sino-Japanese War, Adams made a new assessment of Russian
power.

To him, Russia then appeared as a "great new element" which

had just given a "prodigious example of her energy in the East."
At that time, Adams considered that the United States itself was at
the "end of our rapid expansion" and would henceforth be forced to
face more "favorably situated competitors."

His field of vision

extended into Asia, but there he saw Russian "omnipotence" which he
feared greatly.

To Adams, Russia was the "great disintegrator" and

the chief cause for the "political perturbations in the world."

He

alternated from a belief that Russia could sweep both England and
America "out of her path without a squeal" to a hope that the Russian
advance in Asia would "throw England into our arms, and make things
easier for us." 34
By early 1898, Adams noted to Hay with satisfaction, prematurely
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it turned out, that "Russia had been obliged to drop her plunder in
the East, and to let herself be corked up on the Amur."

Adams regained

more confidence in America's capabilities with the naval victories in
the Pacific.

For the future, Adams repeatedly forecast two centers

of power in the world, an American center, offset by a Russian center
forming across Asia.

By February 1899, he was predicting:

There are two future centres of power; and of the two,
America must get there first. Some day, perhaps a
century hence, Russia may swallow even her; but for my
lifetime I think I'm safe.
With returning confidence he could predict, before he left Washington,
an advance by the United States toward the Orient:
The country is big, and our energies are vast, and,
sooner or later, to the East we must jo, for a situation
is always stronger than a man's will. 5
It is not difficult to imagine that this was the thought that Adams
left behind with his friend Hay.
The Anglo-Russian debate would have been of little moment
had it not reflected a topic much on America's mind.

The articles

favoring each side of the controversy and the furor they were creating
were very familiar to the framers of the open door notes.

While still

ambassador, Hay had already heard the official English position and
was entirely sympathetic to it.

The debate also served the purpose

of marshalling the opinion of the American business community to which
the Administration also was listening closely.

While the actual

amount of trade with China had not increased substantially over
previous years, the American estimation of their current and future
economic stake in the region had increased tremendously by 1899.

Much

of the heightened interest was created by the American Asiatic Association.

The association had among its officers and honorary members
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men such as Everett Frazer, Clarence Cary, Edwin Conger, Charles
Denby and John Barrett, all knowledgeable concerning conditions in
China.

A large number of financial, trading and industrial companies,

principally from the northeastern states, were listed as members by
May 1899.

The association also had established connections with a

number of Chambers of Commerce and was attempting to set up branch
offices around the country and in the Far East.

Of particular signifi-

cance, the association had its own journal and an energetic publicist,
John Foord.

Through this journal, the reprint of articles, speeches

and the minutes of meetings provided an effective sounding board to
cover Asiatic political and economic affairs.

The association used

all its means to focus attention on America's national interests in
Northeast Asia.

The association also had sufficient political in-

fluence to gain direct access to administration and congressional
leaders.
Another influential pressure group consisted of all those who
manufactured and exported cotton textiles to Northeast Asia.

Within

this group the manufacturers in the South were rapidly acquiring
the greatest share of exports.

Between 1889 and 1899, the number of

spindles in the South increased over 190 percent and consumption of
cotton in southern mills over 206 percent (compared to 11 and 29 percent in the North and 71 and 88 percent in India, which showed the
second largest growth).

Since most of this increase was directly

attributable to increased shipments to Northeast Asia during those
ten years, the South could justly claim a vital interest in the open
door policy there.

Overwhelmingly. the cotton manufacturer in the

South joined the northern industrialist in being concerned that they
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continue to receive fair and equal treatment.

The only foreseeable

threat to their prosperity came from Russia's possible future moves
against them.

As D. A. Tompkins, a southern mill owner expressed it:

Unless we soon take steps to maintain permanently our trade
in Manchuria or other Chinese States, we shall see the day
when that trade will be annihilated. The time is rapidly
coming, unless there is a change of policy, when Russia will
be strong enough to show us the door out of Manchuria,
instead of keeping the door open.36
As the opening of their campaign to safeguard their interests,
the Pepperell Manufacturing Company and numerous other prominent
cotton manufacturers and merchants sent a petition to the state
department in January 1899, pointing out the "danger of being shut
out from the markets of that portion of Northern China which is
already occupied or threatened by Russia."

Unlike the lack of official

reaction that the petition might have provoked in years past, the
department was quick to examine the situation on behalf of persons
of such "high character and standing."

Conger in Peking and Tower

in St. Petersburg were directed to give serious attention to the
subject.

Interestingly, the directions to Tower included Siberia as

well as Manchuria as an area of concern.
his answers were far from reassuring.

When Muravev was queried,

His replies were generally

evasive, claiming that Russian policy had not yet been completely
formulated.

Besides, Witte, the minister of finance, had the prime

responsibility.

Muravev did tell Peirce that "due profits on the

railway lines would be exacted."

Peirce also related that Witte

had previously pronounced a policy to him of "absolute protection of
Russian industries to the point of a prohibitive tariff, whenever
the conditions will permit."

Peirce's report back contained no more

specific Russian guarantees of an open door for the future than
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Hitchcock had received a year earlier.

This did not end the matter.

The administration had been alerted to a situation of prime importance.
To Peirce's report the First Assistant Secretary, Alvey Adee appended
the following note:
Ambassador Tower will continue to w~tch this matter which
has from the outset of the recent move of various foreign
powers to gain a foothold in China had the President's most
serious consideration. Mr. Tower will be expected to use
every opportunity to act energetically in the sense desired
by the numerous and influential signers of the petition.37
The public debate concerning what America's course of action
should be in Northeast Asia served several purposes.

It concentrated

attention on Russia as the primary obstacle to American interests in
the region.

It blunted any criticism that the McKinley administration

might expect from joining in an open door cause already espoused by
its former nemesis, Great Britain.

It coalesced business groups into

bringing additional pressure to bear on a Republican administration
already sensitive and sympathetic to their cause.

All of which tended

to overcome previous caution and permitted a departure in policy to
be contemplated.

To John Hay and his associates, the future of

American interests in Northeast Asia augured so poorly that it seemed
necessary to make some unprecedented move to forestall Russia.

The

United States was ready to change sides, away from Russia and toward
Great Britain.
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CHAPTER X
CLOSING THE DOOR ON A FRIENDSHIP

Although the United States had previously evinced interest in
the entire Northeastern Asia, including Siberia, the provinces of
North China, and to a lesser extent Korea, by 1899 Manchuria had
become the center of attention.

It was in Manchuria that Americans

considered the open door most thteatened.

And the key to Manchuria,

from the American standpoint, was the treaty port of Newchwang.

If

Newchwang could be kept open, the mercantile, maritime nations had an
alternative to the Russian transportation system for the distribution
of their merchandise and a means to assert their influence inland.
A system of native transshipment of goods inland by water and land
had long been used effectively.

Russia was awake to competition to

its Manchurian enterprises from this quarter and that is why Russia
had vigorously opposed any nnn-Russian rail terminal there.
Manchuria-watchers, then, looked closely at developments in
Newchwang for clues to Russia's intentions.

Unfortunately, the United

States had no consul of its own as yet stationed at Newchwang for
direct observation and reports.

Secretary Hay had, in view of the

now recognizable importance af the port, asked Congress for authority
to fill such a post.

Meanwhile, the state department kept abreast of

events there through reports from the other consuls in North China,
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particularly the one at Chefoo, nearest to the scene, and from
newspaper accounts published in China.

This mixture of fact and

fancy must have given Hay and his advisers cause for more concern.
A grim picture was painted.
Already by 1899, Russia was remorselessly and surely strengthening its grip on Manchuria and proceeding with the Russification of
the province.

Thousands of Russian Cossacks and railroad guards were

stationed throughout the region, many at locations where the railroads
were not yet planned.

The Russo-Chinese Bank was establishing

branches throughout Manchuria in order to control financially all
enterprises in the interest of the Russian Empire.

Agricultural

and mineral resources were being exploited for the sole benefit of
Russia.

Land was being acquired, by force, at artificially low rates.

The Russian language and currency were more and more frequently used
by the Chinese inhabitants.
Chinese customs were ignored.

Russia had virtually occupied Newchwang.
At Newchwang the Russians paid not

the "slightest attention to the Chinese government, nor do they pay
duties to that government on the millions of dollars worth of stores
and materials which they are now landing."

During a November 1898

visit to Port Arthur, Consul Fowler was impressed by the urgent
preparations the

Russians were making.

He came away convinced that

in a short time all of China north of Chefoo, including the port of
Newchwang would be annexed outright by Russia.

1

To Fowler, the United States, like it or not, was inextricably
involved in Asiatic politics and must decide whether "to be respected
or annihilated commercially, as well as politically."

In order to

protect American interests in North China "by our own guns, and by
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our own coal," he recommended again the acquisition of a nearby
coaling
group.

station.

The most feasible base was in the Miao-tao island

These islands were strategically located in the middle of

the narrow strait guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Chihli,
approximately half-way between Chefoo on the Shantung peninsula and
Port Arthur on the Liaotung.

Steamers belonging to the Russo-Chinese

railroad were already making regular runs between the two ports.
Then Fowler received word, probably exaggerated, but nevertheless
disturbing, that Russia claimed the Miao Tao island group as part of
its Southern Manchurian cession.

In addition, Russia planned to

construct its own port facilities at Chefoo.

Such a Russian presence

at this choke-point could, in time of conflict, conceivably deny the
maritime powers access to both Newchwang and Taku, the port for Tientsin
and Peking. 2
By mid-1899 most observers probably agreed with John Foard
of the American Asiatic Association that the North China market "was
threatened by the virtual supremacy of Russia in Manchuria and the
Liaotung peninsula and the consequent danger that the treaty port of
Newchwang
empire."

• might at any time be declared a part of the Russian
The American Consul-General in Shanghai agreed:

Our trade in China is now most largely with the Northern
part which today is almost in Russia's grasp. Our interest
is great but the emergency is so pressing that only the
promptest and most effective measures can safeguard our
interests.
The question had become, not would Russia take unequal advantage of
commercial opportunities in Manchuria, but when would they shut the
door.

Most estimated that Russia would wait no longer than the com-

pletion of the Siberian-Manchurian rail system, scheduled for
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completion no later than 1903. 3
The pressure for the United States to take a more active role
in Northeast Asia intensified when it was learned that England intended
to retrench.

England, having been unsuccessful in single-handedly

preventing the cession of Southern Manchuria to Russia, was, by mid1898, prepared to negotiate a settlement with Russia to prevent any
further advance of Russia southward toward the region of England's
paramount interest, the Yangtse basin.

For its part, the Russian

foreign office was anxious for a breathing spell in order to consolidate its gains.

The negotiations, which were conducted on-and-off

for nine months, were capped by a bilateral agreement in April 1899.
The principal area of contention centered on railway construction.
Each nation had plans which included building within the other's
loosely defined sphere of influence.

An English syndicate was ready

to finance a Chinese rail line running from Shanhaikuan
and thence on to Mukden.

to Newchwang

This railroad would have furnished severe

competition to Russia's Southern Manchurian system.

At the same time,

Russia was intervening in the Yangtse basin by its backing of a
Belgian syndicate's efforts to construct the Peking-Hankow railroad.
The main provision of the Anglo-Russian agreement called for each
to recognize the railroad sphere of the other with a line of demarcation variously interpreted as being drawn through the Great Wall or
through Peking.4
This Anglo-Russian agreement had a great impact on American
diplomatic planning.

The United States, as the New York Times was

want to point out, had missed the opportunity in early 1898 to side
with England to prevent cessions of Chinese territory.

From now

on, the English government was making its best deal to protect its
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own interests.

The United States would have to face alone the con-

sequences of a hardening sphere of Russian influence in Manchuria and
Mongolia.

The understanding also highlighted the vulnerability of

Newchwang as a point of entry for American goods.

The only likely

rail service to the port would be a Russian spur line, subject to
discriminatory rates.

More ominous was the complete refusal of Russia

to agree to an English proposal calling on both powers to forego
preferential tariffs and rates on railroads in their respective
spheres.

Witte had vetoed this proposal, for it would have had the

effect of establishing an open door policy in Manchuria, which would
have seriously hampered Witte's plans for the commercial and industrial

exploita~ion of the province. 5
To the New York Times, the announced agreement marked the
final abandonment by England of the struggle for an open door in
China:

"Russia will of course erect barriers in Manchuria against

the entry from the sea of commerce upon equal terms" and the "one
port (Newshwang) in which we have found our chief market for manufactures is within the Russian sphere of influence."

In this respect,

the government had not "adequately perceived or protected the National
interests." 6

Henceforth, the United States must look to its own

resources to keep the door open to Manchuria.
The consensus reaching the state department from these various
sources was:

(1) Russia had, or would soon attain, a dominant position

in the region of Manchuria and possibly extending into Northern China
proper; (2) Russia would soon disregard assurances otherwise and
discriminate against American trade with the region; (3) The United
States should lead a coalition of maritime powers to prevent this from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

306
happening; and (4) time was short.

This sense of urgency was rapidly

eroding the administration's policy of "watchful waiting."

Although

Hay personally favored joint Anglo-American action and had pressed
such a course from his London post, he fully realized that, despite
the growing understanding between the two nations, no formal alliance
could possibly receive the necessary approval of Congress and the
public.

Besides, the British were drifting toward war with the Boers

by the middle of 1899 and, having come to an accommodation with
Russia, were liable to be too preoccupied in Southern Africa to give
•

t h e F ar East t h e~r

.

pr~me

.

attent~on.

7

Most of the other options available to Hay were equally
unattractive.

To do nothing was tantamount to permitting Russia full

sway in its ambitions.

To threaten the use of•force would have been

recognized immediately as a bluff.

To make the best of any partition

by preparing to grab a portion of China for the United States held
little interest for Hay, but had some tentative adherents.

Minister

Conger had laid out a possible strategy for the United States:
If it wishes to be a party to the division and sharer in
the assets, then it is necessary that the place be selected
and its cession or lease demanded at once; even now it may
be too late • • • • There is practically nothing left for
the United States but the province of Chihli. This,
however, with Tientsin as the entrepot for all northern
China, is destined in the future to be commercially one
of the most valuable permanent possessions in the Orient
• • • if all China is to fall into the hands of European
powers, a strong foothold here by the United States, with
something tangible to offer them, might compel them to
keep permanently open doors for our commerce.
President McKinley may have entertained some such idea himself.

8

Some of the dimensions of Hay's dilemma were outlined by him
to the editor of the New York Sun, who had inquired:

"Is it impossible

for the government to exert some influence against China's partition?
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Has that gone too far?"

To which Hay replied in a private letter:

We are, of course, opposed to the dismemberment of that
Empire, and we do not think that the public opinion of
the United States would justify this Government in taking
part in the great game of spoliation now going on. At
the same time we are keenly alive to the importance of
safeguarding our great commercial interests in that
Empire • • • • We do not consider our hands tied for
future eventualities, but for the present we think our
best policy is one of vigilant protection of our commercial
interests, without formal alliances with the other Powers
interested.9
One recourse, which might have proved fruitful, had it been
pursued vigorously, was direct bilateral negotiations with Russia to
obtain the long-term guarantees that Americans sought in Northeast
Asia.

American diplomats in St. Petersburg had, from time to time,

questioned the Russian foreign ministry as to their intentions in
Manchuria and been turned aside with vague, not completely satisfactory,
assurances.

But no serious talks were held.

Toward the end of 1898

and early into 1899, the United States had an opportunity to reopen
with Russia the old prospects for joint economic development of
Northeast Asia.

Since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia's

extraordinary railway expenditures in the Far East had amounted to
1,442 million rubles, a great drain on the Russian treasury.

Moreover,

Russia was experiencing difficulty in borrowing further capital from
Europe and had turned to American bankers for financial assistance.
A syndicate formed by J. P. Morgan and Baring, Magoun and Company
offered ite services to the Imperial Government.

On behalf of the

syndicate, William Ivins proposed to take 80 million dollars in Russian
bonds.

The two parties never reached final agreement on the financial

terms.

Nor did the United States, though aware of Russia's financial

position, use this situation as a wedge for government-to-government
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negotiations for a cooperative policy in Northeast Asia.

Perhaps

this was too great a leap into the new diplomacy for Hay to consider.
He certainly doubted whether the Senate "would accept any treaty of
consequence with Russia."
succeeded.

Nevertheless, negotiations might have

Later, when coufronted by the open door note, Witte

advised Muravev that it would be possible "under pressure of extreme
necessity" to renounce Russia's railway and customs tariff privileges
in Manchuria, provided that any power wishing to profit by these
special advantages "likewise participated in the enormous material
expenditures" that Russia was under.

At the time he wrote this

opinion, Witte was again negotiating the issue of railway bonds, this
time with George Perkins of the New York Life Insurance Company.

10

Another clue to Russia's financial straits was disclosed when
the tsar proposed a conference of the powers to halt the increasing
development of armaments.

It was generally understood that at least

one, if not the prime, motive behind the Russian proposal was the
inability of Finance Minister Witte to continue spending the necessary
funds on railroads, while concurrently effecting needed modernization
of military equipment.

Many nations were suspicious of the Russian

scheme, or were skeptical of such a utopian project, but no power
wanted to spurn the conference and be branded as an obstacle to peace.
As a consequence, the Hague Peace Conference was meeting May to July
1899, just when, coincidentally, Alfred E. Hippisley and William W.
Rockhill began to fashion a strategem for keeping China open to all
nations on an equal basis.

To an extent Hippisley-Rockhill borrowed

from the tactics of Muravev, who had freely used moral suasion to
coerce the powers to the conference.

In a similar manner they planned
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to test the sincerity of the Imperial Government, which had posed as
the champion of peace.

Did this Russian grand gesture toward world

amity extend to the Far East?ll
The writing of the open door notes and the process of negotiating their acceptance has been well documented elsewhere and need not
be repeated here in every detail. 12

Attention will be focused primarily,

rather, on those aspects which touched on the changing relations of
Russia and the United States and these were considerable.

For just

as the American fears about the prospects in Northeast Asia centered
on the threat from Russia, so too, the notes were composed with the
object of halting the Russian advance chiefly in mind.
Rockhill assumed his post in Washington on May 22, 1899, four
days after the commencement of the peace conference at the Hague.
Hay once more had an experienced adviser on Far East matters.

Rockhill

had served at the American legations in Peking and Seoul between 1884
and 1887, had made two trips of exploration to Mongolia and Tibet,
and then returned to the state department from 1893 to 1897.

Through

these experiences he was well acquainted with the mounting concerns
among the American community in China about Russia's designs.

He,

himself, was directly involved when the Russian government prevented
American entrepreneurs from building railroads into Manchuria.

As

he familiarized himself with the current situation in China, discussed
matters with members of the American Asiatic Association, and read
the flood of articles treating the impending parition of China, Rockhill came to appreciate the fears of the American businessmen.

Al-

though he, personally, was probably more concerned with maintaining
the independence and the integrity of China, for the sake of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

310
pressures being exerted on the administration, he had to give his
first attention to America's economic interests.
Rockhill was assisted in his search for a way out of the
administration's dilemma by the arrival of a long-time friend from
his China days, Alfred E. Hippisley, a British subject, who had served
in the Chinese customs service for more than 30 years.

Hippisley and

his American wife had come to Baltimore to visit her family.

From

there he frequently visited Rockhill in Washington, where they discussed means for ensuring the equality for all nations in China.
Gradually from these talks there emerged a scheme for the United
States, as the nation least interested in annexing Chinese territory,
to take the lead in calling official attention of the other powers to
the growing danger of partition and conflict.

At the same time, the

American concerns about securing treaty rights and privileges could
be emphasized anew.

Each of the powers would be requested to pledge

not to interfere in the treaty ports or disciminate in the application
of tariffs.

Since so-called "spheres of influence" had already been

generally recognized, it was reluctantly decided that preferential
privileges dealing with railroads and mines must tacitly remain
each power in its own sphere.
briefed Hay on their scheme.

~qith

In mid-July Rockhill and his friend
Thereafte·r, as Hippisley departed

Baltimore, Rockhill furnished Hay with the gist of their correspondence
on the subject.

The proposal had many advantages.

for an overt alliance.

It did not call

No Senate approval was required.

It was not,

at least on the surface, merely following England's lead.
of the electorate would be aroused to automatic opposition.

No segment
The

project did not contemplate the use of threat to use force, only
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diplomatic persuasion.

But the plan did represent a switch from

watchful waiting to an active initiative.
Hay was still wary.
horne:

As he wrote to Rockhill from his summer

"I am fully awake to the great importance of what you say, and

am more than ready to act.

But the senseless prejudices in certain

sections of the 'Senate and people' compel
caution." 13

UG

to move with great

Unsaid, but perhaps of greater significance, Hay may not

have been confident that President McKinley was equally ready to
act.

The planners had realized that for the open door notes to succeed,

all the great powers addressed must join in the guarantees or else
the plan would fall apart.

In their assessment, only Russia and

France, the most protectionist minded nations, might balk and that
France would likely go along with whatever Russia did.

The key

threat then, Russia, was also the key to success for the proposal.
Adding to the sense of urgency, Hippisley warned that:
I think it would be suicidal for America to drift and do
nothing for another year • • • • My latest advices from
Peking say: "The activity of the Russians in Manchuria
is simply wonderful • • • the Russification of Peking
and North China will proceed as rapidly as has that of
Manchuria."l4
Nevertheless, matters might well have rested there, but for
several fortuitous circumstances in mid-August.

First, the Russian

government made a move which seemed to promise that Russia might
acquiesce in the general plan to guarantee the open door in China.
In addition to its press campaign in the United States, Russia now
took a more concrete measure to forestall the growing American hostility
towards its action in Manchuria.

On August 11, 1899, the tsar issued

an ukaz proclaiming that Talienwan (or Dalnij, as the Russians renamed
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it) is a free port, that is, the "right to import and export merchandise
of every description free of customs duties" was established.

Mer-

chandise destined for Russia would pay the customary duties upon
entering the empire.

The ukaz failed to mention merchandise destined

for China, but Muravev assured Tower that only Chinese regulation
would pertain in these circumstances, without Russian interference.
Tower was greatly gratified by the ukaz.

To him, as far as Russia

was concerned, the ukaz spelled an open door to China which "opens
the way also to the future of American trade and the certain increase
of American mercantile prosperity."l5
From St. Petersburg Tower viewed the ukaz differently than
other observers.

It did not guarantee the open door.

Proclaiming

Dalnij a free port was a practical necessity for Russia to stimulate
the import of the necessary materials to build rapidly the port
facilities, the rail terminus and fortifications.

The same procedure

had been used to construct Vladivostok, which was now about to lose
this special status.

Furthermore, Americans in China genuinely

believed that all the hinterland beyond the free port would soon be
annexed outright by Russia, thus subjecting foreign imports to Russian
customs duties.

Finally, the ukaz included no provision which would

preclude discriminatory rail rates for goods transshipped from
Dalnij.

The New York Times considered the Tsar's ukaz a slick piece

of world politics. 1 6

The framers of the open door notes, however,

deliberately chose to put the broadest, most optimistic interpretation
to the ukaz, hoping to gain Russia's concurrence with guarantees of
far wider applicability.
Second, Rockhill also chose to interpret the Ukhtomskij-
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Holstrem article as a conciliatory gesture toward the United States.
Taking out of context and acknowledging that the authors' assertion
that "the independence and integrity of China is a fundamental principle
of Russia's policy in Asia" might not be absolutely correct, Rockhill,
nevertheless, thought the article portended that the "friendly consideration of St. Petersburg" could be expected for the American
plan. 17

To Hippisley, also, the Tsar's ukaz and the Ukhtomskij

article seemed to assure, in advance, the respectful consideration
of the Russian Government for the open door project.

The time to

test the true nature of Russia's friendship seemed at hand.

On

August 24 Hay agreed, requesting that Rockhill draft the necessary
instructions to the American ambassadors concerned.
The final and most important factor in undermining any
resistance of President McKinley to the open door notes were the
views of Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University.
Schurman had been appointed to head a commission to investigate
conditions in the Philippines and to advise the president personally
on the Far East situation.

He arrived back in San Francisco on

August 14, 1899, and promptly gave his views on the Orient, based
partly on his conversations with English and Japanese statesmen:
It seems to me that the great question there is not
Formosa nor the Philippines, but China • • • • To hold
China intact is the thing of overshadowing importance.
It is feared, now that Russia has taken Manchuria, it
will try to encroach gradually on some or all of the
other eighteen provinces of China, and when it gets them
it will do as that country has done hitherto--put a
duty on all foreign goods • • • China • • • should
maintain its independent position, but its doors should be
kept open. It means much to England and Japan and not
less to America. 18
The president's own advisor had confirmed the nature and the direction
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of the threat to American interests in the Far East.

Rockhill and

Hippisley were hopeful that Schurman's views would "exercise very
great influence on the decisions of the Administration."
they did.

Apparently

Schurman conferred with McKinley on September 2 and again

on the 4th.

The first open door notes were mailed two days later. 19

The three principles included in the open door notes, to
which the United States was requesting the powers to adhere formally,
were identically worded.

However, a comparison of the explanatory

material which was included in the notes was markedly different in
the letter to Ambassador Tower.

The previous oral assurances given

by Russian officials, saying that American trade would ·not be adversely
affected, were acknowledged.

In addition, the note to Russia stressed

the need for a "permanent form to the assurances" and an extension of
their coverage beyond the territory already occupied.

Such a declara-

tion from the Imperial Government would relieve the business world
of the United States "from the apprehensions which have exercised a
disturbing influence during the last four years on its operations in
China."

Furthermore, the "declaration of such principles by His

Imperial Majesty would • • • powerfully tend to remove dangerous
sources of irritation and possible conflict between the various
powers."

Although generally ignoring the subject of China's territorial

integrity, the note to Russia slipped in the gratuitous assumption
that the "consolidation and integrity of that Empire • • • is believed
• • • a fundamental principle of the policy of His Majesty in Asia."
Moreover, Great Britain and Germany were requested to lend their
"support in obtaining similar declarations from the various powers
claiming 'spheres of influences' in China."

Russian assistance was
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not solicited in the same manner.

Instead, it was simplystatedthat

"the acceptance by His Imperial Majesty of these principles must
therefore inevitably lead to their recognition by all the other powers."
When the Russian obstacle was overcome, everything else would easily
be achieved.

By emphasizing the "liberal and conciliatory commercial

policy" of the tsar, the United States hoped to turn this "policy"
into a reality.

20

Upon close examination, it can be seen that the texts of
the three principles were drafted with the presence of Russia in
Manchuria specifically in mind.

The American note was aimed directly

at Russian current and anticipated economic practices.

For the other

powers, the principles represented only theoretical preventive
measures designed to curb any possibility of future abuses.

Each

would gain by the guarantees in the remainder of China, while suffering no real loss in its own special sphere.

But, as the Russian

ministers soon realized, acceptance of the three principles, despite
their general applicability, would undo some actual advantages which
Russia already enjoyed and forestall others which they fully intended
to acquire.

Nor was there any compensatory advantage for Russia to

gain elsewhere in China.
The first principle provided "that no power will in any way
interfere with a treaty port or any vested interest within any leased
territory or within any so-called 'sphere of interest' it may have in
China."

The United States was immediately concerned about treaty

rights and privileges at Newchwang.
heavily on the fate of Newchwang.

Access to Manchuria depended
Formal adherence to this principle

would, it was hoped, stop Russian encroachments already reported at
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that port and strengthen Chinese administration there.

This same

tactic would be used four years later when the United States forced
China, in the face of Russian opposition, to open up three additional
treaty ports in Manchuria to American commerce.
The second principle stated "that the Chinese treaty tariff
of the time being shall apply to all such ports as are within 'spheres
of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no n,atter what nationality
it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the
Chinese Government."

Again, this provision would not only bolster

the Chinese customs service, but would also, in particular, prevent
the reported practice of Russia ignoring the
Newchwang.

Chines~

customs at

And whether the United States was entirely aware of

the provisions of the Li-Lobanov secret treaty of 1896 or not, Russia
already had secured Chinese tariff concessions for their goods transported over the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and perhaps expected further
favors.

Acceptance of this principle would have tended to limit

these Russian advantages.
The third principle declared, in part, that "no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its
'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other
nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied
on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported
over equal distances."

This was the most vital clause of the open

door notes for the American businessman.

The other aspects--treaty

ports and customs--were really a reaffirmation of existing treaty
rights.

As long as China remained relatively intact, the United

States had the means, along with all the other maritime nations, for
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insisting that they be honored.
matter.

Rail rates were an entirely different

The setting of transportation charges in its sphere was solely

dependent on the Russian Government.

If Russia chose to discriminate

against American shippers along the Manchurian rail network, or
further south, if Russian ambitions had their way, the United States
had little recourse to Chinese authorities.
monopoly and full control.

Russia had achieved a

Evidence that Russia intended to use its

advantage was readily at hand.

Russo-Chinese agreements already

permitted rate-fixing in favor of Russian merchandise.

Russia h&d

flatly refused to agree with England to forego this rate-fixing.
These factors had been repeatedly emphasized by the publicists of
the Far Eastern question.

Besides, setting rates which discriminated

against a commercial rival was nothing new to American rail magnates.
Rockhill and Hay were fully cognizant of the underlying demand they
were making on Russia.

This principle seemed innocent when addressed

to all the powers, but it had applicability only to Russia.

Russia

was the one power that had a system of railroads nearly operational,
completely under its jurisdiction and connected to its national rail
network.

Russia

~·las

being asked to give up this sizeable advantage

which would have helped it to amortize its immense construction costs.
This last provision was not in Hippisley's draft of the open
door notes.

Rockhill added the clause on his own, solely to protect

American commercial interests operating in the Russian Zone.

Despite

this hidden obstacle, Rockhill and Hay were surprisingly optimistic
about the response they would receive from the Russian Government.
Like the other powers, Russia had been put into a position where a
direct refusal to a seemingly moderate request was thought to be
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impossible.

In fact, Hay was so confident of an affirmative answer

from Russia, that he delayed addressing a similar note to France until
late November, trusting that a Russian acceptance would help carry
France into the fold.

His optimism was unfounded.

The Russian

Government strenuously attempted to delay or avoid a direct reply.
What Hay had accomplished, though, was the

sh~fting

dilemma from his shoulders onto the back of Muravev.

of his Far East
For more than

a year, Count Cassini had been reminding Americans that the United
States must step carefully in the Orient so as not to break-up the
long friendship with Russia.
American initiative.

Now the roles were reversed by the

Muravev must try to squirm out of his predica-

ment without conceding any Russian advantage, but without causing a
rift with the United States.
The open door negotiations with Russia lasted for nearly six
months.

Partly this was due to the slowness of the mail, approximately

two weeks from Washington to St. Petersburg.

More of the delay was

caused by the absence of Muravev from the capital for several months
and the unwillingness of his deputy, Count Lamsdorff, to make
decisions in this sensitive policy area.

Most of the delay, however,

can be attributed to the deliberate procrastination on the part of
Muravev who sought to avoid committing the Russian Government.

He

desperately hoped that one of the other powers would reject the
American proposal first, which would obviate the need for Russia to
take any position at all.
Charge Peirce had delivered the open door proposal to Lamsdorff
on September 20.

When no response of any kind was forthcoming, the

state department asked Tower about the delay and learned that Muravev
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had been on vacation.

No serious consideration of the open door began

in the Russian foreign ministry until mid-November, but for the next
six weeks the matter was reviewed, in the words of Tower, "with unusual
attention and treated with a degree of consideration which it would
not have met if it had come from almost any other conceivable source."
The Russian cabinet, though, was strongly disinclined to make any
specific announcement of Russian policy in China.

The imperial ministers

were intensely unwilling to bind themselves in writing for the future.
Even the expression "open door" was distasteful to Muravev, as it
reminded him of hostile English policies.

All of Hay's diplomatic

skill and persistence was required to force Russia into even a semblance of a definitive reply.

Commencing in November, Hay gradually

increased the pressure on Count Cassini for a reply.21
Strangely, when Cassini and Muravev first studied the open
door note, they failed to comprehend fully the underlying purport
of the American proposition.

In an exchange of dispatches Cassini,

apparently agreeing with the American stance, summarized the American
aim on November 16 as the "preservation of the principle of the 'open
door' and the inviolability of Chinese territory, which alone can
guarantee the interests of the United States in that country."

Two

days later Muravev complained that the note was so unclear and confusing that it was difficult to understand the intentions of the
American Government.

Nevertheless, Muravev, too, had "no serious

objections against the principles expounded in the note" as long as
they applied only to the sphere of interest in Chinese territory and
not to Russia's leased territory.

In fact,

Mu~avev

saw some advantage

in the American recognition of Russia's "privileged position" in
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Manchuria.

Had Muravev persisted in this view it would have suited

Hay's purpose mightily. 22
Tower was not able to confer with Muravev personally on the
subject of the open door until November

22~

At that time, Tower

surmised that Muravev must have kept abreast of the topic during his
travels, which he had.

Muravev was quite familiar with the American

proposal, but hesitated to make a detailed reply until Cassini could
make further inquiries of the state department which "shall remove
the doubts at present entertained by the Imperial Government."

Al-

though Muravev voiced no specific objection to any of the three
principles, Tower noted some hesitancy stemming from the commitment
concerning rail rates.
· kl"1ng o f
some 1n

w·1tte ' s

Upon his return, Muravev had probably received
·
2 -1
t h ough ts on t h e sub Ject.

On November 26, Cassini, unaware that the attitude of the
foreign minister had started to shift, sent a telegram to Muravev
proposing that he enter into conversations with the United States on
a number of points, all of which would have been acceptable to the
state department. One point specifically proposed that:

"In our

(Russian)sphere of influence we retain the exclusive right of constructing and exploiting railroads, of mines and other industrial
enterprises.

On these railroads there will be no discriminating tariffs~r24

Two days later, Muravev sent a letter to Witte enclosing Cassini's
telegram regarding the desirability of coming to an agreement with
the United States.
Witte, who was very familiar with previous American attempts
to gain railway concessions in Manchuria and Siberia, was not taken
in by the covert proposal banning discriminatory rail rates.

He
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realized that this was an attempt at "neutralization" of the Manchurian
railways and, in that sense, directly hostile to Russian goals.

To

agree to the American principles would, he thought, "deprive us of
a privilege having significance for our economic interests in the
Far East" without any compensation elsewhere in China.

Therefore,

he suggested to Muravev that any answer given to the United States
omit any reference to rail charges.

With regard to customs duties

and port levies, he was less concerned. These were regulated by the
Chinese Government outside the Russian leasehold, so the "Russian
Government did not propose to seek any exceptional privileges for her
subjects in this respect as compared with other foreigners. 1125
Faced with Witte's opposition to the rail rate principle,
the foreign ministry changed its attitude completely toward the open
door policy.

Cassini was advised on December 1 that it was deemed

adviseable at the present time only to answer the state department in
"general terms" not binding on Russia.

This put Cassini in a difficult

position in dealing with Hay and Rockhill who were pressing him for
a definitive reply.

By this time, Cassini had convinced himself

that the American note had been distributed solely for domestic
political purposes, that the President only wanted to demonstrate
"his firm determination to protect the trade interests of the United
States" in order "to prepare the way for his second election."

With

this idea in mind, Cassini informed Muravev on December 13 that he
intended to "soft-soap" the United States with an assurance that
"the commercial interests of Americans in China will be respected in
our sphere of influence, as always."

Muravev hastily agreed to this

line of approach, but also asked him to sound out the positions of
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the French and German ambassadors to Washington. 26
Cassini was unsuccessful in sidetracking the American proposal.
He held at least three meetings with Rockhill, none of them decisive.
When Cassini suggested that the United States was only following
Great Britain's lead, Rockhill parried this charge with a challenge
for Russia to be the first to espouse America's cause which "would
have as favorable an effect on the final acceptance of the policy by
all the powers as it would if England were the first to declare it. 112 7
Hay also refused to be cajoled by generalities.

Not knowing Cassini's

earlier position, Hay was convinced that Cassini had consistently
opposed the open door policy.

As Hay recalled several months later,

Cassini resorted to protesting "rather vehemently at one time against
the extent of what he called our 'demands'."
asserted to Hay:

'~ou

Cassini reportedly

don't know what you are asking; you are

attempting something impossible; you have no idea of the extent of
your propositions." 28

Hay knew that he did.

Believing that Cassini would have stood firmly against the
American plan indefinitely, Hay gradually shifted the discussions
to St. Petersburg and began to supply Tower with the diplomatic means
with which to pressure Muravev.

On December 9, Hay, perhaps stretching

the truth, advised Tower by telegram that Germany would "raise no
objection to the proposition of the United States" and that the
"adherence of Great Britain to the proposition was assured."

Armed

with this information, Tower met Muravev two days later, requesting
that the Imperial Government take the American note into "immediate
and serious consideration" so that he might report a "friendly and
favorable reply."

Muravev hastened to assure Tower that Russia's
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reply "would be friendly, in any event."

At this meeting Muravev

paid considerable attention to the question of "what had France done
in the matter?"

After the meeting, Tower was uncertain that the

Russian Government would ever make a complete declaration satisfying
American purposes.

Yet, as was his style, Tower put the best possible

light on the Russian recalcitrance, blaming the stalemate on Russian
conservatism and habit of thought, "rather than as a proof of any
intention upon the part of Russia to oppose the interests of the
United States." 29
Anticipating that Russia might stall until France had declared
itself, Hay changed his tactics and decided to tackle France first,
hoping that French concurrence would assist materially in bringing
the reluctant Russia into line.
remarkably amicable.

Negotiations with France proved

By December 16, the French foreign minister,

while not agreeing precisely to the American text, was
ready to apply, in the territories which are leased to it
(France), equal treatment to the citizens and subjects of
all nations, especially in the matter of customs duties
and navigation dues, as well as transportation tariffs on
railways.
Furthermore, France favored "equal treatment in the broadest sense,
throughout China." 30

The presumably arch-protectionist France was no

longer a bulwark behind which Russia could hide.
pass this news on to Tower on December 19.

Hay was quick to

Five days later, Tower

again confronted Muravev, who acknowledged that he was acquainted
with the French announcement.

At this meeting, Muravev took the

first tentative and highly qualified step toward acceptance.

Russia,

he declared, "intends to pursue the same policy as that announced by
France, namely, the policy of equal treatment to all nations."

But
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as the conversation developed, it became clearer that Muravev only
meant that the United States could expect the same privileges that
were extended to any other, that is, non-Russian nation.

Tower

immediately sought acquiescence "that no privileges should be given
to Russian merchants or manufacturers which were withheld from those
of other countries."

Tower pressed further on the Russian policy

regarding rail rates, to which Muravev was forced to admit:
Well, we have built the railroads, and I think it quite
probable that we shall give preference to our own people;
though all foreign nations will be treated absolutely
alike.
In the end, Muravev begged off making any formal statement on the
excuse that the questions raised largely rested within the jurisdiction of the finance minister. 31
Hay continued to apply pressure.

On December 27, he tele-

graphed Tower that the "President (was) greatly disappointed" and to
"try energetically to have the Russian Government to accept our
proposition."

That same afternoon Tower called on the foreign minister

once more and put forth the American case as forcefully as a friendly
nation probably could.

He mentioned the President's disappointment

at the turn of affairs.

He reviewed the stance of the other great

powers.

He reminded Muravev of the beneficial build-up of commercial

intercourse between Russia and America.

And then he added a warning:

that a refusal upon the part of Russia to adhere to these
propositions would produce the most painful and unfortunate
impression on the United States and I urged him to avoid by
all means in his power a result so damaging to the present
cordial feeling between the people of the two powers.
Muravev alternately showed irritation at being addressed in this
fashion and solicitude to avoid any breach of good feeling between
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32
Russ~a

Muravev had been pushed into a corner from which he saw no
escape.

As he lamented to Witte on December 28, he found it impossible,

after the affirmative answers by the other powers, "to go counter to
a politico-economic principle generally accepted by the powers, and,
by undermining the existing friendly relations between Russia and
the U.

s.

A., create occasion for the organization of a coalition

·
.,33
.
o f powers Ln
t h e F ar Eas t very d angerous f or our ~nterests.

Reluctantly, Muravev bowed, two days later, to the American
insistence for a formal commitment.
his "demands."

Hay had achieved a portion of

Regarding the Russian sphere, Muravev agreed only

that:
As to the ports now opened or hereafter to be opened to
foreign commerce by the Chinese Government, and which
lie beyond the territory leased to Russia, the settlement
of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself
and the Imperial Government has no intention whatever of
claiming any privilege for its own subjects to the
exclusion of other foreigners.34
This reply represented a positive gain for the American policy.

If

followed in good faith, it would strengthen the Chinese administration
in Manchuria and would grant equal access to American merchants
through the port of Newchwang.

No mention of rail rates was included

in the Russian response, which was disappointing, but probably
anticipated.

To make certain that Cassini understood this omission,

Muravev, when forwarding a copy of the contents of the Russian reply
to his ambassador, prefaced the copy with this phrase:

"Not addressing

the question of railway tariffs, I answered the American note in the
following manner • •

.,35

Hay tried to eke out a further concession on rail rates by
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using Muravev's previous oral statement that Russia intended to pursue
the same policy as France.

Tower, however, persuaded Hay not to use

this strategem, when Muravev objected strongly.

Muravev did consent

to a public general statement being made by the state department
that 11 Russia has replied favorably to the American propositions" and
he agreed to the publication of Russia's formal answer.
20, 1900, putting the broadest and most

fa~orable

On March

interpretation on

the various responses from the powers to the American proposal,
Hay announced that he considered 11 the assent given to it by Russia as
final and definitive." 36
But would it remain definitive?
Henry Adams:

Not likely, according to

"Hay has succeeded in embarrassing Russia very much;

but the agreement binds no one to anything, and perhaps that is the
reason why everybody assents. 1137

Nor was Hay quite certain 11 what

line Russia is going to take in the matter," but he was satisfied with
the outcome.

As he reported to Henry White:

He (Muravev) did say it, he did promise, and he did enter
in just that engagement. It is possible that he did so
thinking France would not come in, and that the other
powers would not. If now they choose to take a stand in
opposition to the entire civilized world, we shall then
make up our minds what to do about it.38
The open door notes may not have been binding on any of the
powers, but John Hay fully realized that a lasting and significant
change had been wrought in the Russian-American relationship.

The

impetus behind the sending of the American open door notes had been
the direct result of the perceived threat of the Russian advance into
Manchuria.

The provisions

written into the notes were specifically

designed to offset Russian advantages there, those actually in practice
and those believed to be nearing achievement

The timing of the notes
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was deliberately gauged to a period when Russia momentarily seemed
most ready to countenance an open door for all of China.

And the

notes were negotiated with a view toward exerting the maximum diplomatic
pressure on Russia to accept them.

Moreover, the imperial government

was fully awure that the American plan had been consciously aimed at
checking Russian aspirations in Asia.

The United States' government

had finally decided to join the trek of its pioneers across the North
Pacific and play a more active and responsible role in the Far East.
For the sake of the China market and for strategic position in the
Pacific, the United States was prepared to add its weight to the
balance of power in Northeast Asia and confront Russia, at least
diplomat:i.cally, in Manchuria.

No longer would a geographic gap

separate Russian national interest from American.

A century of

cooperative effort between Russia and the United States in the Pacific
had finally been breached.

In the tug-of-war in Asia between England

and Russia, the United States had decided to pull with England.

The

open door notes had cracked the traditional Russo-American friendship.
Subsequent events only increased the fissure.
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CONCLUSION

Having traced, in some detail, the history of the Russo-American
relations in Northeast Asia throughout the nineteenth century, the
question originally posed remains:

What caused the estrangement between

Russia and the United States at the end of the century?

While taking

a century-long viewpoint has helped clarify the nature and progress of
the relationship, no single, overriding cause for the rivalry was
isolated.

Rather, a complex of factors contributed to it,some of which

can be factually demonstrated and some of which are based to some extent
on mere supposition.
One of the prominent factors which decreased the likelihood of
continuing the traditional friendship was one which was also generally
recognized at the time by the participants--the ever narrowing separation between the two nations.

Whether measured in terms of physical

geography, in time elapsed for transportation and communications, or
in the growing psychological sense of being close neighbors across
the North Pacific, the gap was steadily closing.

And while propinquity

of itself did not necessarily lead to rivalry, apartness had significantly
served to avoid serious quarrels previously.

Throughout the century

the North Pacific fence, which had tended to make good neighbors, was
repeatedly breached as the Americans refused to be confined to the
North American continent.
But more than propinquity was involved when American and Russian
331
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interests collided in Manchuria.

After all, a multitude of previous

encounters, friendly and otherwise, had occurred from Sitka to the
Kuriles and from Kamchatka to the mouth of the Amur.
that developed in Manchuria was markedly different.

The situation
Previous episodes

had not substantially weakened the relationship, primarily because
the contacts had largely been the result of private initiatives on the
part of individuals and businesses.

The Russian and American confronta-

tion in Manchuria more directly involved the two governments.

The

increasingly active support afforded by the United States' government
to its merchants in China and Manchuria during the late 1890s presents
a typical case history for what Emily S. Rosenberg has described as
erecting the fout1dations of the "promotional state. "

1

The Russian

government was already heavily involved in promoting Russian enterprise
in Manchuria and to counteract this "unfair" competition an American
foreign policy was designed, for the first time, to reduce the threat
of Russian barriers against American trade and capital in Northeast
Asia.

The first open door notes were an outgrowth of this newly

assumed posture as a "promotional state."

As a consequence of these

Russian and American partnerships between the government and the private
sector, the competition in Manchuria was increasingly elevated to the
diplomatic level, thereby intensifying the rivalry.

Moreover, both

Russia and the United States had recently demonstrated an ability to
use naval force to gain their purposes in the Pacific.
With the North Pacific serving less and less as a means to
insulate the two nations from on.e another and with each government
prepared to join in to support its citizens i.n any quarrel, a third
factor prompted the strain in relations.

Neither the Russian nor the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

333
American leaders seemed surprised or particularly

conce~ned

that the

long period of friendship was on the verge of ending.

The meeting

of the two expanding powers had long been predicted.

That a crucial

intersection of interests was actually occurring in Manchuria came
as a foreordained event, a self-fulfilled series of prophecies.

And

since an eventual rift had long been expected over the course of
much of the century, the gradual escalation of the rivalry assumed a
pattern of inevitability.

Hindered by this mindset, neither nation

attempted to air their basic differences or to discuss thoroughly and
candidly the serious issues that divided them in Manchuria.
This mental outlook was fostered by the growing realization that
the tr2ditional friendship had largely been reduced to rhetoric over
the past three decades.

Little in the way of concrete dividends, for

either side, could be identified in the years following the failure of
the Asian-American telegraph line.

The few gestures of amity that took

place during this period were more than offset by fresh irritations
and suspicions of the other's actions.

One of these irritations

concerned the no longer muted American criticism of Russia's autocratic
rule.

While the reign of Nicholas II could hardly be considered more

repressive than that of Nicholas I, the crescendo of denunciation
of the Russian political and social systems was both a symptom of the
decreasing value attached to a Russo-American friendship and at least
a minor factor in causing embittered relations.

Had the friendship

retained a firmly recognized practical use, the criticism may have been
less pronounced and been received with less of a sense of outrage.
The growing Anglo-American rapprochement toward the end of the
century also has been cited as another factor contributing to the
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alienation of Russia and the United States.
necessarily in the manner normally accepted.

And it was, although not
Separating and

identifyin~

cause from effect during a period of active and multilateral diplomatic
maneuverings easily leads to different interpretations.

A review of

the policy debates in the United States during the late 1890s suggests
that the United States did not turn away from Russia simply because of
its considerably strengthened ties with Great Britain.

Russia did

not become America's rival just because Russia happened to be Britain's.
Rather, the worsening American attitude toward Russia was probably
one of the main factors which strengthened the Anglo-American bond.
However, had relations with Great Britain not been improving, if there
had been no alternative to the Russian friendship, then the United
States might have worked harder to reach an understanding with Russia.
A complex interaction of factors, then, formed the background
for the abrupt change in Russo-American relations.

By the end of the

century the distance separating the two empires could no longer be
depended upon to isolate conflicting interests.

The two governments

had increased the potential consequences of any dispute by assuming
participatory roles.

The ties of friendship, which had once been

strong, had been allowed to deteriorate.

Consequently, the major

differences in their political systems now pulled them into different
orbits.

The United States became more reconciled with Great Britain,

whose political system and Far East policies appeared far more compatible.
Finally, the confrontation in Asia, as it approached, was accepted in
an almost fatalistic manner, because it had been foretold.
With that general background, the second question still needs
to be addressed:

Why was Manchuria considered so vitally import?nt to
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both Russia and the United States?
easy to discern.

Russia's interests are fairly

Russia had been expanding in Asia for

cen~uries.

Manchuria, directly on its borders, was a natural next target.

The

promise of the Amur region had never been completely fulfilled.
had not afforded Russia ready commercial access to China,
free port on the North Pacific.

~or

It

an ice-

The addition of Manchuria to its

empire would achieve both of these objectives plus gain a wealth of
natural resources.

Russia had invested a huge stake by advancing its

informal empire into Manchuria.

Based on previous experience with

American seaborne competition, the imperial government realized that
its chances of recouping its investment depended heavily on barring
American investors from Manchuria and placing American traders at
disadvantage.

Any suggestion of an open door policy creating conditions

for fair competition in Manchuria was clearly an anathema to Russia's
national interests.
Searching for the American motives for taking a firm stand
against the Russian advance into Manchuria is decidedly more complicated.
Why was the United States more concerned about Manchuria than the spheres
further south where twenty or more times as many customers made up the
vaunted "China market"?

True, the United States had discovered, some-

what belatedly, that American commerce, unaccountably, was comparatively
successful in Manchuria and North China, whereas elsewhere in China
the American share in the market had been dwindling for fifty years,
despite the prevailing open door policy.

It could have been that

Americans decided to cling to and protect this lesser Manchurian market
because that was all that was available without facing the stiff
competition from the British merchants in the South.

The text of the
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first open door notes supports this view, but the scope of the trade
hardly warranted the trouble entailed.

A similar case can be constructed

that the United States was chiefly concerned that a Russian acquisition
of Manchuria would swiftly be followed by outright partition of all
of China by the foreign powers, thus forestalling American expectations,
however unrealistic, for regaining a substantial share in the China
market.

This view is consistent with America's deep suspicions of

Russian intentions in Northeast Asia, but does not gibe with the
contents of the first open door notes, which did not call for any
guarantee of China's geographic integrity.
Undoubtedly, the United States was concerned about protecting
its export trade of cotton goods and kerosene to Manchuria.

However

small-scale, it was marginally important to cotton growers, cotton
merchants and the Standard Oil Company.

At the same time, the United

States was equally concerned that China would follow the fate of Africa.
Nevertheless, the complete change in the American stance toward Russia
over the Manchurian issue cannot be completely explained on narrow
commercial motives.

Market concerns in Manchuria loomed important

and certainly monopolized the latter-day rhetoric, but relying solely
on these limited economic motives for answers leaves unresolved contradictionso

In differing ways and, more often than not, only in vaguely

articulated ways, Manchuria had assumed a larger importance in America's
world view.

Americans considered Manchuria as the bulwark preventing

Russia from dominating China, threatening Japan and becoming the premier
power in the North Pacific.

Checking Russia's advance meant more than

just protecting the several million dollars worth of sales of cotton
goods and kerosene.

It meant preserving the North Pacific as an avenue
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for the expansion of the United States.
Throughout the nineteenth century Northeast Asia had been
viewed as the strategic key to the Orient, America's own "Northwest
Passage."

Once Siberia and the .\mur region were firmly consolidated

under Russian control, Manchuria represented the last opportunity for
securing a foothold on mainland Asia.

American ambitions in Manchuria

were but the culmination of past dreams for Northeast Asia as a new
frontier, as a terminus for the trans-Pacific steamship-rail connections,
and as an opening to China, India, all of Asiatic Russia and the back
door to Europe.
In his book Virgin Land, Henry Nash Smith explained how the
American West had become both a symbol and a myth.

2

A part of this

symbolism concerned the West as a "highway to the Pacific" and beyond.
In many ways the American image of Northeast Asia had become a natural
extension of these symbols and myths, although less clearly defined
and attenuated by distance.

Westward expansion was never envisioned

as stopping at the Pacific shore.

Thomas Jefferson had encouraged

John Ledyard's Siberian venture long before he authorized the Lewis
and Clark expedition.

American poets gave voice to this vision of

expansion across the Pacific.

Two samples illustrate.

1794 Timothy Dwight was embellishing this

symb~l

As early as

of expansion:

Soon shall thy sons across the mainland roam;
And claim, on far Pacific shores, their home;
Their rule, religion, manners, arts, conve3
And spread their freedom to the Asian sea.
Walt Whitman also frequently chanted about America's Pacific destiny as
mistress of a "new empire" where:
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His daring foot is on lar.d and sea everywhere-he colonizes the Pacific, the ~rchpelagoes;
With the steam-ship, the electric telegraph, the
newspaper, the wholesale engines of war,
With these, and the world-spreading factories,
he interlinks all geography, all lands4
Despite these visions, the practical aspects of American
expansion across the Pacific and onto the Asian mainland presented a
nearly insoluble problem.

It was difficult enough for the early leaders

of the United States to conceive how republican institutions could be
maintained over a large trans-continental nation.
difficult to rationalize colonizing overseas.

It was even more

The debate over the

future of the Philippines demonstrated the kind of dilemma which the
Pacific expansionists faced throughout the century.

This is why

even the most ardent expansionist found it nearly impossible to
articulate any satisfactory solution.

When contemplating the prospective

regions of Asia, the Northeast, in many ways, offered the fewest
obstacles.

The region seemed most like the "virgin land" of America's

West, waiting to be developed and civilized--a vast territory, sparsely
populated and scarcely governed.

As earlier chapters have described,

various approaches were t·entatively attempted.

The whalers and hunters,

without any set plan at all, claimed squatter's rights to any vacant
beach.

Aaron Palmer encouraged Americans to seek out those areas which

were still unclaimed and ungoverned.

Commodore Perry took an insular

approach, establishing island "points of refuge" from which missionaries
could penetrate the mainland.

William Collins and numbers of later

adherents hoped that the United States could develop the Amur basin
and other parts of Siberia under the aegis of Russian administration.
Hiram Sibley was confident that his telegraph company could administer
the native populations along wide strips of Siberia.

American railroad
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men, such as the promoters of the American-China Development Company,
thought that rail franchises would form the pathways for expansion.
While all these manifestations of the American expansionist drive
were frustrated, Northeast Asia, and particularly Manchuria, remained
a tantalizing symbol of what William Gilpin had termed America's
"untransacted destiny."
By the end of the century American chances for expansion into
Asia seemed to hinge on the fate of Manchuria.

While the Manchurian

market, itself, held limited importance, the immediate issue of keeping
that market open was opportunistically seized in order to confront
Russia on a matter of high-sounding, idealistic principle, a demand
which Russia would have difficulty in refusing.

If the Russian

advantage in Manchuria could be offset, the Russian advance into
Manchuria could be checked and American access assured.

From Manchuria

it was thought that American influence, commerce and enterprise would
gradually prevail over wider and wider circles of Asia.

The aim of

the United States was to exert its efforts to holding on to the Manchurian key to American expansion in Asia.

This was a goal deemed

worth pursuing even at the risk of losing the friendship of Russia.
Brooks Adams had thought it worthwhile to compete for this "seat of
empire" despite the prospects that a military struggle with Russia
might ensue on the shores of the Yellow Seao

The McKinley administra-

tion, while never prepared to go to that extreme, was under serious
domestic political rressure to protect America's interests in Manchuria,
both actual and symbolic.

The promulgation of the first open door

notes was the result.
Since the promulgation of these first notes, the so-called
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open door policy has taken on a celebrated life of its own.

Frequently

cited as one of the bedrock foundations of American foreign policy, it
has been expanded and interpreted and applied to situations far removed
from Manchuria and China.

Historians

have differed greatly, first,

about what motivated the open door notes and, second, about whether
they successfully accomplished their purpose.

Tto!O viewpoints demonstrate

the degree of these differences, both with each other and the conclusions
of this study.
Concerning motivations, George Kennan has asserted that the
first open door notes represented principally the views of the Chinese
Imperial Maritime Customs Service and were "really aimed largely at
the British," who, it was feared, were ready to abandon their open
door policy in China.

John Hay, according to Kennan, probably never

understood the practical significance of the policy that he has been
credited with authoring.

William A. Williams, on the other hand,

believed that the open door policy grew out of national debate over the
proper tactics and strategy for American expansion.

To him, the policy

emanated from a coalition of businessmen, intellectuals and politicians,
who opposed colonialism, but advocated instead a policy of an "open
door through which America's preponderant

econo~ic

strength would enter

and dominate all underdeveloped areas of the world."S
The motivation behind the first open door notes was both broader
than the assessment of Kennan, and narrower than that of Williams.
John Hay and his associates were well aware of the significance of the
notes, although unable at the time to foresee all of the consequences
or the eventual sweep assigned by others to the policy.

The notes

were drafted in response to the particular threat to American interests

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

341
in Manchuria posed by the Russian advance.

The notes followed a

national debate concerning what the United States should do to halt
this advance.

By selecting and re-emphasizing the old concept of an

open door in Manchuria, Hay and his advisers were also probably seeking
a formula to facilitate America's own expansion into the region without
resorting to colonialism.

Despite the "new diplomacy" or the beginnings

of a "promotional state," however, nothing in the events leading up
to the first open door notes or in the process of drafting them indicates
that the state department or any coalition of interests intended to
craft a national blueprint designed to foster future American economic
expansion worldwide.
Kennan has judged the open door policy of the United States to
have been a failure.

The policy, in his view, has been mythologized

undeservedly as a triumph of American diplomacy.

In reality, the

United States has been unwilling to bolster the policy with any exercise
of force or to adhere to the policy within its own possessions.
has made a

co~pletely

Williams

opposing estimate of the policy's accomplishments.

To him, the open door policy was a "brilliant strategic stroke."

By

ending the debate between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists,
American energies could be channeled into the formation of an informal
empire.

This imperial anti-colonialism, based on the premises of an

open door policy, has "led to the gradual extension of American
economic and political power throughout the world."
Both Kennan and Williams have looked at the enunciation of the
first open door policy from the perspective that the notes were only
the beeinning of long process which is still ongoing.

From that

vantage point the actual motivations that stimulated the first expression
of the open door policy and the original purposes behind the notes
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are obscured by our current assessment of the open door policy as it
has been enlarged and re-shaped.
tack.

This study has taken a different

The promulgation of the first open door notes was viewed as

the last step in a long process, the culminating event in a long and
generally friendly relationship.

The notes had relatively limited

objectives and pertained only to a particular region during a specific
time frame.

In effect, the notes insisted that the United States be

dealt a hand in the play for the Manchurian stakes and not be excluded
from the table.

Certain Russian prerogatives within its sphere were

recognized, but limitations were set on the amount of discrimination
of American interests which would be tolerated.

Implicitly, the

notes demonstrated an increased American readiness to assume a more
active role in Asian affairs.

They were a realistic appraisal, at

long last, that American expansionist aims in Northeast Asia were not
going to be achieved through any kind of partnership with Russia, only
in the face of Russian competition.

The notes were also a frank

recognition of the true status of the Russo-American relationship.
Ambassador

Breckinrid~e

had, a few years earlier, called on the United

States to show "in some suitably marked way • • • conspicuous disapprobation of our relations with Russia."

This, too, was accomplished.

The

superficialities, to which the traditional friendship had been reduced,
were wiped clean.

Russia and the United States could, had they so

chosen, have entered the new century determined on a fresh start.
Instead, the United States for the next several years applied diplomatic
pressure to gain an open door in Manchuria and Russia as stubbornly
resisted, until the objectives of both protagonists were thwarted by
Japan.

In the final analysis, the United States never has gained its
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long sought foothold in Northeast Asia.
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